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Extant scholarship has mainly focused on assessing how battlefield conditions such as 
casualties and military stalemates affect the probability of peace settlements taking place during 
civil conflicts. However, there is a lack of scholarly work that probes other factors that might 
influence the decision to negotiate. I identify two broad classes of explanations that I expect 
influence a government’s decision to negotiate: behavioral and institutional explanations. In 
regards to behavioral explanations, I argue that rebels that are at least as popular as the civil war 
government pose a salient threat to the political survival of the incumbent, thereby increasing the 
costs of continued war and making negotiations more likely to occur. Moreover, the military 
costs of prosecuting the war and the costs involved for overseeing protests by supporters of the 
rebels become exorbitantly high in this political environment, which makes seeking a political 
solution to the war a more attractive choice for the incumbent. In terms of institutional 
explanations, I provide an assessment examining under what conditions the level of institutional 
consolidation of a regime and the strength of electoral institutions shape incentives for peace 
negotiations. I first argue that unconsolidated regimes have a number of institutional deficiencies 
that make the costs of continued war higher relative to consolidated regimes, which consequently 
increases incentives to negotiate with the non-state opposition. I then argue that regardless of the 
level of regime consolidation, electoral institutions, such as competitive elections, incentivize 
political leaders to hold peace negotiations only if the rebels are at least as popular as the state. 
iv 
Continued war essentially becomes a costly option for these leaders given that it will threaten the 
electoral success of the incumbent. Empirical results using a mixed-effects logistic regression 
and case studies suggest that institutional factors matter for negotiations, but the popularity of 
rebels relative to the government appears to play a nuanced role in the civil war government’s 
decision to negotiate. My project highlights the importance of understanding how certain 
characteristics of political regimes and relative popularity of rebel groups work together to create 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1. The Negotiation Puzzle  
In 2017, there were 48 armed conflicts taking place around the world between 
governments and violent opposition groups according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 
which monitors trends and dynamics in civil wars worldwide (Pettersson & Eck, 2018, p. 536). 
Close to 69,000 casualties occurred as a result of civil conflicts worldwide, with a large share of 
these deaths originating from ongoing conflicts in Syria (Pettersson & Eck, 2018, pp. 537- 538). 
The detrimental impacts of armed conflict are indisputable; conflicts cause casualties, immense 
suffering, destruction of economies, a breakdown of human and social development, and 
regional insecurity (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018).  
Given the devastating social, economic, and political implications of conflict, political 
solutions to armed conflicts fought between wartime adversaries (the government and rebel 
group1) have frequently been touted by international organizations dedicated to peace 
(Cunningham & Sawyer, 2019). However, not all civil wars experience peace negotiations and 
not all peace negotiations that do take place lead to any positive outcome, including a peace 
agreement. The leading explanation as to why parties to conflict engage in peace negotiations 
emanates from William Zartman’s (2001) ripeness theory. The theory maintains that civil war 
belligerents (the government and violent non-state opposition) enter into peace negotiations 
                                               
1 Rebel groups are defined as “Any non-governmental formally organised group of people having announced a name 
for their group and using armed force to influence the outcome of the stated incompatibility.” Source: UCDP (n.d.-
a). Definitions. Retrieved from http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/  
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when both perceive they have reached a military impasse in the conflict; continued fighting is 
not only pointless but also costly because neither side believes it has the military capacity to 
vanquish its opponent on the battlefield (Zartman, 2001, p. 8). However, not all cases of conflict 
conform to Zartman’s expectations. Peace negotiations have occurred in the absence of high 
military costs and military stalemates (Urlacher 2013, p. 178). The Mexican government called a 
ceasefire after only twelve days of fighting the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional 
(EZLN) rebel movement. Peace negotiations occurred nearly two months later, in February 
1994, despite the Mexican army maintaining military superiority over the insurgents (Edmonds-
Poli & Shirk, 2012, p. 198). Other cases also point to divergent experiences for civil wars. Since 
1989, dozens of rebel groups in Myanmar signed ceasefire agreements with the civil war 
government following decades of deadly conflict (Lee, 2016, p. 63). However, despite more than 
a decade of fighting the Sendero Luminoso and the Túpac Amaru Movement, the Peruvian state 
opted to maintain its strict military strategy (despite the mounting civilian casualties) against 
both groups rather than attempt peace talks (Burt, 2007).  
This project probes other factors expected to shape incentives for negotiations. I identify 
two broad classes of explanations that I expect to influence a government’s decision to negotiate: 
behavioral and institutional explanations. With regard to behavioral explanations, I assess how 
the popularity of rebels relative to the government affects incentives to negotiate. There is a lack 
of studies that assess how public opinion regarding the rebels (including their objectives) shapes 
incentives for negotiations. Second, there is a lack of scholarly work examining how 
characteristics of a country’s political regime shape the decision of the government to negotiate, 
including an evaluation of behavioral factors that may modify the relationship between political 
regime characteristics and negotiations. As such, my research diverges from most studies that 
3 
focus heavily on assessing how contextual battlefield factors, such as wartime duration and 
battlefield deaths, affect the decision to fight or settle. Moreover, my research seeks to contribute 
to theory building by better understanding the causal mechanisms that lead to peace negotiations 
during civil war.  
1.2. Main Argument 
I argue that behavioral and institutional explanations influence incentives for political 
incumbents holding office to engage in peace negotiations with the non-state opposition during 
civil war. In terms of behavioral explanations, I argue that negotiations are more likely to occur 
when the rebels are at least as popular as the civil war government. Building on Lieberfeld 
(1999) and Mason (2004), I expect that under such a political environment, the rebels and their 
sympathizers from the population make the military and financial costs of prosecuting the armed 
conflict too steep for the civil war government. Finally, the civil war government faces salient 
political risks of being forced out of office, such as by a coup, for not addressing the demands of 
the rebels, which makes ending the civil war a more attractive choice for the incumbent than 
continued war (Lieberfeld, 1999).  
In terms of institutional explanations, I provide an assessment examining under what 
conditions the following two characteristics of a state’s political regime affect the decision-
making calculus of the civil war government to negotiate rather than fight: 1) the level of 
institutional consolidation of a political regime, and 2) the strength of electoral institutions. 
Unconsolidated regimes are regimes that have nascent and underdeveloped rules regarding the 
allocation of political power and decision-making as well as poorly developed public policies. 
These are political regimes that have yet to develop complete, effective, robust, and self-
enforcing institutions regarding the allocation of political power (Weingast, 1997; Jackman, 
1993). Leaders presiding over unconsolidated regimes have also yet to implement the regime’s 
4 
policies fully and effectively and promote the regime’s norms and ideologies domestically 
(Göbel, 2011). These leaders have a greater need to focus on building their regime’s stability and 
perception of a mature and functioning state rather than fighting costly wars. Resources are 
better allocated toward developing institutional rules and solidfying the regime’s policies than 
fighting if their leaders want to promote the durability of the regime. The high opportunity cost 
of fighting for unconsolidated regimes makes political incumbents more likely to try and settle 
the conflict. Moreover, the benefits of reducing violence, including ending armed conflicts, are 
high given that they allow the incumbent to secure recognition and international assistance 
(Stanton, 2016).  
Second, I argue that stronger electoral institutions, such as competitive elections, should 
increase the costs of continued war only if the rebels are at least as popular as the civil war 
government. Because electoral institutions increase the sensitivity of leaders to unpopular 
wartime policies (Stanton, 2016), I argue that stronger electoral institutions should only have an 
effect on the incumbent’s decision to negotiate when the rebels enjoy enough popular support 
that may threaten the political survival of the incumbent. Consequently, I argue that stronger 
electoral institutions alone do not have an effect on the decision to negotiate but rather only have 
an effect when conditioned by the degree of popular support for the rebels relative to the 
government. Hence, I argue that regardless of the level of regime consolidation, stronger 
electoral institutions incentivize the incumbent to hold peace negotiations only when the rebels 
are at least as popular as the civil war government. Under this political environment, there is a 
realistic chance that the incumbent could be ousted from public office for not considering the 
demands of the rebels. High domestic political costs in the form of fears of political defeat in 
upcoming elections motivate leaders that face elections to engage in peace negotiations with 
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popular rebel groups (Lieberfeld, 1999) even in the absence of a military stalemate or high 
military costs.  
1.3. Research Questions  
The following are the research questions this project intends to answer: 
1) Are peace negotiations more likely to occur when the rebels are at least as popular as 
the civil war government?  
2) Are unconsolidated regimes more likely than consolidated regimes to engage in peace 
negotiations during civil wars? 
3) Do electoral institutions alone affect the probability of peace negotiations taking 
place during civil wars? 
4) Regardless of the degree of regime consolidation, do stronger electoral institutions 
increase the probability of peace negotiations when the rebels are at least as popular 
as the state? 
1.4. Goal of Dissertation  
To answer the research questions put forth in this project, I leverage a mixed-methods 
research design. I first undertake a large-N empirical study to test a series of hypotheses 
emanating from my theoretical expectations. I use a multi-level logistic regression using data 
from Ogutcu-Fu (2016) that cover peace negotiations that took place from 1980 to 2005 between 
dyads engaged in armed conflict worldwide.  
I complement my empirical design with a qualitative component to better understand the 
casual mechanisms by which institutional and behavioral factors affect the civil war 
government’s decision to engage in peace negotiations with the non-state opposition. Two sets of 
qualitative studies are undertaken as part of this project: (i) a within-case analysis focusing on 
the Indonesian experience with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), and ii) a comparative case 
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analysis focusing on the Mexican state’s experience with the Zapatista Army of National 
Liberation (EZLN) rebel movement and the Peruvian state’s experience with the Túpac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement and the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) rebel groups.  
The qualitative component leverages a rich source of pre-existing primary sources, 
including statements, speeches, interviews, autobiographies, memoires, diaries, and videos to 
help elucidate on causal mechanisms and to bolster causal arguments advanced in the theory 
section of this project. I leverage nearly ninety publicly available statements made by 
government leaders including presidents, rebel members, military elites, mediators, citizens, and 
journalists to better understand why civil war governments decide to negotiate during armed 
conflict with the violent opposition. To my knowledge, no work to date has been done that 
employs a comparative case analysis approach to examine how institutional or behavioral 
variables influence the onset of peace talks during active civil wars.  
1.5. Definitions of Key Terms and Concepts  
This research uses concepts, language, and terms related to civil wars and conflict 
resolution that will be used regularly throughout this paper. This section provides the definitions 
and descriptions of these terms and concepts.  
1.5.1. Civil Wars 
This research project focuses on the determinants of peace negotiations in the context of 
civil wars. In this paper, armed conflict, civil conflict, and civil war have the same definition. 
There is, however, no agreed upon definition of a civil war in the conflict resolution literature. A 
widely used definition of armed conflict comes from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(UCDP), which provides data on trends in civil wars worldwide. According to the UCDP’s 
definition: 
7 
An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or 
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year 
(UCDP, n.d.-a).  
 
In this paper, I focus on armed conflict between the following dyad: the civil war 
government (a state actor) and a rebel group (a non-state actor). For the purposes of this paper, 
the terms violent non-state opposition, insurgent group, and rebel group mean the same thing. A 
violent non-state actor is defined as a group that uses armed violence directed against the 
government (or government property) in an attempt to induce political change (UCDP, n.d.-a). 
Civil conflicts necessarily center on concerns about the political legitimacy of the ruling 
government. In fact, during civil wars, the government’s political legitimacy is being contested 
internally, at least by those who are actively fighting the government (Zartman, 1995). During 
civil wars, the government and the violent non-state opposition engage in a bloody confrontation. 
A rebel group might be fighting to control the government or demanding full control over 
territory within a state. In the latter case, a non-state opposition is fighting the government for the 
right to secede territorially from the remainder of the state (UCDP, n.d.-a). In the former case, 
the rebel group is fighting to usurp from power the political elites controlling the central 
government. The legitimacy of the government may also be contested by civilians and other 
actors in society who lend their support to the political and ideological objectives of the violent 
opposition (Schlichte & Schneckener, 2015).   
1.5.2. Peace Negotiations  
Broadly speaking, peace negotiations are the political strategies undertaken by parties to 
conflict (government and rebel group) that aim to resolve the underlying causes of the armed 
conflict. Peace negotiations involve discussions that center on finding ways to end the civil war; 
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successful negotiations often lead to peace settlements2 that lay the conditions for peace between 
belligerents (Ogutcu-Fu, 2016, p. 409). Peace negotiations may involve more than one rebel 
group (Nilsson, 2008). However, for the purposes of this paper, I am concerned with whether or 
not a certain dyad engages in peace negotiations during civil war.  
Peace negotiations aimed at finding a solution to the war are necessarily considered a 
second-best alternative to outright military victory but better than an outright military loss 
(Zartman, 1995; Mason, Weingarten, & Fett, 1999). The government prefers to maintain total 
political control of the state and total control of its territories. Similarly, the rebels aim to control 
the state (if they are fighting wars concerning control over the central government) and control of 
territories under contestation (if they are fighting wars concerning control over a territory) (see 
UCDP, n.d.-a). The worst outcome for the government (rebels) is when the rebels (government) 
win militarily. Expectedly, the best outcome for the government (rebels) is when the rebels 
(government) lose militarily. The second best outcome is a peace settlement (Zartman, 1995; 
Mason, Weingarten, & Fett, 1999). Under a peace settlement, both wartime adversaries still 
maintain some form of political power (Zartman, 1995; Mason, Weingarten, & Fett, 1999; 
Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003).  
Not all civil conflicts experience peace negotiations (Bapat, 2005; Urlacher, 2011; 
Ogutcu-Fu, 2016). Even when peace talks do take place, battlefield fighting tends to continue, 
given that both sides find it risky to completely lay down their arms as they try to work out a 
political deal (Duyvesteyn & Schuurman, 2011). Peace negotiations hence tend to be part of a 
bilateral strategy that include both the continued use of military fighting and the use of peace 
                                               
2 I treat “negotiated settlement,” “peace settlement,” and “peace agreement” as having the same meaning in this 
dissertation. 
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negotiations aimed at resolving the war. As an example, during the civil war between the 
Indonesian state and the Free Aceh Rebel Movement (GAM) (a separatist movement vying for 
an independent Aceh), the Indonesian government under President Megawati continued to attack 
the rebels’ base in North Aceh in 2002 while simultaneously engaging in peace negotiations with 
the rebels (Schulze, 2004, p. 44). Throughout 2002, the government dispatched nearly 30,000 
security personnel to Aceh (Human Rights Watch, 2003, p. 12).  
Even though the violent opposition during civil war is contesting the legitimacy of the 
government, the latter still wields greater military power, allowing the incumbent in the central 
government to decide the “rules of the game,” including if and when to negotiate (Zartman, 
1995, p. 8). Political elites in Jakarta have often rebuffed the Free Papua Movement’s requests to 
meet at the negotiating table to resolve the separatist conflict (Ondawame, 2000, p. 211). Instead, 
the Indonesian government under Suharto opted for a strict military approach in dealing with the 
rebels (Human Rights Watch, 2007, p. 11). In contrast, the government of Nicaragua carefully 
considered, and eventually accepted, the Sandinistas’ request for peace negotiations after several 
years of bloody fighting (Kinzer, 1983). In this dissertation, I expect insurgents to be willing to 
enter into peace talks with the civil war government in general (Cunningham & Sawyer, 2016). 
First, rebel groups are often in a position of military inferiority relative to the government; during 
the beginning of the civil war, the odds of defeating the rebels is the highest for the incumbent 
government (see Akcinaroglu, 2012, p. 880; Zartman, 1995). Given that peace negotiations are 
necessarily preferred to an outright military loss, rebel groups should be willing to at least try to 
secure a slice of political power. Second, rebel groups that seek to either oust the government or 
push for secession or autonomy often claim they will provide policies that will improve the 
political and economic rights of citizens they purport to represent (Cunningham & Sawyer, 2016, 
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p. 6). Consequently, engaging in peace negotiations provides rebel groups the opportunity to 
exhibit their benevolence to their constituents and to possibly achieve some of their goals 
(Cunningham & Sawyer, 2016, p. 6).  
Before parties to conflict commence formal negotiations aimed at ending the war, leaders 
or representatives sent on behalf of the civil war government and the rebel group generally first 
meet to set the protocols for formal peace negotiations. These initial negotiations provide each 
side with the ability to express commitments to resolving the war, set rules for future peace talks, 
develop schedules, decide on topics for discussion (and not for discussion), and decide if any 
external actors will participate in the future talks, such as mediators, civil society organizations, 
and representatives from other countries and international organizations (Fisas, 2016, p. 7).  
Following the exploratory negotiations, adversaries to war can proceed to more formal 
peace negotiations aimed at more thoroughly addressing the underlying incompatibilities of the 
civil war (Ogutcu-Fu, 2016, p. 409). A critical component of this stage is that representatives 
from both the government and rebel organization must be present and engage in face-to-face 
discussions with one another at the negotiating table (Ogutcu-Fu, 2016). These formal 
negotiations are sometimes mediated by external actors, including government representatives 
from other countries or non-governmental organizations. In other cases, peace negotiations are 
conducted between wartime adversaries without external involvement. Representatives from the 
government of India mediated the peace process between the civil war government of Sri Lanka 
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) separatist group (Biswas, 2006). In 
Bangladesh, peace negotiations between the civil war government and rebels fighting for 
autonomy in the Chittagong region took place without any external mediation (Chowdhury, 
2002).  
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Although peace negotiations can cover an array of topics, the goal of these peace 
negotiations is to find solutions to successfully terminate the conflict. During these peace 
negotiations, wartime adversaries seek ways to end the conflict via peace agreements, with each 
side trying to relinquish as few concessions to the opposing party as possible (Pearson, 2011, p. 
46). The ruling government necessarily prefers to grant very few political concessions to the 
rebel group. Expectedly, the rebels aim to extract as many political concessions as possible from 
the government. Each side to conflict has a “target” point, which is defined as their desired 
outcome (Galin, 2016, p. 92). A peace settlement that contains concessions that fall below a 
party’s “resistance point” refers to offers that are unacceptable to a party to conflict (Galin, 2016, 
p. 92). During peace negotiations, each party at the negotiating table aims to reach a peace 
settlement that is as close as possible to its own “target” and hence closer to the opposing party’s 
“resistance point” (Galin, 2016, p. 92).  
1.6. Value-Added of the Research  
This research project has academic and policy value. First the academic contributions of 
this project will be discussed followed by the policy implications of this research.  
1.6.1. Academic Contribution  
First, from an academic perspective, this research project focuses on understanding 
predictors of peace negotiations during armed conflict. The scholarship on civil wars has mainly 
focused on examining the predictors of: armed conflict (see Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & 
Gleditsch, 2001), conflict duration (see Fearon, 2004), and peace after the end of armed conflict 
(see Hartzell, Hoddie, & Rothchild, 2001). There is a lack of a systematic inquiry on when and 
why peace negotiations occur in the first place between wartime belligerents. To this end, this 
research project aims to provide a more thorough assessment of the determinants of peace 
negotiations.  
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Second, this research probes how behavioral and institutional factors influence 
negotiations. The majority of studies in the peace negotiations literature focus on assessing how 
the fighting capacity of wartime adversaries affect the decision to strike a peace deal (see 
Hultquist, 2013). Little is known about how other factors, such as behavioral and institutional 
factors, influence the decision to negotiate. Only recently have scholars begun to focus attention 
on how other factors apart from battlefield conditions affect strategies adopted by wartime 
adversaries during armed conflict, including the decision to meet and find a political solution to 
the conflict (see, for instance, Urlacher, 2011; Biswas, 2006; Ogutcu-Fu, 2016). It is within this 
context in which I build on the scholarship focused on other determinants of peace processes. 
This project can also help promote synergies with other research that assesses the effects of 
behavioral and institutional factors on other conflict dynamics and outcomes, including the 
brutality of the war (Stanton, 2016), duration of the war (Thyne, 2012; Uzoyni & Wells, 2016), 
reaching of a peace agreement (Ogutcu-Fu, 2016; Biswas, 2006), and the success of a peace 
agreement (Urlacher, 2011).  
Third, there is a dearth of studies that take into consideration interactive effects. The 
small scholarship that does exist looks at the effect of institutional and behavioral variables 
separately. In this research, I provide arguments as to why I expect the popularity of the rebels 
relative to the government to moderate the relationship between electoral institutions and peace 
negotiations. By taking into consideration interactive effects, my research intends to provide an 
accurate understanding of when certain institutional variables impact negotiation outcomes.  
Finally, this research exploits the strengths of both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches to provide a thorough assessment of how behavioral and institutional factors affect 
the decision to negotiate. The qualitative component helps shed light on the causal mechanisms 
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that produce negotiation outcomes while the qualitative aspect can assist in assessing the 
robustness of theories and elucidating on the casual mechanisms at play between variables 
(Gerring, 2007). In this project, I leverage statements made by members of civil war 
governments and rebel groups to better understand when and why negotiations take place during 
wars (and when they do not). To my knowledge, no work to date has been done that uses a 
comparative case analysis approach to examine research questions related to how behavioral and 
institutional factors affect the onset of peace negotiations. 
1.6.2. Policy Contribution  
In 2016, armed conflicts cost nearly 12% of the global gross domestic product (GDP) 
(Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018, p. 3). Although preventing civil wars from occurring in 
the first place is the ideal solution, peace negotiations are the first step that bring wartime 
adversaries together and are intended to facilitate an end to the war, thereby preventing further 
losses to life. Predictably, without peace negotiations, parties to conflict cannot settle their 
differences. If policymakers can thoroughly understand the factors that jumpstart the peace 
process, they are more likely to increase the probability that civil wars can terminate. However, 
understanding the factors that influence the occurrence of peace processes requires a solid 
foundation rooted in rigorous research.  
This research project serves as an endeavor to understand more thoroughly the 
determinants of peace processes during civil wars. Historically, peace processes have not figured 
prominently in the policy toolkits of governments engaged in war prior to the Cold War period 
(Human Security Centre, 2006, p. 18). Following the end of the Cold War, international non-
governmental organizations focused their efforts on mainstreaming norms of human security, 
human rights, and peace in conflict-affected countries (Human Security Centre, 2006, p. 19; 
Westendorf, 2015, p. 1; Bell & O'Rourke 2010). This change in the international landscape has 
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led to a significant shift in conflict terminations patterns: in the 1990s, 65% of civil wars ended 
with peace agreements; for comparative purposes, negotiated settlements were a rarity during the 
Cold War period (Human Security Centre, 2006, p. 19). Both domestic and international 
policymakers alike can benefit from understanding more thoroughly the drivers of peace 
processes. Overall, the findings emanating from this research have important implications for 
policymakers seeking to better understand why peace processes occur during conflict.  
1.7. Outline of Research Project  
This study proceeds as follows:  
• Chapter 2 provides a survey of the extant literature, highlighting key theoretical 
and empirical gaps to lay the foundation for the theoretical arguments made in 
this project.  
• Chapter 3 provides the theoretical framework and proposes a set of hypotheses 
that will be evaluated in subsequent empirical and qualitative chapters.  
•  Chapter 4 lays out the research design of the study. 
•  Chapter 5 provides the empirical analysis that tests a series of hypotheses 
emanating from the theoretical expectations. 
•  Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 supplement the empirical analysis with case studies to 
probe more thoroughly the causal mechanisms that affect the civil war 
government’s decision to negotiate.  
•  Chapter 8 of the project provides a summary of this research project, including 
the academic and policy implications emanating from the research, and provides 







CHAPTER 2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction  
In the peace negotiations literature, the bulk of the research focuses on assessing how the 
military capacities of wartime adversaries and battlefield conditions affect prospects for peace 
settlements (see Zartman, 1995; Salla, 1997; Mooradian & Druckman, 1999). Even then, most of 
this literature is qualitative and practitioner-based. Contextual wartime factors (including 
battlefield deaths, duration of conflict, and strength of wartime adversaries), though important, 
only paint a partial picture of why peace negotiations occur during conflict. Given this limitation, 
a research agenda has recently emerged that probes how other factors might influence conflict 
dynamics, including the occurrence of negotiations during civil wars (see Ogutcu-Fu, 2016; 
Urlacher, 2011, 2013).  
The following section will assess the state of the scholarship on conflict resolution and 
identify lacunas in the literature that prevent us from fully understanding determinants of peace 
negotiations between wartime adversaries.  
2.2. Existing Theories 
Ripeness theory remains a popular and central theory in explaining why civil war 
governments and rebel groups seek a peace settlement during civil wars (Zartman, 1995; 2008). 
The theory derives its momentum from contextual battlefield factors. During civil wars, wartime 
adversaries obtain critical information regarding their opponents’ military strength (i.e., number 
of troops and/or weapons) that may have not been known prior to the beginning of war. A side 
that is militarily superior to the other stands a stronger chance of winning the war and, rationally, 
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should continue to fight to secure a military victory. If relative military capacity changes during 
the war, each side evaluates the benefits of continued fighting versus alternatives courses of 
actions, including settling the war at the negotiating table (Zartman, 1995, 2001, 2008). A 
military stalemate, by definition, occurs when neither side believes it can win militarily 
(Zartman, 2001, p. 8). When there is a stalemate, according to Zartman (1995), “both parties lose 
faith in their chances of winning and see an opportunity for cutting losses and achieving 
satisfaction through accommodation” (p. 18). Further fighting, Zartman continues, in such a 
stalemate condition becomes too “painful” for both parties (Zartman, 2001, p. 8). This “painful 
deadlock” varies across wartime adversaries, but may include “a bloody standoff that suddenly 
brings costs home, a loss of foreign support or an increase in foreign pressure” (Zartman, 1995, 
p. 18). Future fighting is not only worthless but also costly (Zartman, 1995, 2001, 2008).  
Although stalemates and perceptions of some sort of pain are expected to drive wartime 
belligerents to settle, they do not necessarily lead to a successful political deal. Zartman (2001) 
maintains that a “Mutually Enticing Opportunity” (“MEO”) is required to reach a peace 
agreement and for a durable peace (p. 14). Although the exact nature of these “MEOs” is 
unclear, Zartman (2001) describes that they must provide the wartime adversaries with a better 
political outlook in any post-war environment (p. 14).  
The scholarship that assesses the soundness and validity of Zartman’s theory is largely 
qualitative in nature and dominated by case studies (O’Kane, 2006; Amer, 2007; Pruitt, 2007; 
Salla, 1997). In general, there is a lack of consensus of how to best capture the mutually hurting 
stalemate condition during wartime fighting. Even then, different proxies for the mutually 
hurting stalemate condition have led to different findings in the scholarship, with implications for 
the soundness of ripeness theory. O’Kane (2006) finds that the government of the United 
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Kingdom initiated peace negotiations roughly 20 years after wartime fighting with the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA), even though most of the wartime costs in terms of human lives lost 
occurred in the early 1970s (almost 500 people had lost their lives in the civil war in the year 
1972 alone) (pp. 275-276). Salla (1997) finds that despite exorbitant human and military costs 
suffered by the government under Suharto, peace negotiations with the East Timor insurgents did 
not transpire (p. 450). Rothstein (2007) also points out that the Israeli government began peace 
negotiations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) even though the latter wielded a 
much stronger military.  
2.2.1. Empirical Studies on Conflict Costs, Peace Negotiations, and Settlements 
Relative to the qualitative literature assessing the explanatory power of ripeness theory, 
only a handful of empirical studies exists that consider the effect of costly conflicts on peace 
negotiations (see Ogutcu-Fu, 2016; Urlacher, 2011). Civil war scholars have used indicators such 
as the duration of fighting, relative military strength, the extent of territory under the control of 
rebels, and battlefield deaths to proxy for the stalemate condition and costly conflicts (Hultquist, 
2013; Kaplow, 2016; Urlacher, 2011; Ogutcu-Fu, 2016; Mason, Weingarten, & Fett, 1999). 
 Similar to the qualitative literature, there are a number of limitations in the empirical 
scholarship: (i) inconsistent findings across indicators, (ii) lack of a thorough investigation and 
theory building stemming from the inconsistent findings, and (iii) lack of empirical work 
assessing the differential effects of each of the aforementioned wartime indicators for costly 
conflicts and military stalemates on peace negotiations attempts during civil war. Only a handful 
of empirical studies assess the effect of conflict duration on peace negotiations, and these 
findings are mixed. A few scholars find that lengthier conflicts are more likely to witness peace 
negotiation attempts (see Urlacher, 2011; Ryckman & Braithwaite, 2017; Thomas, 2012). 
Ogutcu-Fu (2016) concludes that lengthier wars have no meaningful effect on the occurrence of 
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peace negotiations during armed conflict, however she does find that lengthier conflicts are less 
likely to end in negotiated settlements, a finding that casts doubt on the soundness of ripeness 
theory.  
A number of scholars find that civil wars governments are more likely to engage in peace 
negotiations when faced with rebels that are at least as strong militarily as the government (see 
Thomas, 2012; Ryckman & Braithwaite, 2017; Ogutcu-Fu, 2016). Although military parity 
might approximate for a stalemate condition, negotiations may be used as a strategy by the 
government to prevent an impending military defeat by the rebels (Thomas, 2012, p. 11; 
Hultquist, 2013) or to prevent an exhaustive and outright costly war from taking place 
(Lounsbery & Cook, 2015, p. 246).  
Some studies find that deadlier conflicts (as captured by the number of battlefield 
casualties) are more likely to experience peace negotiations take place between wartime 
adversaries (Urlacher, 2011; Ogutcu-Fu, 2016; Mooradian & Druckman, 1999). However, 
Ryckman & Braithwaite (2017) find no evidence that wartime adversaries are more likely to 
launch peace negotiations in deadlier conflicts. 
In the literature that focuses on peace settlement outcomes, results are also mixed across 
the indicators. Overall, less attention has been given to understanding whether indicators of 
costly conflicts exert the same (or different) effects on the reaching of a peace settlement 
following peace negotiations (see Ogutcu-Fu, 2016). Only a handful of scholars have taken into 
consideration the distinct and sequential stages of the process of civil war termination, including 
the decision to enter into peace negotiations and the decision to sign a peace settlement following 
peace negotiations (Ogutcu-Fu, 2016; Kaplow, 2016).  
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In the literature assessing the effects of conflict duration on negotiated settlements, the 
results are mixed. Hultquist (2013) finds that conflict duration has no statistically signficant 
effect on the reaching of a peace deal or ceasefire. Thomas (2012) also finds no evidence that 
civil war governments are more likely to grant more political deals with insurgents following 
lengthier wars in Africa. Mason, Weingarten, and Fett (1999) find that peace settlements tend to 
follow lengthier conflicts. However, DeRouen and Sobek (2004) find evidence that lengthier 
wars are less likely to end in peace agreements. Some research finds that negotiated settlements 
are more likely to occur in conflicts involving militarily powerful insurgents (see Gent, 2011; 
Hultquist, 2013; Thomas, 2012).  
2.2.2. Moving Forward  
The theoretical argument of ripeness theory faces several limitations. O’Kane (2006) 
maintains, “Zartman argues that whilst objective indicators can be useful in helping an MHS to 
be identified, it is the subjective perception of an MHS by the parties themselves that is the key. 
It is this dimension that is so hard to identify” (p. 276). More so, the theory fails to adequately 
explicate what types of discomfort during a stalemate are necessary for peace negotiations. 
Although military costs may play a leading role in the decision to settle the conflict, other costs 
are also likely to be important drivers that can make it painful for belligerents to continue war, 
including economic costs of continued war (particularly for the government) and mounting 
battlefield deaths. Second and related, it is not clear whether certain types of “pain” (Zartman, 
2001, p. 8) on average matter more for insurgents than the governments and vice versa. Finally, 
the theory is not able to explain why, in some cases, the civil war government has attempted 
peace negotiations with poorly armed rebel groups, particularly in the absence of a military 
stalemate (Urlacher, 2013).  
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A number of scholars have considered other factors apart from battlefield conditions that 
might encourage peace negotiations during active civil war (see Ogutcu-Fu, 2016; Urlacher, 
2011; Walter, 2003; Biswas, 2006; Ryckman & Braithwaite, 2017). On the rebel side, the 
research is very limited due in part to the reliability of data on rebel characteristics. The 
institutional features of rebel groups have generally not been a central focus in the peace 
negotiations literature, but recent work suggests that they have important effects on the onset of 
negotiations during armed conflict (see Ogutcu-Fu, 2016; Thomas, 2012).  
2.3. Rebel Characteristics and Conflict Dynamics  
Until recently, the characteristics of rebel groups have not been a key focus in the 
scholarship. Part of the problem has been a heavy reliance on the “unitary actor assumption,” in 
which the rebel group is viewed as a singular actor fighting the state (Cunningham, 2011, p. 
295). The second part of the problem is due to data limitations. However, several datasets have 
been developed in recent years that provide information on the institutional and organizational 
aspects of insurgent groups (see, for instance, Heger & Jung, 2017).  
Although the literature is still in its infancy, a growing number of scholars assess the 
relationship between the cohesiveness of rebel groups and conflict outcomes (see Cunningham, 
2011; Krause, 2014, Bakke, Cunningham, & Seymour, 2012a; Cunningham, Bakke, & Seymour, 
2012b). Some scholars maintain that rebel groups that are more cohesive are less likely to suffer 
from defection problems, which increases the chance that the civil war government may view 
such groups as a reliable negotiating partner (Krause, 2014). Cunningham (2011), however, finds 
that the civil war government is more likely to offer non-cohesive rebel groups peace deals in a 
strategy to alleviate some of the sources of opposition to the regime—including those posed by 
less radical members of the opposition—and hence the war burden of the state.  
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Apart from the few studies focusing on fragmentation, some work assesses the effect of 
political characteristics of rebel groups on conflict length (Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 
2009; Wucherpfennig, Metternich, Cederman, & Gleditsch, 2012). Of the few studies that exist, 
there appears to be a consensus that rebel groups that possess political branches permitted to 
operate by the state are more likely to experience shorter armed conflicts (Wucherpfennig, 
Metternich, Cederman, & Gleditsch, 2012; Uzonyi & Wells, 2016; Cunningham, Gleditsch, & 
Salehyan, 2009).  
Much less attention has been given to understanding how characteristics of rebel groups, 
apart from their military strength, affect the onset of peace negotiations. Kaplow (2016) is one of 
the few civil war scholars who provides an explicit theoretical framework for understanding how 
organizational and institutional characteristics of rebel groups affect prospects for peace 
negotiations during armed conflict. Using a cost-benefit lens, Kaplow maintains that both rebel 
groups and governments take into consideration direct and indirect costs and benefits for 
engaging in peace talks during war. He also predicts that civil war governments are more 
inclined to negotiate with rebel groups that have strong internal unity, which is expected to 
increase the probability that group members adhere to the terms of any political deal. Kaplow 
(2016) further argues that the perceived legitimacy of the rebel groups’ objectives factors into the 
political costs of not negotiating. Civil war governments are expected to offer peace negotiations 
to rebels that enjoy domestic and international support. Moreover, Kaplow predicts that 
governments face high political costs for offering negotiations to a rebel group when there exist 
non-violent groups in society that have grievances against the state. Offers to a rebel group might 
encourage these non-violent groups to take up arms and resort to violence against the state to 
achieve political goals, thereby increasing the government’s costs of negotiating (Kaplow, 2016). 
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Although Kaplow fails to find evidence that cohesive insurgent organizations are more likely to 
engage in peace negotiations with the civil war government, he does find evidence that civil war 
governments are more likely to attempt peace negotiations when faced with insurgent groups that 
enjoy both domestic and international support. Kaplow also finds evidence that civil war 
governments are less likely to attempt peace negotiations when simultaneously dealing with non-
violent groups which may in the future use violence against the state. His research however is 
restricted to North Africa and the Middle East, which reduces the generalizability of his study 
(Kaplow, 2016). 
Finally, Ogutcu-Fu (2016) is one of the few scholars who assess how institutional and 
behavioral characteristics of rebel groups affect prospects for peace negotiations and peace 
settlements following peace talks. Although Ogutcu-Fu (2016) does not find evidence that rebel 
groups that enjoy popular support are more likely to experience peace negotiations, she does find 
evidence that popular rebel groups are more likely to sign political settlements with the state. 
Ogutcu-Fu (2016) also finds that rebel groups that are more cohesive are more likely to enter into 
peace negotiations and to secure a peace agreement following peace talks.  
2.4. Literature on the Institutional Characteristics of States and Conflict Dynamics  
Unlike the literature focusing on rebel characteristics, there is a sizeable literature that 
assesses the institutional characteristics of states and governments on conflict outcomes. Scholars 
have mostly focused on the type of political regime in their analysis, assessing the effects of 
democracy on conflict outbreak (Hegre et al., 2001), conflict duration (Lyall, 2010), and the 
duration of peace (Hartzell, Hoddie, & Rothchild, 2001; Mattes & Savun, 2009). Research 
focusing on the political drivers of peace negotiations, however, dwarfs in comparison. Only a 
few scholars examine how political features of the state, including regime characteristics, 
influence negotiation attempts during active civil wars (see Biswas, 2006; Urlacher, 2011, 2013).  
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2.4.1. Regime Type and Civil War Outbreak  
The extant scholarship has devoted a great deal of attention to assessing the effects of 
political regimes on the occurrence of armed conflict (see Hegre et al., 2001; Cederman, Hug, & 
Krebs, 2010; Regan & Bell, 2010; Reynal-Querol, 2002a, 2002b; Reynal-Querol, 2005). Indeed, 
political regimes are perhaps the most scrutinized political feature of the state in the literature. 
 A growing number of civil war scholars find a curvilinear relationship between 
democracy and civil war risk, in which highly democratic countries and highly authoritarian 
countries are less likely to experience a civil war than countries with intermediate levels of 
democracy (known as anocracies or semi-democracies) (see Hegre et al., 2001; Reynal-Querol, 
2002b; Regan & Bell, 2010). The combination of democratic and authoritarian features in 
anocratic political regimes has frequently been implicated as the driver for civil war outbreak by 
a number of scholars (Hegre et al., 2001). Although semi-democratic countries may permit 
opposition parties to run for office or allow the media to function, the government still engages 
in autocratic practices, including suppressing minority rights with the use of force or stacking 
electoral votes in favor of the ruling incumbent. Resentment against the regime is brewed as a 
result of these institutional features; the ability to protest against the regime and the 
government’s simultaneous use of autocratic practices provide the impetus for civil war (Hegre 
et al., 2001, p. 33). Unlike their anocratic counterparts, highly authoritarian and democratic 
governments have institutional mechanisms to effectively avert rebellion from breaking out in 
the first place. In strong authoritarian countries, fortified security institutions prevent non-violent 
dissent from turning violent. In highly democratic governments, leaders provide institutional 
channels to citizens (including participation in electoral politics) to address their grievances, 
which in turn reduces the probability of armed conflicts breaking out (Hegre et al., 2001; Muller 
& Weede, 1990, p. 646).  
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However, Vreeland (2008) questions whether armed conflicts are more likely to occur 
under anocracies than other regime types. Vreeland (2008) finds that the Polity score that is used 
to capture a country’s level of democracy contains a component that includes civil war violence, 
thereby obscuring the true effect of anocracies on the outcome variable (p. 402). When this is 
corrected, Vreeland (2008) finds that the effect of anocracies on civil war outbreak disappears (p. 
402). 
A minority of civil wars scholars do find differences between the outbreak of armed 
conflict under authoritarian governments and democratic governments. Elbawadi and Sambanis 
(2000) find that democracy helps avert armed conflict. Getmansy (2012) also finds that 
democracies are less likely to experience episodes of armed conflict than their autocratic 
counterparts, a finding that she attributes to the delivery of public goods and services under 
elected leaders, which help promote satisfaction toward the regime (p. 711). However, Hegre and 
colleagues (2001) find no evidence that very democratic governments are more likely than their 
very authoritarian counterparts to experience conflict (p. 42).  
Rather than focusing exclusively on the level of democracy, Regan and Bell (2010) and 
Hegre and colleagues (2001) find that the transitional aspect of regime change (changes toward 
a more autocratic form of government) is a predictor of armed conflict. Regan and Bell (2010) 
argue that rebellion ensues because citizens fear they will lose their access and participation in 
democratic institutions (including political participation) under the coming new political order, 
which intends to grant the executive the monopoly of decision-making power (p. 750).  
2.4.2. Regime Type and Conflict Duration  
Unlike in the literature focusing on the determinants of civil war outbreak, only a few 
scholars evaluate the relationship between political regime type and the length of armed conflict 
(see, for instance, Lyall, 2010; Fearon, 2004). One camp of scholars maintains that democratic 
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governments during conflict should be more open to compromise and ending civil wars given 
that they provide institutions for addressing and resolving grievances via political channels and 
accommodating minority rights (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Fearon, 2004; Biswas, 2006). However, 
Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce (2008) argue that democratic governments are more likely 
to suffer reputational costs if they reward groups that engage in undemocratic behaviors (i.e., 
using violence) with concessions. Consequently, maintaining a strict military approach against 
groups that employ violence remains the only choice for these regimes (Balch-Lindsay, 
Enterline, & Joyce, 2008, p. 353).  
Among studies that assess the effect of political regime type on the length of civil wars, 
the results have been mixed. Some research finds that democracies tend to be involved in 
lengthier conflicts (see Cunningham et al., 2009; Wucherpfennig, Metternich, Cederman, & 
Gleditsch, 2012). A few other scholars do not find any convincing evidence that political regimes 
exert a meaningful effect on the length of armed conflict (Fearon, 2004; Lyall, 2010; Getmanksy, 
2012; Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, & Joyce, 2008). Wucherpfennig and colleagues (2012) find that 
armed conflicts fought in democracies are less likely to terminate in any type of clear victory 
(either a rebel or government victory) than those fought in authoritarian countries. Hultquist 
(2013) also finds some evidence that democratic countries are less likely to prevail militarily 
against rebels than authoritarian countries. Getmansky (2012), however, finds no evidence that 
democracies are more likely than autocracies to prevail militarily against the insurgents.  
Some research examines whether certain institutional configurations in political regimes 
influence the length of armed conflicts. Studies by Thyne (2012) and Uzoyni and Wells (2016) 
confront this line of research. Thyne (2012) argues that parliamentary forms of government are 
not amenable to conflict resolution given that they, as feared by rebels, encourage political elites 
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to engage in quarrels with one another regarding wartime policy changes. Thyne (2012) finds 
empirical support that armed conflicts are lengthier in countries that have parliamentary forms of 
government than under presidential forms of government. Uzonyi and Wells (2016) find strong 
support that a leader’s time in public office and institutional constraints on decision-making 
work together to influence the length of armed conflict. Specifically, Uzonyi and Wells (2016) 
find that long-serving incumbents (which tend to be found in authoritarian countries) are more 
likely to continue to fight when they enjoy the monopoly on decision-making power.  
2.4.3. Regime Type and Peace Processes  
Peace negotiations. 
Only a handful of scholars assess the effects of democracy on the occurrence of peace 
negotiations (see Biswas, 2006; Urlacher, 2013; Thomas, 2012; Cunningham & Sawyer, 2019; 
Ryckman & Braithwaite, 2017). However, similar to the literature focusing on the predictors of 
conflict duration, there exists disagreement regarding the theoretical arguments linking regime 
type and peace negotiations during conflict. Moreover, the empirical findings remain mixed.  
One camp of scholars finds evidence that democracies are more likely to engage in peace 
talks with the opposition during armed conflict (Biswas, 2006; Urlacher, 2013; Cunningham & 
Sawyer, 2019; Thomas, 2012). Biswas (2006) argues that democracies should be more willing to 
negotiate given that they provide political avenues that the opposition can leverage to address 
their grievances. Biswas (2006) also maintains that democratic governments face more salient 
reputation costs stemming from international condemnation of continued war, which compels 
leaders to settle the conflict at the negotiating table. Urlacher (2013) finds that democracies that 
are engaged in less brutal civil wars are more likely to attempt peace talks with the violent 
opposition than their authoritarian counterparts but finds no evidence that democratic 
governments are more likely to hold peace talks when involved in deadlier conflicts (p. 185). 
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However, Ryckman and Braithwaite (2017) find no difference in the probability of meeting for 
peace talks between authoritarian and democratic leaders. Although the aforementioned research 
by these scholars provides some evidence that democratic governments are more likely to initiate 
peace negotiations than their authoritarian counterparts, it is unclear as to why democracies are 
not able to prevent violent conflicts from occurring in the first place given that they have 
institutional mechanisms to resolve grievances. According to political scientist R.J. Rummel 
(1995): “[T]hrough democratic institutions social conflicts that might become violent are 
resolved by voting, negotiation, compromise, and mediation” (p. 4).  
Hegre (2014) provides a possible explanation as to why democracies might face violent 
groups, pointing out that the ideologies and norms accepted by the general population in 
democracies are inherently incompatible with those buttressed by rebel groups, which tend to be 
more radical and extreme. Rebel groups that subsequently turn to violence to induce political 
change are essentially viewed as fringe groups that pose a threat to the fundamental values of the 
democratic regime and hence will more likely be targeted intensely by democratic governments 
for elimination (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, & Joyce, 2008; Hegre, 2014).  
A few scholars assess whether certain institutional configurations of political regimes 
influence the occurrence of peace negotiations (see Bapat, 2005; Urlacher, 2011). Bapat (2005) 
focuses on the allocation of decision-making power in the government: In countries where 
executives share decision-making power, negotiation attempts, Bapat (2005) argues, are more 
likely to occur given that other political elites can vote to change the status quo and opt for 
peace. Bapat’s empirical findings support his theoretical argument. Urlacher (2011), however, 
argues that institutions that allow other political elites to change policies should have the 
opposite effect. Urlacher (2011) provides a two-fold argument: In the spirit of veto player 
28 
theory,3 he first argues that changing policy is more difficult because it requires the agreement 
and consensus of many actors. Second, and similar to the argument advanced by Thyne (2012), 
Urlacher argues that opposition groups are less inclined to seek a political solution with an 
incumbent who cannot control the policy agenda and make unilateral promises. Despite his 
theoretical predictions, Urlacher (2011) does not find any evidence suggesting that executives 
who share decision-making power in government are less likely to undertake peace negotiations 
than those who have unilateral power to make decisions. However, Urlacher (2011) finds 
evidence that executives who share powers are less likely to successfully terminate the armed 
conflict following the signing of a negotiated settlement.  
Biswas (2006) provides research that assesses the relationship between power-sharing 
institutions and peace negotiations. She finds no evidence that federal states (in which the 
national government shares powers with lower-tier governments) are more likely to negotiate 
with the violent opposition than incumbents presiding in countries that do not have such power-
sharing arrangements. However, her analysis finds a negative relationship between federalism 
and peace negotiations only when there is military intervention during the armed conflict 
(Biswas, 2006).  
Ogutcu-Fu (2016) is one of the few studies this research projected identified that 
incorporates the sequential aspects of the peace process into the analysis of the determinants of 
conflict resolution. Her work assesses how certain characteristics of rebel groups and civil war 
governments affect the occurrence of peace negotiations and the reaching of negotiated 
settlements after wartime adversaries have initiated peace negotiations. Her research is also one 
                                               
3 See Tsebelis (1999).  
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of the few that figures the institutional and behavioral features of both the civil war government 
and rebel groups prominently into theoretical arguments. Ogutcu-Fu (2016) identifies two 
features of the civil war government expected to shape incentives for settling the civil war via 
dialogue: 1) the degree to which citizens are satisfied with the policies of the civil war 
government, and 2) the extent of decision-making power of the ruling party in power. She argues 
that governments that enjoy domestic support from citizens should be more willing to negotiate 
given that they face less salient political costs for changing policies. Ogutcu-Fu (2016) also 
theorizes that negotiations are less likely to occur if there are more rival parties that can occlude 
attempts by the incumbent to change courses of action during civil war.  
To capture public support for the civil war government, Ogutcu-Fu (2016) uses a variable 
from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) by Beck and colleagues (as cited in Ogutcu-Fu, 
2016, p. 409) that measures the fraction of votes in the prior national election that went to the 
political party in power in the central government. To capture whether the political incumbent 
can control the policy agenda within the government, she leverages mostly the DPI, which 
provides a variable that captures the number of legislative seats held by rival political parties. 
Using bivariate probit modeling, Ogutcu-Fu (2016) finds no evidence that domestic approval of 
the civil war government or the sharing of decision-making power in government exert a 
meaningful effect on the probability of peace talks during civil war. However, she does find 
evidence that following peace talks, civil war governments that enjoy domestic support from 
citizens are more likely to reach a peace agreement. She also finds that once peace negotiations 
are attempted, executive leaders who share political powers with rival parties, which tend to 
occur in more democratic countries, are less likely to strike a peace settlement with the 
opposition (Ogutcu-Fu, 2016). Similar to the argument advanced by Urlacher (2011), this finding 
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suggests that policies are harder to change if the agreement of many actors is needed, including 
the consensus from hardline members of government who may prefer to just fight the rebels 
(Ogutcu-Fu, 2016). However, it is not clear why this argument seems to only hold for the 
striking of a peace deal and not for the decision to negotiate.  
Negotiated settlements.  
Unlike the few scholars who consider the sequential process of conflict resolution (see 
Ogutcu-Fu, 2016; Kaplow, 2016), most studies use competing risk models or hazard models to 
assess the effect of political regimes on the onset of negotiated settlements during civil war. 
Scholars using these models in general do not find any evidence that political regimes exert a 
meaningful effect on negotiated settlements (DeRouen & Sobek, 2004; Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, 
& Joyce, 2008; Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). A few scholars, though, find evidence that regimes 
with intermediate levels of democracies (also known as anocracies) are more likely to have their 
conflicts end in peace agreements than other regime types (see Hultquist, 2013; Cunningham, 
2014).  
Several scholars restrict their analysis to territorial conflicts in modeling the relationship 
between political regimes and negotiated settlements, although this research is very scarce 
(Cunningham, 2014; Walter, 2003). Cunningham (2014) finds evidence that peace deals with 
separatist groups are more likely to occur under semi-democratic regimes than under strong 
authoritarian or democratic regimes. Walter (2003) finds that democratic leaders are more likely 
than their authoritarian counterparts to strike a peace deal with separatist groups (p. 145).  
2.4.4. Regime Type and the Durability of Peace  
Some research examines whether regime type affects the duration of peace. Civil war 
scholars point to democratic countries’ traditions in power-sharing, use of political channels to 
address perceived injustices, and prior laws advancing minority rights as contributing to lasting 
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peace following the signing of peace agreements (Hartzell, Hoddie, & Rothchild, 2001, p. 189). 
A few scholars studying this relationship have found evidence that democratic governments are 
more likely to experience the successful termination of civil wars following peace settlements 
(Hartzell, Hoddie, & Rothchild, 2001). However, other studies do not find strong evidence that 
political regimes exert a meaningful effect on the length of peace (Lounsbery & DeRouen, 2016; 
Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Quinn, Mason, & Gurses, 2007; Mattes & Savun, 2010). Other 
research finds support for a curvilinear relationship between the level of democracy and peace; 
countries with intermediate levels of democracy (anocracies) are the most susceptible to conflict 
relapse (Mason, Gurses, Brandt, & Quinn, 2011, p. 186). However, theoretical inquiry as to why 
anocratic regimes are more prone to armed conflict recurrence is lacking in the extant 
scholarship.  
Urlacher (2011) assesses whether specific institutional arrangements in political regimes 
influence conflict outcomes. He finds evidence that political incumbents who share decision-
making power, which tends to occur in more democratic regimes, are less likely to experience a 
resolution of their armed conflicts following the signing of negotiated settlements. He attributes 
this finding to the bargaining dynamics of the peace process: consensus for peace is less likely to 
occur when decision-making powers is spread across a greater number of actors who hold veto 
power during peace talks (those whose approval is needed to sign off on a peace settlement) 
(Urlacher, 2011, p. 84-85).  
2.4.5. Regime Type and Civilian Violence  
Some research has assessed the relationship between regimes and civilian violence (see 
Stanton, 2016; Morrow, 2007; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004; Lacina, 2006). A 
number of scholars point out that democratic principles of non-violence and human rights as well 
as the public’s sensitivity to accumulating casualties incentivizes democratic incumbents to fight 
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their armed conflicts less viciously (see Lacina, 2006; Stanton, 2016). A few scholars do find 
evidence that democracies are less likely to prosecute brutal wars (Valentino et al., 2004, p. 394; 
Stanton, 2016; Morrow, 2007; Lacina, 2006). Morrow (2007) finds that democratic incumbents 
are less likely to practice restraint against civilians if they are not signatories to international 
accords that dictate norms of behavior toward civilians during armed conflict (p. 567). However, 
when they are signatories, democratic governments are less likely than their authoritarian 
counterparts to disobey international accords (Morrow, 2007). Stanton’s 2016 book Violence and 
Restraint in Civil War: Civilian Targeting in the Shadow of International Law probes how 
different characteristics of a country’s political regime shape the civil war government’s conduct 
toward civilians during counterinsurgencies. Stanton advances a multi-prong theory that 
identifies three features of a country’s political system that are expected to influence how civil 
war governments fight wars. She argues that regimes that lack stability are more inclined to curb 
their use of violence against their citizens during their counterinsurgencies because they need 
international aid to consolidate their weak power. Apart from stability, Stanton (2016) maintains 
that two key institutional configurations found in democratic regimes also influence the civil war 
government’s use of violence against people: i) electoral institutions of accountability, and ii) 
political channels that permit other actors and groups in society to influence public policies and 
the decision-making process. She argues first that democratic countries are more likely to be 
careful in targeting unarmed individuals during war because their leaders are likely to face 
electoral punishment down the road, particularly given that democratic norms champion human 
rights and that citizens in democratic countries tend to be sensitive to war costs, including 
mounting casualties. In contrast, autocratic leaders do not face accountability for their actions 
and wartime behavior at the ballot box, making them more likely to prosecute brutal wars 
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(Stanton, 2016). Second, Stanton (2016) argues that democratic rules and institutions provide 
channels that allow other actors to influence policymaking, which restricts the incumbent’s 
power to continue implementing wartime policies that hurt civilians. She finds support for her 
theoretical arguments in her empirical model and qualitative case studies (Stanton, 2016). 
However, the theory put forth in in this research is unable to explain why a number of 
democratic governments, including in Peru, Colombia, Ireland, and Spain, have engaged in 
prolonged and bloody wars with rebel movements.  
2.4.6. Other Political Characteristics of the State and Peace Negotiations  
A few other studies consider other political characteristics of the state (see Urlacher, 
2011), but there is overall a lack of a coherent framework for understanding how different 
political dimensions of a state might affect policies during civil wars.  
Urlacher (2013) and Ryckman and Braithwaite (2017) are some of the few scholars to 
examine how leadership dynamics affect incentives for peace negotiations during armed conflict. 
Urlacher (2013) finds that the political ideologies of new leaders and their length in office are 
key predictors of peace negotiations. He finds evidence that newly elected leaders from moderate 
political parties are more likely to participate in peace talks with the violent opposition, whereas 
new leaders from nationalist and conservative political parties (which tend to espouse a pro-war 
agenda) who come into power during armed conflict are less likely to attempt peace talks with 
the opposition. Urlacher (2013) also finds strong evidence that the length of time served in public 
office and the leader’s ideologies work together to shape incentives for dialogue. Leaders from 
hawkish political parties are less likely to negotiate as their time in public office increases.  
Although Ryckman and Braithwaite (2017) also maintain that changes in leadership 
allow for a repositioning of wartime policies, these scholars provide an argument somewhat 
contrary to that advanced by Urlacher (2013). Ryckman and Braithwaite (2017) argue that new 
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leaders who adhere to a different political ideology than that of the predecessor leader do not 
have established policies and sufficient knowledge of the grievances of the rebels. Subsequently, 
new leaders are less likely to be viewed as reliable negotiating partners by insurgents. In 
contrast, new leaders who hold the same political ideology as the predecessor leader are 
perceived by the violent opposition to be more knowledgeable about the incompatibilities of the 
war and consequently better equipped at finding practical solutions to end wars, making peace 
negotiations and peace settlements more likely to occur. Ryckman and Braithwaite (2017) find 
support for their theoretical predictions in that new leaders affiliated with the predecessor regime 
are more likely to engage in dialogue and sign a negotiated settlement with the insurgents.  
Daniel Lieberfeld’s book Talking with the Enemy: Negotiation and Threat Perception in 
South Africa and Israel/Palestine (1999) is one of the few qualitative studies that examine the 
relationship between a host of contextual and institutional factors and negotiations. Lieberfeld 
(1999) identifies these factors through a comparative case analysis that assesses South Africa’s 
and Israel’s experience with the African National Congress and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization, respectively. Through these case analyses, Lieberfeld (1999) identifies a number 
of “perceptual and political shifts” that lead wartime adversaries to meet at the negotiating table 
(p. 77). These include, among other conditions, a new leader in government, sustained popular 
support for the rebels, a military stalemate, and prior negotiation attempts between wartime 
adversaries (pp. 77-93). Similar to the argument advanced by Urlacher (2013), Lieberfeld (1999) 
argues that new leaders who come into power during the course of civil wars are expected to be 
more open to finding non-military solutions to the armed conflict than their predecessor 
counterparts, who likely were affiliated with prolonging or initiating the war. Second, in the case 
studies, Lieberfeld (1999) finds evidence that governments are more willing to negotiate with 
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rebels that enjoy popular support given that the political and military costs of prosecuting the war 
become too high. Third, prior contact and cooperation with rebels at the negotiating table is more 
likely to foster trust and good will, making future negotiations more likely to occur (Lieberfeld, 
1999).  
Other institutional features of the state have received much less attention. This research 
project identified only one study by Biswas (2006) that explicitly considers how the age of a 
political regime affects incentives for peace negotiations. She argues that younger regimes are 
less likely to be viewed as credible negotiating partner by insurgents (given that they do not yet 
have predictable policies), which makes peace negotiations less likely to occur. However, 
contrary to her theoretical expectations, Biswas (2006) finds that newer political regimes are 
more likely than older regimes to attempt peace talks during war.  
2.5. Moving Forward  
The literature review has identified the following gaps that require further theoretical and 
empirical inquiry. 
 First, the literature focusing on behavioral explanations for negotiation onset is very 
scarce. The bulk of the literature restricts its attention to assessing how the balance of military 
power between the rebels and the civil war government affect the decision to seek a political 
solution to the conflict (see Hultquist, 2013). The scholarship can benefit from better 
understanding under what conditions another form of support for the rebels—passive support—
influences a government’s decision to negotiate.  
 Second, research on the political determinants of negotiations is very much still in its 
infancy. Most studies assess the political determinants of the onset of civil wars and the length of 
armed conflict (see Hegre et al., 2001; Fearon, 2004). Far less attention has been given to 
understanding how political features of the state affect the decision to negotiate.  
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Third, the causal mechanisms that link behavioral and institutional variables with 
outcome variables (the onset of negotiations) are unclear. Qualitative studies can play an 
important role in informing and checking the viability of theories (Gerring, 2007). These studies 
can also help shed light on the competing findings found in the empirical scholarship as well as 
help identify missing variables that affect the casual chain, including mediators and moderators 
(see Gerring, 2007, p. 45). Qualitative research is particularly useful for this project because the 
theoretical arguments center on the decision-making calculus of civil war governments. As 
Gerring (2007) states, “When studying decisional behavior, case study research may offer insight 
into the intentions, the reasoning capabilities, and the information-processing procedures of the 
actors involved in a given setting” (p. 45). By using both quantitative and qualitative research, 
this project intends to provide a more thorough understanding of the decision-making calculus of 
civil war governments, including when and why behavioral and institutional factors affect their 









CHAPTER 3.  THEORY  
3.1. Introduction  
Between 1980 and 2005, Indonesia experienced three separatist conflicts. The 
consolidated regime of President Suharto, who ruled Indonesia from 1965 through 1998, 
embraced a unilateral military strategy in dealing with the following separatist movements: the 
Free Aceh Movement (GAM), the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, and the 
Free Papua Movement (Rinakit, 2005; Schulze, 2004; TAPOL, 2003). Since the inception of 
these civil wars, the Indonesian military, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), shaped the 
counterinsurgency polices of the country (Kingsbury, 2006; Schulze, 2004; Rinakit, 2005). 
Although demands for ending the armed conflicts and halting the use of repression became 
salient under President Suharto, his regime did not seek out peace negotiations with separatist 
groups (Stanton, 2016).  
However, following the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, a shift in the political 
environment away from authoritarianism toward democracy largely curbed the ability of the 
president to unilaterally control the policy agenda (Schulze, 2004). Suharto accepted the end of 
his rule following protests against the government in the wake of a poor economy (Prasetyo & 
Birks, 2010). This critical event loosened the chains of authoritarian rule, leading to a change in 
the handling of the conflict by successive governments: The elected leaders began to pursue 
peace negotiations to terminate the armed conflict with the secessionist movements (Aspinall & 
Crouch, 2003; Schulze, 2004). According to a journalist based in Indonesia, Aristed Katoppo, the 
political survival of Habibe rested on the demands of the public: “If you want to stay afloat, you 
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can't go against the current” (as cited in The Economist, 1998). Political leaders under the 
unconsolidated regime in the late 1990s not only engaged in peace negotiations with the GAM 
but also provided concessions to rebels fighting for an independent East Timor (Schulze, 2004).  
This chapter provides the theoretical framework for understanding how behavioral and 
institutional factors affect strategies adopted by civil war governments during war. My argument 
herein is examined via a cost-benefits lens from the perspective of the civil war government. A 
cost-benefit framework helps illuminate how civil war governments may think about certain 
options and decisions during armed conflict (Kaplow, 2016; Stanton, 2016). Incumbents during 
civil wars take into consideration the benefits and costs of alternative courses of action in their 
decision-making calculus, including those associated with a unilateral military strategy and peace 
negotiations. These costs can include both direct costs and indirect costs of certain actions, 
including political costs (Stanton, 2016; Kaplow, 2016), international costs (Stanton, 2016), and 
foregone costs of continuing war. The theoretical arguments in this chapter will lend themselves 
to a series of hypotheses that will be empirically tested in the next chapter of this dissertation.  
3.2. Assumptions  
I begin this section with several assumptions related to the behaviors and preferences of 
civil war adversaries, beginning with the assumption that wartime adversaries prefer a military 
victory to a negotiated settlement for reasons previously described in this dissertation. I make 
two assumptions regarding the behaviors of rebel groups: First, insurgents are willing to enter 
into peace talks with ruling elites in general (Cunningham & Sawyer, 2016). During civil wars, 
either the government or rebel group can offer peace negotiations and either one can reject the 
other’s offer. However, rebel groups are often in a position of military inferiority relative to the 
government (Akcinaroglu, 2012). Given that peace settlements are necessarily preferred to an 
outright military loss, rebel groups should be willing to at least try to secure some level of 
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political power. Second, peace negotiations provide rebel groups the opportunity to make good 
on their words of promising to provide their constituents with policies aimed at improving their 
political rights (Cunningham & Sawyer, 2016). Consequently, negotiations allow rebel groups 
the opportunity to follow through on their objectives on the national scale (Cunningham & 
Sawyer, 2016). The GAM welcomed peace negotiations because it believed it would help 
increase their chances to fulfill their political demands (see Schulze, 2004, p. ix).  
My assumptions regarding the behaviors and actions of the incumbent government is 
partly grounded in the theory of “political survival,” which includes three key elements (Bueno 
de Mesquita & Sivereson, 1995, p. 842). First, maintaining political power is the main goal of 
the incumbent (Bueno de Mesquita & Sivereson, 1995). Related, political incumbents strive to 
foster the stability of their institutions and political regimes. However, the institutions of the 
political system may be contested by certain groups, including the wider citizenry or even rival 
government elites. Political detractors can have the power to destabilize governments and 
regimes through the use of force or protests. Subsequently, leaders seek to formulate rules to 
ensure the stability of their regime and their own political survival to prevent forced removal 
from office (Bueno de Mesquita & Sivereson, 1995, p. 842).  
In general, the political survival of the incumbent is dependent on the incumbents’ 
“winning coalitions,”—those within the country that have the power to determine whether the 
incumbent can continue to rule (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2007, p. 251; Bueno de Mesquita, 
Morrow, Siverson, & Smith, 1999, p. 149). Regardless of the regime type, the preferences of the 
winning coalition need to be satisfied to improve the incumbent’s chances for continuing in 
office (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2007). In autocratic regimes, the incumbent must satisfy the 
preferences of a narrow subset of people and groups, including military officials and the wealthy. 
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As the country becomes more democratic, the winning coalition expands to include not just those 
in the incumbent’s inner circles but the wider citizenry, including those with voting rights 
(Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2007, p. 255).  
However, there may be considerable variation and fluidity regarding whose support the 
incumbent has and needs to retain power. Unconsolidated regimes are regimes that have nascent 
and underdeveloped rules regarding the allocation of political power and decision-making as 
well as poorly developed public policies (Weingast, 1997; Jackman, 1993). These are political 
regimes that have yet to develop complete, effective, robust, and self-enforcing institutions 
regarding the contours of political power. Leaders presiding over unconsolidated regimes have 
also yet to fully and effectively develop and implement the regime’s policies and promote the 
regime’s norms and ideologies domestically (Göbel, 2011). The distribution and contours of 
political power, including the scope and limits of the executive leader’s political powers and the 
roles and responsibilities of other political elites (including opposition parties), are incomplete 
and not yet solidified (Weingast, 1997). Moreover, the composition of the incumbent’s winning 
coalition is still being figured out, and it is unclear whose support the incumbent has and needs to 
remain in power. Because of these institutional deficiencies, the incumbent’s grasp on political 
power hangs on a thread as turf wars between the incumbent and rival elites, who are seeking a 
greater slice of political power, become commonplace (Weingast, 1997). Examples of 
unconsolidated regimes include newly formed states, transitional states, or regimes that have 
undergone a significant change in their type of regime (Stanton, 2016). Consequently, the 
incumbent presiding over an unconsolidated regime is concerned with adopting policies—even 
policies that appease those outside his anticipated constituency base—to ensure his political 
survival and the endurance of the regime (Albertus, Fenner, & Slater, 2018).  
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Finally, institutional mechanisms of accountability, such as electoral institutions, vary in 
both scope and quality across political regimes (Bueno de Mesquita & Sivereson, 1995). 
Although elections are a staple institution in democratic countries, they can and do occur in 
anocratic and even authoritarian countries to varying degrees of competitiveness and fairness 
(Golder, 2005). Electoral institutions, particularly competitive elections, can be used by citizens 
to hold leaders accountable for unpopular policy choices. Popular elections can remove a 
political leader from office, particularly a leader who makes policy choices that go against the 
preferences of his constituencies (Bueno de Mesquita & Sivereson, 1995). Leaders who rule 
within political regimes that provide strong electoral institutions are expected to take into 
consideration public attitudes and the demands of constituents during policymaking, given the 
strong possibilities of electoral punishment in the future (Stanton, 2016; Bueno de Mesquita & 
Smith, 1995, 2007).  
The following section will discuss how behavioral factors, namely the popularity of the 
rebels relative to the civil war government, are expected to influence the government’s decision 
to negotiate.  
3.3. Behavioral Explanations: Rebel Support Relative to the Government 
Rebel groups and their supporters are expected to exact political costs on the civil war 
government that shape incentives for peace negotiations. What people think about insurgent 
groups will influence how they behave and act during armed conflicts (Mason, 2004), which will 
in turn affect the decision-making calculus of the civil war government. Before proceeding, it is 
important to define what is meant by popularity. The definition of “popular” as provided by 
Merriam Webster (2019) is a state or condition of an individual or an entity being “commonly 
liked or approved.” This dissertation however focuses on a specific type of popularity, what I 
call “non-active” popular support. The distinction between active popular support and non-
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active popular support for rebels requires attention. Rebel recruits (civilians who take up arms 
and fight against the civil war government) provide a rebel movement with active popular 
support (Mason, 2004, p. 167). While Mason (2004) provides definitions and descriptions for 
different types of “active” and “passive” support citizens can provide rebels (pp. 163-169), I 
define for this research non-active popular support as encompassing any type of support that falls 
short of taking up arms on behalf of a rebel group. Put differently, individuals who support a 
rebel group but do not serve as fighters in the insurgency provide the insurgents with what I call 
non-active popular support.   
Across many cases, rebel groups may have active fighters but members may be forced by 
militant leaders into taking up arms on behalf of the group (Gates, 2017). However, rebels that 
are militarily weaker than the government are not necessarily also less popular than the 
government. The Zapatista rebels in Mexico had no more than a hundred fighters, relatively low 
active support compared to the government’s 12,000 fighters (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2012, p. 
198). However, the rebels enjoyed relatively stronger passive support than the civil war 
government—support for the rebels was widespread throughout Mexico (see Muñoz, 2006). The 
Revolutionary United Front, a rebel group that fought against the government of Sierra Leone, 
suffered from very low levels of domestic support in the 1990s (Hazen, 2013, p. 86) even though 
it wielded a large fighting force of up to 7,000 fighters, with some accounts putting the figure at 
28,000 members (Cook, 2003, p. 20). For comparative purposes, 15,500 active fighters served in 
the state’s armed forces at this time (Malan, Rakate, & McIntyre, 2002, as cited in Fortna, 2008, 
p. 167).   
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3.3.1. Understanding Non-Active Popular Support for Wartime Adversaries  
Support for the rebels.  
Rebel groups can be popular with citizens for many reasons and also have varying 
degrees of domestic support. First, the perceived legitimacy of a rebel group tends to figure 
prominently into the decision for a citizen to support a rebel group. Indeed, public support is 
habitually linked with the legitimacy of a rebel group. According to Schlichte and Schneckener 
(2015), “Legitimacy… refers to the belief in the rightfulness of an armed group’s agenda and 
violent struggle” (p. 413).  
The definition of legitimacy provided by Schlichte and Schneckener (2015) suggests that 
insurgent organizations are popular if citizens accept both their political objectives and their use 
of violence. Both these conditions require further attention. With regard to the legitimacy of 
political objectives, rebel groups may have different goals as well as multiple goals. Rebel 
groups fighting wars of secession have the ultimate goal of achieving independence for a given 
territory within the boundaries of a state. Other rebel groups may have a list of goals they want 
the civil war government to address, including those that provide certain political, economic, or 
social rights to their constituencies. More extreme goals involve rebel groups that seek to usurp 
the ruling elites and impose their own system of government (Metz & Millen, 2005). Goals of 
rebel groups may also change during the course of the conflict; some rebel groups that originally 
demanded independence may eventually be satisfied with a concession deal that provides them 
with limited autonomy rights (see Baikoeni & Oishi, 2016). 
Citizens, however, may differ regarding the extent they support a rebel group’s political 
objectives. A citizen may, for example, agree with a partial list of goals of the rebels (i.e., 
improvements in minority rights) but reject the rebels’ goal of implementing a socialist state. 
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Another citizen may accept all of the goals advanced by the rebels, thereby providing the latter 
with a greater degree of popular support. Hence, there may be variation in the degree of domestic 
support for the political objectives of the insurgent organization (Kaltenthaler & Miller, 2015).  
Some citizens may also acknowledge some of the grievances of insurgent groups but disagree 
with their overall political objectives. Citizens may simply possess “feelings or expressions of 
sympathy” (Paul, 2010, p. 489) for the plight of the insurgents. In some cases, citizens may want 
the civil war government to offer some sort of political concession to the rebels falling short of 
their actual demands. During the conflict, citizens by and large preferred granting the rebels a 
limited form of self-government rather than having the country lose territory (Miller, 2009, p. 
52).  
The second component of the definition of Schlichte and Schneckener (2015), centering 
on the approval of an insurgent’s use of violence, also requires attention. Citizens who approve 
of a rebel group that came into power via violence to install a new political regime necessarily 
approve of the political agenda of the rebels and their use of violence that was used to achieve 
those objectives. Datum polls conducted in Peru during the 1980s provide insights into the 
percentage of respondents who favor both the political objectives of the rebels and the use of 
violence. A 1982 poll conducted by Datum in Peru (as cited in McClintock, 2001, p. 88) found 
that 13% of respondents surveyed favored a socialist-inspired regime in which the ruling elites 
came into power via the use of force. These citizens necessarily support both the political 
ideology of the ruling elites and the use of violence.  
However, recall that popular support is not a straightforward concept and there is often 
variation in the type and degree of support for a rebel group: one citizen may approve both of the 
goals of the rebels and their use of violence while another citizen may agree with the main goals 
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of an insurgent group but denounce their use of violence. Potentially, rebel violence may force 
citizens to lend their support to the civil war government (see La Serna, 2012), causing shifts in 
the balance of popular support between the civil war government and the insurgents. In Pakistan, 
insurgent violence reduced domestic support for insurgents, with disapproval the strongest 
among communities living in areas where violence was commonplace (Blair, Fair, Malhotra, & 
Shapiro, 2013). In cases of extreme dissatisfaction with rebel violence, civilians may take up 
arms against the insurgents themselves, a phenomenon that has been documented across a 
number of armed conflicts, including in Peru with the Sendero Luminoso (La Serna, 2012). 
During the earlier years of the armed conflict between the Indonesian state and the Free Aceh 
Movement, many Acehnese condemned violent rebellion (Abuza, 2016, p. 29) while 
simultaneously condemning the civil war government’s policies of extracting oil resources for 
development initiatives outside of the province (a key grievance of the Free Aceh Movement) 
(Prasetyo & Birks, 2010). Overall, the Acehnese did not support the rebels during the 1970s 
under President Suharto (Abuza, 2016, p. 29). 
As a caveat, it is not always the case that increases in violence by rebels necessarily 
translates to a reduction in domestic support. Insurgent groups by definition are violent in nature 
(Schlichte & Schneckener, 2015, p. 415). Hewitt (1990) notes how the most lethal rebel groups 
that use terrorism, including the Basque separatists, still enjoyed high approval rates nationally 
during the early years of the conflict with the central government of Spain. However, Schlichte 
& Schneckener (2015) maintain that the lengthier conflicts (which produce more casualties) 
should be negatively associated with public support for insurgents (p. 416).  
Citizens can also support insurgents for other reasons not related to legitimacy or their 
use of violence (Schlichte & Schneckener, 2015). Citizens may support rebel groups because 
46 
they provide the population with critical services, such as education, health, or security (see Paul, 
2010; Mampilly, 2012, p. 54; Schlichte & Schneckener, 2015, p. 418). In extreme cases, citizens 
support rebels out of apprehension or force—these citizens face execution by rebels for failing to 
support them (Schlichte & Schneckener, 2015, p. 414). Citizens may also provide rebels with 
indirect support, such as allowing the rebels to train in their communities without reporting them 
to local state authorities (Paul, 2010, pp. 490-491).  
Finally, it is important to note that public support for the rebels is not static and may 
change, and often does, over time depending on conflict dynamics. The Zapatistas in Mexico 
considerably increased their support base during the 1990s as the government became more 
repressive during the short-lived armed conflict (Muñoz, 2006).  
Support for the government.  
Similar to claims made in the discussion on popular support for rebels, public support for 
the civil war government is often tied to the legitimacy of the government. According to Lipset 
(1959), “Legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the 
belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society” 
(p. 86). According to Jackman (1993), under legitimate regimes, there exists “an acceptance of 
the political order as generally reasonable, given the known or feasible alternatives” (p. 99).  
There may be variation in degree of domestic support for the civil war government. 
Citizens may support the overall political regime and its ideologies and reject those espoused by 
the rebels (see La Serna, 2012). Other citizens may simply support the civil war government by 
default, even if it has failed to improve welfare for citizens, because the alternative form of 
government supported by the rebels is not acceptable (Velasco, 2005).  
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 Alongside support for the political regime in power, citizens may also support the 
government’s use of violence, including its counterinsurgencies, to protect the civil war 
government from being overthrown by non-state actors. A democratic form of government had 
the backing of most citizens during the armed conflict in Peru with the Sendero Luminoso 
(Palmer, 1992, p. 66). Moreover, many citizens favored the use of force against the rebels (La 
Serna, 2012, p. 171) and rejected the political ideologies of the Sendero Luminoso (St. John, 
1984).  
However, during armed conflicts, the popularity of the civil war government may be a 
function of its use of violence. The government’s counterinsurgencies—particularly those that 
employ indiscriminate use of violence against civilians, rely on repression, and cause massive 
economic and infrastructural destruction— may not only lead to a loss of domestic support for 
the incumbent, but may also increase domestic support for the rebels (Hewitt, 1990). According 
to the “provocation-repression” line of argument (Hewitt, 1990, p. 146), the balance of popular 
support in favor of the rebels increases when the civil war government uses force and repression 
against the rebels. Due to the military advantage of the civil war government (Akcinaroglu, 
2012; Zartman, 1995, p. 8), antipathy toward the ruling regime is brewed in the population when 
state troops react to insurgent violence by using routine repression to scout out alleged members 
of rebel groups (Hewitt, 1990, p. 146). In many cases, rebels leverage the government’s military 
advantage to win support: The underpowered Zapatista rebels in Mexico hoped that the civil 
government’s counterinsurgency against the rebels would generate dissatisfaction toward ruling 
elites while simultaneously increasing domestic support for the opposition (Bob, 2001, p. 326). 
Indeed, the government’s human rights abuses during the short-lived armed conflict played out 
heavily in the media (Brewster, 2005, p. 152).  
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3.3.2. How Do Civil War Governments Gauge Popular Support for the Rebels? 
How do civil governments know the extent and nature of popular support for the rebels? 
How do civil war governments know the extent of popular support for themselves? Are 
governments able to accurately distinguish between the different types of popular support? Are 
governments able to determine the balance of popular support? Admittedly, for the civil war 
government, it is likely difficult to precisely gauge the extent, scope, and type of popular support 
the rebels may possess among the wider population. Potentially the actual latent popular support 
for the rebels may be unknown at any point in time, particularly during the early stages of the 
conflict, creating a problem of asymmetric information for the incumbent. The actual latent 
domestic support for the rebels may be fraught with uncertainty, particularly in areas where the 
government’s bureaucratic and monitoring reach is limited (see Krasner & Risse, 2014, p. 546).  
Despite the imperfect information regarding the latent domestic support for the rebels, 
governments can proxy for the underlying latent support for the rebels by leveraging a number of 
institutions, activities, and phenomena (what I collectively call “observable cues” in society) that 
provide information on rebel support within its territories. The following observable cues are 
leveraged by the civil war governments (to different degrees depending on the prevailing regime 
type) to approximate the extent of popular support for the rebels: the ethnic composition of the 
population, the presence of demonstrations and protests in favor of the rebels, the media, polling 
institutions, and elections (Lorentzen, 2013).  
First, a country’s ethnic composition can provide cues to the incumbent regarding the 
possible support base of rebels in armed conflicts that have a strong ethnic dimension (which is 
generally in territorial wars). The ethnic demographics within countries and across time tend to 
be more or less stable and fixed (see Fearon, 2003), and simply knowing the ethnic breakdown of 
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its population will provide the civil war government with critical information regarding the 
possible and likely support base of rebels fighting ethnic-based wars. As an example, if an 
insurgent organization is fighting to improve political rights for a certain ethnic group, and this 
said ethnic group makes up 40% of the population, it may be reasonable for the civil war 
government to assume that the rebels may have the ability to mobilize (or already have the 
support of) this portion of the population. Indeed, numerous scholars find that ethnic groups are 
more likely to lend support to rebels that share their ethnicity (Lyall, Blair, & Imai, 2013; 
Kaltenthaler & Miller, 2015; Lyall, Shiraito, & Imai, 2015). This “intergroup bias” is a strong 
driver of domestic support for insurgents (Lyall, Blair, & Imai, 2013, p. 681). According to Paul 
(2010), “[S]hared identity is a powerful social process that can lead to support for terrorist or 
insurgent groups” (p. 499). In a study assessing the determinants of popular support for insurgent 
groups in Pakistan, Kaltenthaler and Miller (2015) find evidence that the Pakistani-based Taliban 
(composed primarily of members of the Pashto ethnicity) could count on domestic support from 
members of its own ethnicity in the population.  
Latent domestic support can also be activated via other observable cues. These include, 
among other things, organized collective action, elections, and the media (Lorentzen, 2013, p. 
129). Democratic countries may have a greater informational advantage in gauging popular 
support for the rebels during armed conflict due to a stronger presence of these cues (see 
Lorentzen, 2013). The civil war government can obtain critical information regarding the extent 
of popular support for the rebels from local human rights organizations, the media, international 
human rights organizations, and local grassroots organizations (Bob, 2001). Indeed, the media in 
Mexico played an instrumental role in highlighting the human rights abuses conducted by the 
Mexican troops during the armed conflicts with the Zapatistas in the 1990s (Brewster, 2005, p. 
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152). Rebel sympathizers and other actors within society, including local human rights 
organizations, may publicly condemn the government’s efforts and engage in demonstrations to 
denounce the government’s counterinsurgency operations and to demand peace negotiations (see 
Bob, 2001). Moreover, a number of polls have been conducted to better gauge opinions related to 
insurgent organizations in democratic countries. A poll conducted between 1999 and 2000 by the 
European Values Study (as cited in Hayes & McAllister, 2005, p. 607) breaks down domestic 
support for the IRA rebels by religion and geographical location.  
In contrast to democratic regimes, ruling elites presiding over authoritarian governments 
may have a greater degree of asymmetrical information regarding the extent and scope of 
popular support for the rebels given the presence of formal institutions that hamper freedom of 
speech, curb opposition activity, and encourage censorship (Lorentezen, 2013, p. 129). However, 
a number of scholars point out that authoritarian leaders can rely on a number of mechanisms to 
gauge the degree and extent of dissatisfaction with the ruling elites, including demonstrations 
(Lorentzen, 2013; Chen & Xu, 2017) and the presence of clientelistic institutions that link 
politicians with communities (Tsai & Xu, 2018). The presence of demonstrations against the 
regime, although intrinsically troubling for the civil war government, provides several strategic 
benefits for the autocrat. First, demonstrations can provide critical information to the incumbent 
regarding the nature of dissatisfaction, as well as help identify those rebel sympathizers who may 
perhaps take up arms alongside the rebels. Second, demonstrations can also provide information 
to the incumbent regarding the nature of the grievances (Lorentezen, 2013), including whether it 
is worthwhile for the leader from a cost-benefit perspective to give the rebels a seat at a 
negotiating table or whether it makes more sense for regime incumbents to continue to maintain 
a unilateral strategy against the rebels.  
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3.3.3. Relative Popular Support and Wartime Strategies  
Political incumbents are expected to be concerned with rebel groups that are popular with 
citizens. Rebels that possess a level of popular support at least at parity with the government 
have the ability to fight a protracted war, destabilize the country, and oust the leader from office. 
Sympathizers of rebel groups may thwart the civil war governments’ war efforts by assisting the 
rebels strategically, withholding critical information about the rebels, or propagating the rebels’ 
ideologies across territories, all of which help the rebels’ wartime efforts against the state 
(Mason, 2004). Consequently, popular support allows the rebels to hold out longer in fighting 
wars. The civil war government is expected to prosecute a lengthier war in such a political 
environment. At the same time, the passive support increases the chances of rebel victory. Mason 
(2004) elucidates why the concern of passive support for rebels cannot be overlooked by the civil 
war government: “[F]or the rebels to prevail, all they require from the population at the outset is 
passive tolerance of their existence. Passive tolerance allows the insurgent organization to 
survive and build its strength” (p. 161). 
Alongside the steeper military costs for fighting the rebels on the battlefield, the 
government must also allocate resources to maintaining law and order, including overseeing 
protests and demonstrations held by rebel sympathizers. As such, rebel sympathizers increase the 
financial cost burden of the state and make continued war costlier (Lieberfeld, 1999). The 
experience in South Africa illustrates this dynamic. The military wing of the African National 
Congress—a political party protesting the South African government’s apartheid policies 
targeted against the majority black population—fought against the state in the 1980s (Lieberfeld, 
1999). Throughout the 1980s, the rebels increased their popular support base, managing to win 
the approval of religious groups, university students, and intellectuals (Lieberfeld, 1999, p. 32). 
Leaders in the National Party–led government recognized that continued war with the rebels was 
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making the costs of war and repression exorbitantly high and unsustainable. Indeed, the 
government felt that the rebels posed less of a threat than the sympathizers of the rebels 
(Lieberfeld, 1999, p 33). Routine demonstrations and boycotts throughout the 1980s “would 
make the country ungovernable” for political elites in power (Lieberfeld, 1999, p. 33). Adriaan 
Vlok, the government’s Law and Order Minister, reflects on the high security costs borne from 
continued war in a political environment in which the rebels enjoyed relatively more popular 
support than the government:  
The army and the police had been telling the government, “You cannot go on like this. 
You cannot maintain law and order in this country if twenty million people, or two 
million people, should march to the Union Buildings [government offices in Pretoria]. 
We cannot stop that.” So it was a practical thing from the security people. We tried to nip 
it in the bud… But the Mass Democratic Movement started to get better organized, and 
you cannot fight if the majority of the people are against you. (as cited in Lieberfeld, 
1999, p. 33) 
 
The incumbent also faces short- and long-term salient political costs for continuing an 
unpopular war. When the rebels have increasing domestic support, the incumbent’s risk of being 
overthrown from office, such as via an uprising or elections, increases (Lieberfeld, 1999). In a 
political environment in which the rebels are at least as popular as the government, there is a 
realistic chance that rebel sympathizers can oust the incumbent from office. The incumbent 
hence will face acute risks to his short-term political survival if he does not at least attempt to 
meet the demands of the opposition: Negotiations allow the incumbent the opportunity to 
alleviate opposition to his government and to even win back popular support (Lieberfeld, 1999). 
In Bangladesh, President Ershad launched peace negotiations after the Chittagong-based rebels 
became popular. An unnamed rebel sympathizer (as cited in Weisman, 1986, para. 22) reflected 
on the popularity of the insurgents: “There are only about a thousand of our people with arms. 
But everywhere they have the backing of the people.” One politician from Bangladesh, Abdul 
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Hasat (as cited in Crossette, 1989, para. 6), reflected on the salient political threat emanating 
from the popularity of the rebels by stating that: “The rickshaw pullers could one day decide our 
destiny.” 
Even if the incumbent does manage to prevail militarily, it can become harder for the 
government to rebuild domestic confidence with the public in the post-war period. Political 
detractors of the regime who were active during the armed conflict, including those who 
supported the rebels, may continue to engage in anti-government activities that attempt to 
destabilize the regime in the post-war period and threaten the political survival of the incumbent.  
The experience in post-war Nigeria illustrates this argument. From 1967 to 1970, rebels 
in the southeastern state of Biafra in Nigeria—a region inhabited primarily by the Igbo tribe—
waged a war against the central government (Borders, 1971). Biafra was proclaimed an 
independent country in May 1967 by the leader of the rebels, Odumegwu Ojukwu (Reuters, 
1975). This proclamation led President Yakuba Gowan to send in troops to Biafra to squash the 
rebellion. The rebels and the civil war government fought for nearly two and a half years, in a 
war that killed roughly 2 million people (Fellows, 1970). During the course of the war, President 
Gowon’s armed forces routinely targeted and massacred alleged supporters of the rebels, 
including members of ethnic groups (Heerten & Moses, 2014; Omaka, 2014). The armed forces 
also routinely used rape (Heerten & Moses, 2014) and bombed towns in Biafra during the war 
(Heerten & Moses, 2014; Omaka, 2014). Moreover, at least 100,000 civilians died of hunger as a 
result of the government’s deliberate restriction of humanitarian aid to Biafra (Bercovitch & 
Fretter, 2004, pp. 74-75). Even though the Nigerian state enjoyed military superiority, the 
Biafran rebels enjoyed strong popular support throughout Nigeria, including in the eastern region 
(see Campbell, 2017; Ibeanu, Orji, & Iwuamadi, 2016, p. 23). The rebels also enjoyed 
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international support (Bercovitch & Fretter, 2004, p. 74). A number of countries including 
France, Haiti, Portugal, Zambia, South Africa, and Tanzania voiced their support for the rebels 
during the armed conflict (Heerten & Moses, 2014).  
In January 1970, the Nigerian state defeated the rebels on the battlefield, effectively 
ending the unpopular armed conflict (Fellows, 1970). In the post-conflict period, the region of 
Biafra continued to suffer from a host of economic, institutional, and social problems, including 
famine, destruction of infrastructure, and chronic unemployment (Borders, 1971). Political 
leaders in Biafra and sympathizers of the rebels remained politically active in the post-conflict 
period, and ethnic tensions continued to simmer above the surface as a result of the unpopular 
war (Borders, 1971). A member of the Igbo tribe confirmed the popularity of Ojukwu in the 
post-conflict period: “People still regard him as their leader” (as cited in Borders, 1971, para. 
10). A Biafran-based journalist discusses why tensions between the Nigerian state and the 
Biafran rebels continued to persist in the post-conflict period: 
It’s important to remember that we were defeated militarily. We reached the point in 
Biafra one year ago where we had to stop, but it was not a voluntary decision. Therefore, 
our minds are not changed, and We consider our differences with the Nigerians 
unresolved. (as cited in Borders, 1971, Section: “Thousands Saved”)  
 
Despite a military victory for the central government, President Gowon’s political 
survival in office remained insecure. Historically, frequent coups had been a common occurrence 
in Nigeria; in 1966, Nigeria experienced two military takeovers of the government (Bercovitch & 
Fretter, 2004, p. 74). To appease discontent against the military regime, the central government 
implemented an ambitious assistance program aimed at improving social welfare in Biafra 
(Fellows, 1970). However, the political survival of the incumbent remained threatened. The 
government engaged in disputes with other political elites over the contours of political powers 
within the federalist system of government (Gambari, 1975). Moreover, ethnic divisions 
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remained salient and political parties from the eastern region, including in Biafra, continued to 
contest the central government’s political legitimacy (Gambari, 1975, pp. 157-158). The 
National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, an political party based in the east, continued to 
wield considerable soft power with the Igbo people in Biafra. The party was led by Michael 
Okpara, who enjoyed strong political power in the east (Gambari, 1975, pp. 157-158). Indeed, 
these political and social tensions set the impetus for a coup that ultimately ousted President 
Gokon from power in 1975 (Reuters, 1975).  
These expectations lead to the first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Negotiations are more likely to occur when the rebels are at least as popular as 
the civil war government  
3.4. Political Regimes  
How governments weight the decision to just fight or seek a political solution to the 
conflict depends partly on characteristics of the political regime. Broadly speaking, political 
regimes provide the rules for decision-making and policy formation for a government in a 
country. A country’s political regime determines how political power is allocated within a 
country, including “who has political rights, how they can be exercised, and with what effects for 
the control over the state” (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000, p. 18). I apply and 
extend on a theoretical line of research by Stanton (2016) that explains how political regimes 
affect the civil war government’s use of violence against civilians to predict under what 
conditions political regimes affect peace negotiation prospects during civil war. The two 
characteristics of a political regime that I will examine are: 1) the level of institutional 
consolidation, and 2) the strength of electoral institutions. My research, however, considers how 
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a behavioral indicator—popular support for the rebels relative to the government—may modify 
the relationship between institutional variables and peace negotiations.  
3.5. Institutional Deficiencies in Unconsolidated Regimes  
Unconsolidated regimes are regimes that have nascent rules regarding the allocation of 
political power and decision-making as well as underdeveloped public policies. These are 
political regimes that have yet to develop complete, effective, robust, and self-enforcing 
institutions regarding the allocation of political power. Leaders presiding over unconsolidated 
regimes have also yet to implement the regime’s policies fully and effectively and promote the 
regime’s norms and ideologies domestically (Göbel, 2011). In unconsolidated political regimes 
(whether democratic or not), institutions and rules deciding the allocation of power are still 
undetermined; predictable patterns of behavior are inchoate at best, which provides a platform 
where competing political rivals and minority groups challenge the incumbent to secure a greater 
slice of political power (Weingast, 1997, p. 33; Saideman, Lanoue, Campenni, & Stanton, 2002, 
pp. 108-109). The ruling incumbent is often at the receiving end of menaces from opposing 
political parties, and turf wars over the contours of political power and institutional arrangements 
become commonplace (Nsia-Pepra, 2014, p. 96). Groups representing the ideologies of the prior 
regime are still active and seek to maintain a political role even under the new political order 
(Ziegenhain, 2008, p. 82; Hainsworth, 2000; Kurniawan, 2017). Moreover, there is considerable 
uncertainty regarding whose support the incumbent has and needs to maintain power for his rule 
and regime. Even in unconsolidated authoritarian regimes, it is unclear whether the incumbent 
has the backing of the military. Following the collapse of the authoritarian regime in Indonesia in 
1998, the military did not back the political elites of the unconsolidated democratic regime 
(Ziegenhain 2008, p. 78). Marcus Mietzner (2010), a political specialist on Indonesia, describes 
how under the unconsolidated regime of Habibe: “an unchallengeable authority no longer 
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existed, encouraging conflicting parties to seek superiority by showing off their organizational 
muscle” (p. 401).  
Given the nascent institutional landscape and the turf wars over political power, 
unconsolidated regimes are more at risk of collapsing (Seeberg, 2018). In contrast, regime 
consolidation entails the strengthening of both the institutions of the regime and the political 
security of the incumbent (Göbel, 2011). In consolidated regimes, rules regarding the allocation 
of political power are clearly defined, self-enforcing, and entrenched in society. The contours of 
political power in consolidated regimes are accepted by rival political parties, which cushions the 
incumbent from forced removal from office (Weingast, 1997, p. 33). 
3.5.1. Governance in Unconsolidated Regimes  
Broadly speaking, governance, as defined by Fukuyama (2013) is “a government’s ability 
to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is 
democratic or not” (Section: “Definitions”). A society that is accepting or at least tolerant of the 
political order is needed to facilitate effective governance. The lack of strong governance in 
unconsolidated regimes is expected to shape incentives for ending armed conflicts. Recall that in 
unconsolidated regimes, leaders have yet to: i) fully create, implement, and enforce the regime’s 
rules regarding the allocation of political power and preferred policies; ii) promote the regimes 
norms and ideologies; and iii) develop broad-based approval for the regime’s institutions and 
rules (Göbel, 2011; Weingast, 1997). According to Anderson, Møller, Rørbæk, and Skaaning 
(2014), mature regimes are characterized by strong governance capacity, which protects the 
regime against collapse.  
For unconsolidated regimes, scarce resources are better used toward improving 
governance than fighting wars. Continuing to prosecute civil wars—which are destabilizing by 
nature—becomes a costly endeavor for unconsolidated regimes whose leaders need to spend 
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their time building and solidifying governance. According to Jackman (1993): “[N]ew political 
orders are, by definition, fluid and inchoate. In such settings, the major task at hand for political 
leaders is to consolidate their position, a process that involves, among other things, the 
cooptation or elimination of potential rivals” (p. 86). These leaders, I argue, need to spend their 
time focusing on structuring power distributions and determining the contours of political power 
among competing elites to protect their survival in office and set the foundation for a stable 
regime. Focusing their efforts on strengthening the institutions and policies of the regime across 
their territories rather than fighting wars becomes paramount.  
Both unconsolidated democratic regimes and unconsolidated authoritarian regimes 
benefit from allocating resources away from fighting toward improving governance. 
Unconsolidated democratic regimes are expected to shift their attention away from fighting wars 
toward improving and enforcing activities of the regime, including the delivery of public 
services. Given that these regimes are expected to have wider winning coalitions in the future, 
public goods provision contributes to the stabilization and consolidation of the regime (Chu, 
Bratton, Lagos, Shastri, & Tessler, 2008). Promoting broad-based economic growth also 
becomes paramount for the regime’s stability (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, & Smith, 
1999). A number of studies show that economic development improves prospects for 
consolidation in democracies by nurturing broad-based acceptance to the regime as well as 
helping improve the legitimacy of the ruler (Brender & Drazen, 2007).  
President Habibe, who came into power in 1998 following the end of authoritarian rule in 
Indonesia, prioritized strengthening institutions and promoting economic growth. Instead of 
fighting wars, Habibe (as cited in Ressa, 1998) affirmed his priority was to jumpstart “the 
economy back into the right track” (para. 2). President Wahid, who succeeded Habibe in 
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Indonesia, had to choose between focusing his attention on internal unrest and enhancing the 
institutional stability of the unconsolidated regime (Soesastro, 2000).  
Unconsolidated authoritarian regimes are also tasked with the burden of promoting 
institutions of governance across their territories. Rather than fighting wars, these leaders will be 
concerned with shifting their energy and resources to winning support to facilitate acceptance of 
the regime’s institutions and strengthening the political apparatus of the regime. To strengthen 
the regime, the incumbent will be concerned with building loyalty networks across territories and 
developing institutional mechanisms that dictate acceptable social behavior (Göbel, 2011). 
Although authoritarian regimes are expected to have restricted “winning coalitions” in the future 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999, p. 149), recall that under unconsolidated regimes, institutional 
mechanisms for suppressing dissent and internal unrest are weak and it still remains unclear 
whose support the incumbent has and needs to remain in power. Moreover, it is also uncertain if 
the incumbent has the support of the military. Similar to unconsolidated democratic regimes, 
immature authoritarian regimes seek to promote wide-scale acceptance of their rules and 
institutions among the general population by promoting economic growth and engaging in 
economic development activities (Albertus, Fenner, & Slater, 2018). Under the immature 
autocratic regime of Ershad in the 1980s, the president focused on promoting economic growth 
to stabilize his regime (Rahman, 1983).  
Unlike consolidated regimes, which have developed bureaucratic apparatuses, continuing 
civil wars under unconsolidated regimes would be considered too costly given that the 
institutional framework of the regime is inchoate and is not likely to endure (Seeberg, 2018). 
Given that unconsolidated regimes benefit from reallocating scarce resources to building and 
improving governance than fighting, I expect that their leaders will be more inclined to seek a 
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peace settlement. Because focusing energy on institutional strengthening is imperative for the 
long-term endurance of the regime, the benefits of negotiation increase, which subsequently 
increases the probability that the wartime adversaries meet at the negotiating table. Resources 
directed toward improving governance will help promote the long-term endurance of the regime 
as well as alleviate some of the current threats that destabilize the regime.  
3.5.2. International Considerations  
Finally, an international dimension also plays an important role in helping unconsolidated 
regimes improve their governance. A number of studies conclude that foreign aid cuts are 
harmful for incumbents involved in armed conflicts (Escriba-Folch, 2010) and even harm an 
autocrat’s ability to enhance the durability of his political regime (Escriba-Folch & Wright, 
2010). Because unconsolidated regimes lack capable and self-enforcing institutions, their leaders 
depend on outside help for shoring up the strength of their institutions (Stanton, 2016). 
Mistreatment of civilians by governments, which occur frequently in the context of armed 
conflict, often lead to the slashing of donor aid by international aid organizations (Stanton, 2016, 
Lebovic & Voeten, 2009). Unconsolidated regimes that come into power during the civil war 
view the re-implementation of aid as critical in helping shore up support for their own fledgling 
regime. Leaders presiding over unconsolidated and unstable regimes are more likely to meet the 
demands of the punishing state to put an end to economic sanctions (Dashti-Gibson, Davis, & 
Radcliff, 1997). A steady flow of financial resources can be leveraged by leaders presiding over 
unconsolidated regimes to rectify economic recessions (a common problem in many countries 
during armed conflict) (Stanton, 2016, p. 40). Aid allows the incumbent presiding over an 
unconsolidated regime to improve the economy, build infrastructure, and strengthen the 
resilience of institutions, including the military sector (Stanton, 2016, p. 40) and allows the 
incumbent, including those presiding over authoritarian regimes, to funnel resources to shield 
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against political and economic shocks that in turn can help the incumbent safeguard his tenure in 
office (Kono & Montinola, 2009). Continued civil wars may also limit opportunities for 
economic trade, which is critical for the endurance of unconsolidated regimes (Stanton, 2016).  
The decision for the South Sudanese state to engage in peace negotiations with rebels in 
2018 was largely driven by concerns over a need to maintain and secure international support, 
with one representative of the civil war government worried that the United States would 
“abandon this country,” which would be detrimental to the interests of the unconsolidated regime 
(O’Grady, 2018). Against the backdrop of poor economic conditions, peace negotiations with the 
rebels eventually took place (Specia, 2018).  
Unconsolidated regimes are expected to reap the benefits of international aid if they 
behave and function like a modern and peaceful state. Because unconsolidated regimes value 
financial help from other countries to help shore up endurance of their regime (Stanton, 2016), 
their leaders face more salient political costs for continuing a civil war than leaders presiding 
over consolidated regimes. In contrast, the costs of continued war are less salient for political 
incumbents presiding over consolidated regimes given that they, by nature, have developed and 
strong institutions (Stanton, 2016, pp. 40-41).  
3.5.3. Bangladesh’s Experience with Negotiations  
The experience in Bangladesh supports the theoretical argument that leaders presiding 
over unconsolidated regimes have strong incentives to end wars. In 1982, the leader of the army, 
General Hussein Ershad, ousted Abdus Sattar—who presided over a democratic regime—in a 
coup (Chakma, 2012, p. 30). Ershad inherited his predecessor’s civil war: Since 1972, the 
government had been fighting the Shanti Bahini, a rebel group fighting for greater autonomy for 
the Chittagong Hills Tract (CHT) region in southeastern Bangladesh (Hazarika, 1989). Ershad 
came into power during the tenth year of the country’s ongoing civil war with rebels. During 
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Ershad’s rule, tens of thousands of people became displaced as a result of the armed conflict and 
up to 3,000 people lost their lives (Weisman, 1986).  
As laid out in my theoretical discussion, the unconsolidated regime was marked by the 
following problems: 1) underdeveloped rules regarding the allocation of political power, 2) 
political elite divisions and threats from rival parties and ordinary citizens as a result of these 
incomplete rules (Baxter, 1991; Crosette, 1989), and 3) a need for a steady stream of foreign aid 
(Mohsin, 2003; Hazarika, 1995). 
 In office, Ershad engaged in quarrels and disputes over political responsibilities within 
his own party and with rival political elites (Chakma, 2012). Ershad’s takeover of the country in 
1982 did not have the support of key political parties or the vast majority of citizens, who had 
previously enjoyed the democratic traditions and institutions of the Sattar regime and were 
concerned of about democratic restrictions under a military regime (Crosette, 1989; Uddin, 
2006). Civil society movements and rival political parties continued to operate in the new 
political environment (Claiborne, 1984; Uddin, 2006). Rival parties became engaged in turf wars 
with Ershad over political powers; one ex-government official (as cited in Crosette, 1989) stated 
that “the queue” to usurp the regime from power “is as long as the Bangladesh Army.” Rival 
parties quickly aligned and colluded with one another against the unconsolidated regime, 
including the two largest parties in the country, the Awami League (AL) and the Nationalist 
Party (BNP) (Islam, 2015, pp. 33-34; Akhter, 2017, p. 64). The forging of relationships and pacts 
between rival parties became a common tactic used by rival parties to delegitimize the country’s 
new institutions (Islam, 2015, p. 37; Akhter, 2017, p. 64). During the 1980s, a handful of social 
movements and political parties emerged, calling for the protection of democratic liberties and 
the promotion of rural livelihoods (see Uddin, 2006, pp. 37-40). One human rights activist (as 
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cited in Crosette, 1989) expressed his frustration with the institutions of the new regime, stating, 
“[W]e have to wait for the army to move him aside.” When asked to comment on the new 
regime’s actions on restricting democratic institutions, Moinal Hussain (as cited in Campbell, 
1982), who worked for a top newspaper in the country, believed that the government’s policies 
would continue to be unpopular.  
Ershad prioritized combatting corruption and promoting economic growth (Rahman, 
1983) to build loyalty for his regime. Ershad and his government advisors routinely pointed to 
the Sattar’s regime failures in rectifying these problems, highlighting the lack of economic 
development and rampant inefficiencies of the government (Rahman, 1983; Islam, 2015). In the 
year before Ershad’s takeover of the government, GDP per capita was non-existent (Rahman, 
1983, p. 153). Ershad justified his coup by highlighting the economic problems and in his words, 
the “all-pervasive corruption” that he believed was “ruining the society” (as cited in Rahman, 
1983, p. 151). Ershad (as cited in Honsa, 1982, para. 7) further accused the Sattar regime of 
failing to bring economic prosperity: “This government has completely failed. The people expect 
the Army to come to their aid.” Sattar himself allegedly agreed that “in the interest of the 
Bangladesh people, military rule has become necessary. I fully support the loyal armed forces’ 
effort to help the nation” (as cited in Honsa, 1982). 
To build the durability of the regime, Ershad allocated resources to improving economic 
development (Hazarkia, 1995, p. 284) and building patronage networks that would set the 
foundation for the institutional apparatus of the regime (Thörlind, 2000, pp. 53-54). Ending the 
civil war with the insurgents allowed Ershad to focus his attention on improving the bureaucratic 
capacity of the state (Crosette, 1989; Rahman 1983, p. 150). In the mid- to late 1980s, Ershad 
engaged in peace negotiations with the political wing of the insurgent movement (Mohsin, 2003, 
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p. 40). The peace negotiations, according to Mohsin (2003), helped Ershad “build support for his 
regime. A peace accord in the CHT might have given him the political legitimacy and 
recognition that he was seeking from the people of Bangladesh” (pp. 39-40). 
Under Ershad’s projects, loyalty networks with rival elites were strengthened through the 
implementation of political decentralization programs (Akhter, 2017). Moreover, Ershad also 
focused his energy alleviating disputes with rival political elites regarding the contours of 
political decision-making to stabilize his regime. During this time, political parties with 
democratic leanings had to be appeased. In this capacity, he co-opted opposition parties by 
offering them jobs and positions in his government (Baxter, 1991, p. 146-147).  
Concerns over the potential loss of foreign aid also played an important role in the 
decision for Ershad to engage in peace negotiations with the rebels (Mohsin, 2003, p. 39). The 
sustainability of the regime was contingent on the continuous flow of donor dollars coming into 
Bangladesh (Hazarika, 1995, p. 11). Without donor aid, Ershad would not be able to strengthen 
his institutions (Alam, 2015) or funnel economic growth to nurture broad-based acquiescence for 
his new regime (Bertocci, 1982). Indeed, donor assistance was critical for developing and 
strengthening the institutional apparatus of the unconsolidated regime, particularly the clientelist 
and patronage networks that would constitute the incumbent’s future support base (Alam, 2015). 
In a 1984 interview, Ershad (as cited in Weaver, 1984) expressed the importance of international 
support: “We are a poor country, with definite leanings toward the West. We’re very good 
friends with the United States and China, and we wanted to maintain good relations with the 
Soviet Union as well.”  
During the peace process in the early 1980s, the government agreed to return swathes of 
occupied territory back to the indigenous tribes of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Other substantive 
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matters were discussed in subsequent peace negotiations (Mohsin, 2003). Following new rounds 
of peace talks in 1988, the rebels pressed for a series of concessions. Apart from self-governance, 
these demands called for the presence of international peacekeepers from the United Nations in 
the conflict zone and for the government to remove its army from the conflict zone. The rebels 
also pressed for the resettlement of non-indigenous people living in the Chittagong region 
(Mohsin, 2003, p. 40). The civil war government subsequently approved the implementation of 
some form of decentralization at the district level in the contested region (Mohsin, 2003, p. 40). 
The experience in Bangladesh illustrates the high costs incumbents face for continuing to 
prosecute wars when the regime remains immature and prone to collapse.  
3.6. Negotiations as a Strategy to Shore Up Endurance of the Unconsolidated Regime  
The argument presented in section 3.5 illustrates that political incumbents who preside 
over unconsolidated regimes face higher costs for maintaining a unilateral military strategy 
against the rebels than those presiding over consolidated regimes. To reiterate, continuing to 
prosecute civil wars, which are destabilizing by nature, becomes a costly endeavor for 
unconsolidated regimes whose leaders need to spend their time developing and strengthening 
governance. Finally, concerns of losing support from international organizations and other 
countries, which is paramount for institution-building, also alters the decision-making calculus of 
unconsolidated regimes (Stanton, 2016).  
In contrast, consolidated regimes face lower opportunity costs for continuing to fight the 
insurgents. Because the rules regarding the allocation of political power are clear and the policies 
of the regime are effectively implemented (Weingast, 1997; Göbel, 2011), their leaders are less 
concerned with reallocating resources from the government budget to institution-building and the 
promotion of the regime’s norms and policies. These theoretical arguments lead to the second 
hypothesis of this research project: 
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Hypothesis 2: Unconsolidated political regimes are more likely to negotiate with rebels than 
consolidated political regimes. 
3.7. Electoral Institutions  
Elections are the mechanisms that allow citizens to hold leaders accountable for 
unpopular policy choices and to reward them for popular choices. Although competitive 
elections are a trademark institution in democratic countries, they can and do occur in anocratic 
countries. In authoritarian countries, elections may only be held in name only (Golder, 2005). 
Though a few studies suggest that democracy is positively associated with peace negotiations 
and negotiated settlements (Biswas, 2006) and negatively associated with civilian violence 
(Stanton, 2016), it is not clear which component of democracy, such as the presence of inclusive 
institutions, the presence of elections, or the degree of fractionalization within government, 
exerts stronger effects on wartime policies. Only a few studies consider the effects of these 
individual components of democracy on war outcomes. For instance, the relationship between 
the degree of decision-making by the incumbent in government and negotiations has received 
some attention, although the findings are mixed (see Ogutcu-Fu, 2016; Bapat, 2005; Urlacher, 
2011).  
Empirical studies assessing the effects of electoral institutions on negotiation behavior, 
however, are virtually non-existent in the extant scholarship. A few scholars, however, do point 
to the delegitimizing effects of elections for the ruler engaged in armed conflict (Velasco, 2005; 
Malhotra, 2016). Armed conflicts are often exploited by rival political elites to damage the 
electoral chances of the incumbent responsible for starting or continuing wars, which are costly 
and deadly by nature (Velasco, 2005). Rival political elites aim to increase the salience of the 
myriad economic, political, and social problems emanating from war, including human 
67 
casualties, in hopes of damaging the electoral chances of the incumbent (Velasco, 2005). This 
argument suggests that incumbents who face stronger institutional mechanisms of accountability, 
such as competitive elections, should be more sensitive to continuing wars. However, enduring 
wars are not just endemic in countries that are ruled by unelected leaders; leaders who have faced 
competitive elections, such as in Spain, Ireland, and Colombia, also have prosecuted lengthy 
wars, opting to fight costly and bloody wars rather than seek a peace agreement (see, for 
instance, Clark, 1990; Pruitt, 2007).  
As an example, competitively elected leaders in Peru maintained a strict unilateral 
military strategy against the Sendero Luminoso and Túpac Amaru rebel movements despite 
mounting battlefield costs and an inability of the civil war government to defeat the insurgents in 
the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s (Rochlin, 2003; Nieto, 2011). Between 1980 and 1987, 
nearly 40% of those killed during the civil war were civilians (Leger, 1987a). Elected leaders 
battled rebels, which in general were condemned by the public. Rather than negotiating a 
settlement, the Peruvian state not only adopted a more brutal campaign strategy against the 
rebels but also denounced human rights organizations for criticizing its military campaigns (see 
Holmes, 2001, p. 103). Armed with public opinion polls favoring an end to terrorism, the 
Peruvian state continued to prosecute the war, often brutally at times, despite mounting 
battlefield costs (CNN, 1997).  
To better understand why leaders who face scrutiny at the ballot box decide to continue 
wars or settle, I argue that the explicit preferences of citizens regarding the rebels need to feature 
prominently into theoretical debates. In general, much less attention has been given to 
understanding how the role of behavioral indicators, particularly the popularity of rebels relative 
to the government, influence the wartime policies of elected leaders. I argue that the explicit 
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preferences of the public should influence the political costs that elected incumbents face for 
continuing the war versus trying to end the war. Here, I consider the role of public opinion, 
specifically the popularity of the rebel group relative to the civil war government, in shaping the 
decision of elected leaders to negotiate.  
3.7.1. Conditioning Effects of Domestic Support for Rebels Relative to the Civil War 
Government  
The balance of popular support for the rebels versus the government determines what 
direction elected leaders will take regarding the conflict. If leaders who face stronger electoral 
institutions, such as competitive elections, do not take into consideration the explicit wartime 
policy preferences of the public, they risk being ousted from power (see Bueno de Mesquita & 
Siverson, 1995; Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2007; Stanton, 2016).  
The more popular support the rebel group has relative to the elected incumbent, the more 
likely the latter is to re-evaluate existing wartime policies to maintain political power 
(Lieberfeld, 1999). In particular, rebel sympathizers who are politically active pose a political 
threat to elected leaders. Supporters of the rebels may cast votes against the incumbent and his 
political party in future elections and engage in anti-government demonstrations and other 
activities that seek to delegitimize the incumbent if the demands of the rebels are not met 
(Lieberfeld, 1999). Moreover, opposition parties can leverage public opinion in favor of the 
rebels to win domestic support and hence hurt the future electoral chances of the incumbent and 
his political party (see Scott, 1994).   
 Leaders who face national elections are expected to engage in peace negotiations when 
the rebels are at least as popular as the civil war government. Stronger electoral institutions force 
the incumbent to be sensitive to the preferences and demands of the public (Stanton, 2016), 
which increases the costs of continued war. In such a political environment, rebel sympathizers 
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pose a legitimate threat to the electoral survival of the incumbent and have a realistic chance of 
ousting the incumbent at the ballot box if he does not negotiate. The accommodation of rebel 
demands is hence expected to reduce political costs—reduce the likelihood of a re-election 
loss—for the incumbent and his political party (Lieberfeld, 1999). Hence, building on 
Lieberfeld’s work, I expect the incumbent to face high political costs for not negotiating when 
the rebels are at least as popular as the civil war government.  
The experiences in the United Kingdom, Indonesia, Spain, and Colombia illustrate how, 
regardless of the level of regime consolidation, relative popular support for the rebels and 
electoral institutions work together to create incentives for peace negotiations. From the late 
1960s to 1997, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) led a terrorist campaign against the British 
government (Pruitt, 2007). With a strong Catholic base of supporters, the IRA sought to drive out 
the British in Northern Ireland in a bloody war that killed thousands of people (Pruitt, 2007; 
Hayes & McAllister, 2005). Between 1969 and 2002, the civil war killed 3,352 civilians, 
according to figures released by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (as cited in Hayes & 
McAllister, 2005, p. 601). Of this figure, nearly two-thirds of these deaths were civilians. In the 
mid-1990s, the political wing of the IRA, the Sinn Fein, significantly increased its popular 
support base through its political campaigns to win hearts and minds, which allowed the rebels to 
secure support from Catholics and newly registered voters (McAllister 2004, p. 140). As the 
rebels were gaining support, the British government experienced a spike in the domestic political 
costs for continuing the war that risked the re-election prospects of British prime minister John 
Major. Human rights groups frequently exposed the government for human rights abuses during 
the course of the war (Darnton, 1994). By 1994, the majority of British citizens supported the 
secession of Northern Ireland, in essence lending their support to the overarching goal of the IRA 
70 
and denouncing Britain’s wartime effort (Darnton, 1994). Indeed, concerns over electoral loss as 
a result of the civil war with the IRA were taking a toll on the prime minister at this time. Out of 
all the prime ministers in Great Britain, John Major was viewed the least favorably by the public 
(Darnton, 1994; Robinson, 1993). Moreover, the Conservative party—Major’s party—continued 
to lose seats in the Parliament (Darnton, 1994). Given the expected political costs, the 
government undertook a series of peace negotiations with the IRA in an attempt to settle the 
bloody and protracted war (An Sionnach Fionn, 2017; Watt, 2008). Jonathan Powell, a member 
from the British government, also acknowledged the government’s determination to end the 
armed conflict (as cited in Watt, 2008). 
Following the transition to democracy in Indonesia in 1998, presidents Habibe, Wahid, 
and Megawati, all of whom faced re-election via competitive elections, faced growing pressure 
from the public to provide concessions to rebel movements. During this time, politicians and the 
public by and large favored a political solution to the armed conflict (Miller, 2009, p. 52). The 
public overwhelmingly condemned the government’s military involvement in Aceh and 
sympathized with the goals of the rebels, including those centering on greater minority rights and 
autonomy (Miller, 2009). According to Aristides Katoppo, an Indonesia-based reporter, Habibe’s 
re-election bid depended heavily on whether he would respond to the demands of the public 
regarding these conflicts, particularly the East Timor conflict (The Economist, 1998). In 
describing Habibe’s precarious political situation, Katoppo (as cited in The Economist, 1998) 
claimed, “It is like white-water rafting. If you want to stay afloat, you can’t go against the 
current.” Given a political environment in which the balance of public opinion favored the 
rebels, Habibe felt he had no choice but to make concessions to rebel movements to reduce the 
risk of losing re-election. Pat Walsh, a human rights activist, also reflects on the government’s 
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policies in response to the increasing support for the East Timor rebels, describing how the 
Indonesian government “walked right through” the demands of secessionist movements (as cited 
in Weldemichael, 2013, p. 261). In contrast, during the authoritarian years in Indonesia, 
President Suharto did not face scrutiny at the ballot box (Stanton, 2016). Suharto chose to 
continue a strict military strategy against secessionist movements, even when there was rising 
support for the rebels during the 1970s (Stanton, 2016, pp. 125-126; Prasetyo & Birks, 2010). 
In Spain, the elected government under President Adolfo Suárez González engaged in 
peace negotiations when the balance of popular support for the rebels tipped in favor of the 
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), a separatist movement fighting for an independent Basque 
province (Clark, 1990). Shortly after taking office in 1975, Suárez adopted a hardline approach 
against the rebels. In this capacity, he targeted alleged members of the ETA; the use of death 
squads against the rebels even became routine (Clark, 1990, p. 89). However, the public, 
disenchanted with the armed conflict, began to pressure the president to end the war and/or meet 
the demands of the rebels, a change in public opinion from the 1960s in which support for the 
rebels was minimal in the Basque region (see Llera, Mata, & Irvin, 1993, p. 116). During the 
mid- to late 1970s, the president’s party began to experience the implications of its unpopular 
policies: Rival political parties cut into the seat share of the Union of the Democratic Centre 
(UCD) party (the president’s party) in the legislative branch (Clark, 1990, p. 90). Support for 
peace negotiations even flavored the 1979 congressional elections, which increased the saliency 
of the rebels’ demands. Rival political parties and scores of citizens, particularly in the Basque 
region, began to press the central government to consider the objectives of the separatist 
movement in the political sphere. Members of key opposition parties called on the president to 
negotiate; in an interview with the Basque-based Deia newspaper in February 1979, the main 
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candidate from the Basque National Party—Xabier Arzalluz—expressed: “The government’s 
position, that it is useless to negotiate, is gratuitous. We have to know what ETA is asking, and 
once these things have been said, then we can know the truth” (as cited in Clark, 1990, p. 89). 
Public opinion regarding the rebels threatened the president’s political survival in office and 
threatened his party’s control in the parliament (Clark, 1990). Subsequently, Suárez launched 
peace negotiations in 1979 (Clark, 1990).  
The Colombian experience also illustrates how relative domestic support for the rebels 
work together with the electoral institutions to affect strategies adopted during civil wars. Since 
1964, the government of Colombia had been engaged in a civil war with the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a Marxist-inspired insurgent group fighting for a system of 
government that redistributes wealth to poorer classes (Leech, 2011). During most of the 1960s 
and 1970s, Colombia’s electoral system remained largely uncompetitive (Jones, 1995). 
Moreover, no peace negotiations with the FARC took place during this time period (UCDP, n.d.-
b). By 1974, popular elections were implemented, largely competitive in nature (Jones, 1995, p. 
7). Andrés Pastrana, a conservative who assumed the presidency in 1998, entered into peace 
talks with the FARC with strong support from Colombians for a peace agreement that included 
concessions to the rebels (Leech, 2011, p. 75). In response to public demand, Pastrana ceded an 
area of 42,000 square kilometers to the FARC, proscribing army troops from interfering in the 
area (Leech, 2011, p. 75, Livingstone, 2003, p. 50; Kline, 2007, p. 54). The president 
“established the demilitarized zone at the beginning of his term and had promised it during the 
campaign,” according to an unnamed sociologist from Colombia in January 2005 (as interviewed 
and quoted in Kline, 2007, p. 54). However, the peace negotiations under Pastrana were 
unsuccessful and rather antagonistic; the rebels failed to curb their use of violence. Moreover, the 
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leader of the FARC, Manuel Marulanda Vélez, pulled out of peace negotiations in early 1999 
(Kline, 2007, p. 58; Leech, 2011, p. 76). Although negotiations still occurred between Pastrana 
and other members of the FARC, relations between the wartime adversaries remained glacial. 
Eventually, preliminary talks resulted in both sides agreeing to topics for discussions in future 
peace negotiations, including socio-economic development and institutional change in the 
military (Leech, 2011, p. 76).  
By 2001, the balance of popular support shifted in favor of the civil war government as a 
result of the FARC’s violent activities. The FARC’s exploitation of the safe haven increased 
domestic support for the government’s military logic against the rebels (Castillo, 2012). Nearly 
two-thirds of citizens designated safety and terrorism as the most pressing concern, according to 
a 2001 poll conducted by Americas Barometer (as cited in Maykas, 2016, pp. 140, 147). The 
Roman Catholic Church cited the FARC’s continued abuses stemming from its control of the 
government-sanctioned demilitarized region (Ruiz, 2001, p. 80). By 2002, the FARC continued 
to lose support (Grisham, 2014, p. 85). According to Jenny Pearce (2003), a specialist in 
Colombian politics, the public placed much of the blame of the violence on the insurgents (p. 
13). Although the pro-government militias committed the bulk of acts of violence—including the 
indiscriminate targeting of civilians—during the course of the armed conflict, the public was 
much more critical of the FARC’s exploitation of the safe haven, which subsequently led to a 
steeper decline in public support (Pearce, 2003, pp. 12-13).  
Álvaro Uribe’s anti-FARC rhetoric contributed to his election victory in 2002,4 in which 
he had the support of just over 50% of voters (Mayka, 2016, p. 140). During this time, 
                                               
4 Pastrana could not run for re-election due to term limits (CNN, 2002).  
74 
Colombians saw little hope for peace with the FARC and heavily favored the government’s 
military approach against the rebels (Leech 2011, p. 88). Armed with domestic support, Uribe 
spearheaded a far-reaching counterinsurgency campaign in his first term in office against the 
FARC, which consequently hurt the rebels’ capacity to commit violent acts (Grisham, 2014, p. 
85). In 2003, Uribe allocated substantial public funds for his ambitious Democratic Security 
plan, which had the goal of defeating the rebels (Mayka, 2016, p. 140). Policies under the plan 
effectively sidelined the powers of the courts by granting the military the privilege to make legal 
decisions (Mayka, 2016, pp. 140-141).  
The FARC continued to lose domestic support and scores of civilians lent their support to 
the Uribe government. During his first year in office, nearly two-thirds of Colombians approved 
of Uribe, according to polls conducted by Latinobarómetro in 2008 (as cited in Mayka, 2016, p. 
141). Moreover, Uribe enjoyed political support from over 60% of congressmen (Mayka, 2016, 
p. 141).  
Uribe’s popular support in his fight against the rebels contributed to his re-election 
victory in 2006. Pre-election polls revealed a little over two-thirds of the public favored Uribe to 
continue on as a second-term as president, and much of this support stemmed from Uribe’s 
crackdown on insurgencies in the country (Teslik, 2006). One policy specialist, Peter Hakim (as 
cited in Teslik, 2006, para. 3), reflects on why Uribe enjoyed domestic support: “Uribe has 
done a masterful job at bringing a measure of security to the country and reassuring people.”  
3.8. Theoretical Predictions  
If the rebels have sympathizers who pose a realistic threat to the electoral chances of the 
incumbent, stronger electoral institutions should compel the incumbent to engage in peace 
negotiations with the violent opposition to stave off future electoral loss at the ballot box for him 
and his political party. Elections make political incumbents more sensitive to public opinion (see 
75 
Stanton, 2016), which in turn increases the political costs of continuing the armed conflict. 
Hence, elected leaders who face rebels who have secured meaningful popular support from the 
population face salient political costs for not negotiating with the opposition. For them, the 
benefits of negotiations are clear (Lieberfeld, 1999).  
 Because I expect that the popularity of the rebels relative to the government conditions 
the effect between electoral institutions and peace negotiations, I will capture this argument with 
a conditional hypothesis. The theoretical arguments presented previously lead to the third and 
fourth hypotheses of this research: 
Hypothesis 3: Electoral institutions alone do not have an effect on the probability of peace 
negotiations.  
Hypothesis 4: Stronger electoral institutions increase the probability of peace negotiations only 
when the rebels are at least as popular as the civil war government (regardless of the level of 
regime consolidation). 
3.9. Alternative Explanations  
Before continuing, alternative explanations for the relationship between regime 
consolidation and peace negotiations should be addressed. Regime change may be caused by an 
unpopular civil war or popular support for the rebels, which may also affect the probability of 
peace negotiations taking place.  
Research on leadership dynamics and civil conflict outcomes provides some insights into 
this explanation (see Croco, 2011; Prorok, 2016; Tiernay, 2015; Ryckman & Braithwaite, 2017). 
Ryckman & Braithwaite (2017) assess how changes in leadership in the civil war government 
affect the likelihood of peace negotiations. However, a concern Ryckman & Braithwaite have is 
that an unfavorable war—in which the civil war government is faring poorly—increases the 
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prospects of a new leader coming to power and also increases the probability of negotiations. 
Ryckman & Braithwaite (2017) find no evidence that poor battlefield performance—as captured 
by a running measure of wartime casualties sustained during the war—significantly affects who 
comes into power during civil war.  
Other research also draws similar conclusions (Prorok, 2016; Croco, 2011). In her 
research, Croco (2011) tests the hypothesis that government leaders who bear responsibility for 
starting or prolonging a civil war are more likely to continue the war in hopes of a victory and to 
prevent their removal from power. However, according to her, there exists a prospect that new 
leaders who are not responsible for the civil conflict take power when the outlook of the armed 
conflict for the state looks bleak. Croco (2011) states that when new leaders take office during 
armed conflict, “they thus have the unfortunate outcomes forced upon them instead of actively 
choosing to settle for worse terms” (p. 471). To test the soundness of this potential driver of 
conflict termination, Croco (2011) restricts her sample to include cases of changes in government 
leadership during the course of armed conflicts. She finds no evidence that past removals of 
presidents implicated in the armed conflict or wartime performance by government troops prior 
to leadership change affected whether or not a new leader who is affiliated with the armed 
conflict assumes power. This leads Croco (2011) to conclude that new leaders unaffiliated with 
the armed conflict are no less likely to come into power than new leaders affiliated with the 








CHAPTER 4.  MIXED-METHODS RESEARCH DESIGN  
4.1. Introduction  
To test the soundness of my theoretical arguments, the research project leverages the 
strengths of both quantitative and qualitative methods. In this chapter, I provide an overview of 
the mixed-methods research design that will be used to evaluate the hypotheses presented in the 
theory chapter. First, I will discuss the advantages of using a mixed-methods design. I will then 
discuss the empirical component of this project, including an overview of the data, sources, and 
variables that will be used to empirically test my hypotheses. I will then provide an overview of 
the qualitative component of the dissertation, which will serve as the basis for the case studies in 
subsequent chapters of this dissertation.  
4.2. Advantages of a Mixed-Methods Design  
There are tradeoffs between large-N analyses and small-N studies. Large-N analyses have 
higher external validity (Gerring, 2007). With regard to the latter type of studies, focusing on a 
few cases in detail can help elucidate on how, when, and why explanatory variables affect 
dependent variables (see George & Bennett, 2005). Causal mechanisms, according to George & 
Bennett (2005) are the “ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes 
through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, 
to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities” (p. 137). Case studies allow 
researchers to investigate more thoroughly how and why causes of interest affect the outcomes of 
interest. The qualitative component will help evaluate the soundness of proposed theories, 
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identify missing variables in the casual chain, and to gauge the strengths of alternative 
explanations (Lieberman, 2005).  
There are several advantages for conducting qualitative research in the context of this 
particular research project. First, there exist relatively scant qualitative studies examining how 
behavioral and political variables affect strategies adopted during civil wars. Most qualitative 
studies examine how variation in the relative military capacities of wartime adversaries or the 
length of conflict affect incentives for peace settlements during civil war (see Zartman, 1995; 
Salla, 1997; Lieberfeld, 1999). Second, the theoretical arguments herein rely heavily on the civil 
war government’s perceptions and decision-making calculus related to domestic political costs. 
Case studies will provide insights into these perceptions. Finally, a critical component of the 
theoretical arguments center on understanding how the balance of popular support between the 
rebels versus the government affects prospects for peace talks. The empirical analysis is unable 
to capture the nature and variation in domestic support, including whose preferences matter more 
for the government to change its behavior during war. A qualitative method is hence better 
designed to capture variation in relative domestic support that is predictably absent in my 
empirical analysis.  
4.3. Empirical Component  
4.3.1. Data  
The quantitative component of the research design leverages data from Ogutcu-Fu (2016) 
that cover all peace negotiations between dyads that took place during civil wars from the years 
1980 through 2005. The final dataset for this project leverages a pool of 94 conflicts from 55 
countries across the world, involving 172 unique dyads. Of the total number of 1,194 dyad years 
in the dataset, 229 dyad-years witnessed peace negotiations take place. Peace negotiations took 
place with 79 different rebel groups. The dataset from Ogutcu-Fu (2016) covers all civil wars as 
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defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) 
(UCDP, n.d.-a) and defined earlier on in this project. Ogutcu-Fu (2016) uses the conflict 
selections from Cunningham and colleagues (2009) in their Non-State Actor dataset. 
Dependent variable.  
The dependent variable, Peace Negotiations, captures whether dyads engaged in peace 
negotiations in any given year of in a civil war (Ogutcu-Fu, 2016, p. 409). Peace negotiations 
occur when representatives from the civil war government and the rebel group, including 
members of their political branches, meet face-to-face to discuss ways to terminate the civil war 
(Ogutcu-Fu, 2016; Ogutcu, 2015). I take this variable from Ogutcu-Fu (2016).  
Independent variables.  
Hypothesis 1 states that peace negotiations are more likely to occur when rebel groups 
are at least as popular as the civil war government. Here, I use the mobilization capacity variable 
from the Non-State Actor (NSA) dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 2013). In the 
NSA, the mobilization capacity variable captures the degree to which insurgents can attract 
personnel relative to the civil war government (Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 2009, p. 
580; Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 2013, p. 522). According to the architects of the NSA, 
the mobilization capacity variable “provides an estimate of an organization’s ability to mobilize 
support, since we expect this to influence government responses, and not whether the 
organization actually mobilizes potential supporters” (Cunningham et al., 2009, p. 580). The 
mobilization capacity variable is based on observable manifestations of popular support, such as 
evidence suggesting support for the goals of the rebels, public demonstrations in favor of the 
rebels, election outcomes in which rebels participated in politics, and the percentage of the 
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population that belong to the same ethnic group as the rebels5 (Gleditsch, Cunningham, & 
Salehyan, 2013). Admittedly, the variable used in this analysis serves as a proxy for rebel 
support relative to the government. Ideally, a more suitable variable for capturing rebel support 
relative to the government would be derived from nationally representative surveys (see Gallup, 
2007) that ask citizens the following question for each year of a conflict with a given dyad: “Do 
you prefer the civil war government to stay in power or would you like the rebels to take 
power?” A more continuous measure of rebel support would also be useful to capture the extent 
of domestic support of the rebels (see, for instance, Blair, Fair, Malhotra, & Shapiro, 2013; 
Kaltenthaler & Miller, 2015). As an example, Kaltenthaler and Miller (2015) captured domestic 
support for the Pakistan-based Taliban via an ordinal variable. To construct the variable, 
participants in their study were asked to provide their feelings toward seven goals of the rebels, 
including goals related to religious indoctrination, public goods delivery, the implementation of 
Sharia law, and the removal of foreign troops from neighboring countries (p. 950). The highest 
value on the scale (a value of six) corresponded to the greatest level of domestic support for the 
rebel group and the lowest value on the scale (a value of zero) corresponded to the lowest level 
of domestic support (Kaltenthaler & Miller, 2015, p. 950). 
However, these proposed measures for capturing rebel support would require citizens to 
truthfully provide responses to sensitive questions. Questions that intend to elicit truthful 
responses6 regarding sensitive topics, such as rebel support, tend to suffer from a number of 
                                               
5 For instance, according to the codebook of the Non-State Actor Dataset, the mobilization capacity of the 
Mindanaeo National Liberation Front (MNLF) was rated as high relative to the civil war government because “[t]he 
Uppsala Conflict Database reports that by the mid-1970s, the MNLF movement had become very popular and was 
supported by almost all Muslims in the Philippines and many abroad” (Gleditsch, Cunningham, & Salehyan, 2013, 
p. 348).  
6 A number of scholars have attempted to overcome these challenges by using an “endorsement 
experiment” (Blair, Fair, Malhotra, & Shapiro, 2013, p. 31; Fair, Malhorta, & Shapiro, 2012; p. 688; Fair, Littman, 
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problems, including the tendency for respondents to withhold answers or provide answers that 
they perceive are socially acceptable (Blair et al., 2013, p. 30; Fair et al., 2016, pp. 9, 11; Fair, 
Malhorta, & Shapiro, 2012, pp. 690, 696; Bullock, Imai, & Shapiro, 2011, p. 365). In regard to 
the former, certain respondents may not respond at all to the questions aimed at gauging their 
support for insurgent groups. Concerns with revenge or retaliation by insurgents may incentivize 
certain participants to withhold answers (Fair, Malhorta, & Shapiro, 2012, p. 697; Fair et al., 
2016, p. 9). With regard to social desirability bias, respondents may provide answers that they 
deem are socially acceptable, including answers they believe are aligned with the views of the 
interviewers (Blair et al., 2013, p. 33).  
The original measure of the mobilization capacity variable included three categories 
covering high, moderate, and low levels of mobilization capacity relative to the government. 
However, because there are a limited number of observations categorized as “high,” a value of 0 
is given to observations in which rebels have low mobilization capacity relative to the civil war 
government and a value of 1 for observations in which the rebels have moderate or high 
mobilization capacity (Ogutcu-Fu, 2016, p. 409). The final variable, which I call Rebel Support, 
is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the rebel group has either a moderate or high ability to 
mobilize popular support relative to the civil war government and equals 0 if the rebels have a 
low ability to mobilize popular support relative to the civil war government (that is, this variable 
                                               
Malhorta, & Shapiro, 2016, p. 8; Kaltenthaler & Miller, 2015). Under these experiments, participants are placed into  
control and treatment groups via randomization and then are asked questions to gauge their  approval for certain 
policies; however, questions posed to the treatment group were framed in a manner in which it was clear that the 
rebel group supported a policy (Blair et al., 2013). According to Blair, Fair, Malhotra, & Shapiro (2013), the 
randomization setup will allow researchers to determine “affect toward the militant groups” once average responses 
from both groups have been obtained and compared to one another (p. 34).  
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equals 0 when the civil war government has a high ability to mobilize domestic support relative 
to the rebels) (Cunningham et al., 2009).   
 The second hypothesis focuses on the institutional consolidation of a country’s political 
regime. Recall that Hypothesis 2 posited that unconsolidated political regimes are more likely to 
negotiate than consolidated regimes. I use regime age as a measure of regime consolidation. The 
political regime component of this hypothesis is tested using the Durability variable from the 
Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2018). The Durability variable “provides a running 
measure of the durability of the regime’s authority pattern for a given year, that is, the number of 
years since the last substantive change in authority characteristics (defined as a 3-point change in 
the POLITY score)” (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2018, p. 14). It is a continuous variable. The 
Durability variable counts the number of years that a political regime has persisted. According to 
Brender and Drazen (2007), unconsolidated regimes tend to also be younger regimes. Indeed, a 
vast literature finds that political institutions, rules, and norms tend to become more established 
and consolidated over time (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009; Pierson, 2000, 2004). According to 
Pierson (2004), “sources of resilience will often accumulate over time” for institutions (p. 164). 
Although changes in political regimes can happen precipitously (Roland, 2004), such as when a 
new authoritarian regime comes into power following a military coup, the consolidation of both 
formal institutions—such as the rules regarding the scope and nature of political powers of the 
executive branch—and informal institutions—such as the wider citizenry’s approval and 
acceptance of democratic values—occurs gradually overtime (North, 1990; Pierson, 2004).  
Figure 1 provides a frequency chart of the distribution of observations of regime age. The 
findings from the frequency chart reveal some interesting results. First, a high proportion of 
observations appear to be very young regimes. Indeed, nearly 20% percent of observations are 
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regimes that have a value of zero for their age. Recall that there is a much lower risk of a 
collapse in established regimes (Mazucca, 2010, p. 336). Countries that recently formed a new 
political regime are more likely to collapse and be replaced by another political regime. Regimes 
that are able to persist are less likely to collapse (Seeberg, 2018, p. 12-13; Powell, Faulkner, 
Dean, & Romano, 2018). This argument can help explain, at least partly, why there are many 
observations of regimes that take on a value of zero in the dataset. Second, the distribution of 
observations in the frequency chart could suggest that violent opposition groups may be more 
likely to launch their rebellions when regimes are less consolidated. Because the contours of 
political power have yet to be fully determined and entrenched institutionally (Weingast, 1997), 
opposition groups that lack access to political avenues to influence the policymaking process 
may view the new political environment as more conducive to change and hope that the new 
regime would incorporate its demand in the political process if they resort to violence. This is 
similar to the “political opportunity theory” prominent in the social movement literature, which 
maintains that groups with grievances against the state view changes in the political environment 
as windows of opportunity for advancing their goals (Tarrow, 1988, p. 429). This can be 
examined by assessing how many conflicts begin during a regime transition.  
Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 focus on electoral institutions. Recall that Hypothesis 3 
states that electoral institutions alone do not have an effect on the probability of negotiations. 
Hypothesis 4 states leaders who face stronger electoral institutions are more likely to negotiate if 
the rebels are at least as popular as the civil war government (regardless of the level of regime 
consolidation). To capture the competitiveness of electoral institutions, I use the Executive Index 
of Electoral Competitiveness (EIEC) variable taken from the Database of Political Institutions 
(DPI) (Cruz, Keefer, & Scartascini, 2018a). The EIEC ranges from 1 through 7. Higher scores 
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for this variable, which I call Elections in this analysis, denote stronger electoral institutions 
(more competitive elections) with lower scores given to countries with relatively weaker or non-
existent electoral mechanisms of accountability (Cruz, Keefer, & Scartascini, 2018a; Cruz, 
Keefer, & Scartascini, 2018b).  
Because I expect that the popularity of the rebels relative to the government conditions 
the effect between electoral institutions and peace negotiations (Hypothesis 4), I capture this 
argument with the following interaction term: Elections*Rebel Support. I use the same Rebel 
Support variable used for Hypothesis 1 to capture the popularity of the rebels relative to the civil 
war government in the interaction term using data from Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 
(2013). The variable Rebel Support is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the rebel group has 
either a moderate or high ability to mobilize domestic support relative to the civil war 
government and equals 0 if the civil war government has a high ability to mobilize domestic 
support relative to the rebels (Cunningham et al., 2013). 
Alternative explanations.  
To control for alternative explanations, I include a number of control variables in the 
empirical analysis. The first set of control variables capture battlefield conditions. The variable 
Conflict Duration counts the number of years a dyad has been at war. Dyads involved in longer 
conflicts are expected to be more likely to settle the war given the inability of a party to prevail 
militarily (Zartman, 1995, 2001, 2008). I take this variable from the Cunningham, Gleditsch, and 
Salehyan (2009). I use a logged version of this variable to reduce skewedness. The second 
control variable, Conflict Intensity, captures the intensity of the civil war between dyads. A 
number of scholars find that deadlier conflicts make peace settlements less likely to occur 
(Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, & Joyce, 2008, p. 357). This variable is from Harbom et al. (2008) 
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and I code it as 1 for conflicts that produce at least 1,000 battle-related casualties a year and 
coded as 0 if otherwise. I use a lagged version of this variable. The third control variable, Rebel 
Strength, captures the military strength of the rebels relative to the civil war government. A 
number of studies also find that peace agreements are more likely to occur when rebels pose a 
military threat to the state, which reduces the chances that the government can win the war 
(Ogutcu-Fu, 2016; Cunningham et al., 2009, p. 590; Hultquist, 2013). I take the data for my 
Rebel Strength variable from Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009). I code the Rebel 
Strength variable as 1 if the rebel group in a given dyad is at least as strong as the state and 0 
otherwise.   
A number of researchers find differences in the resolution of conflict between territorial 
wars and non-territorial wars, pointing out that the former type of conflict is more difficult to end 
than the latter (see Walter, 2003, 2009; Licklider, 1995; Toft, 2002). Scholars point to 
complexities and impracticalities involved in sharing disputed territory for wartime adversaries 
(see Toft, 2003; Toft, 2002), the strengthening of ethnic divisions during armed conflicts 
(Kaufmann, 1996), and reputation costs that civil war governments incur from offering 
concessions (Walter, 2003) as contributing to the endurance of separatist wars. I use the NSA 
dataset (Cunningham et al. 2009) to construct a dummy variable called Territorial Conflict that 
is coded as 1 if the conflict revolves around territorial concerns and 0 if it centers on control for 
the national government.  
I also control for whether dyads engaged in separate peace negotiations in the prior year. 
The variable Prior Negotiations equals 1 if a dyad engaged in separate peace negotiation 
attempts in the prior year and 0 otherwise. This variable is constructed from data in Ogutcu-Fu 
(2016).  
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The remaining set of controls capture economic and demographic conditions in the 
country at war. The variable GDP per capita captures the level of economic development in 
countries. Poorer economic conditions are expected to generate regime change. A few scholars 
find that less wealthy countries are more likely to experience longer civil wars (see Balch-
Lindsay et al., 2008). However, DeRouen and Sobek (2004) find that wealthier countries 
involved in armed conflicts are less likely to seek out settlements. I use a logged version of this 
variable to reduce skewness. I also use a lagged version of this variable. I take this variable from 
Gleditsch (2002).  
I also control for ethnic diversity. Peace settlements are less likely to be offered in 
countries that are more ethnically heterogenous than those that are more homogenous (see 
Cunningham, 2014, p. 89). The variable ELF is a continuous variable that ranges between 0 and 
1 and measures “the probability that two individuals selected at random from a country will be 
from different ethnic groups” (Fearon, 2003, p. 208). The measure for the ELF is from Fearon 
(2003). In addition, I control for the number of other insurgent groups simultaneously fighting 
the government. As the number of non-state groups at war increases, the government should be 
less willing to offer concessions (Cunningham, 2006). I expect that incumbents are less likely to 
consolidate the institutions of their regimes as the number of other non-state actors increases. 
The variable NSAs is from Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009).   
Finally, I control for the time period. The end of the Cold War in 1990 brought about a 
diffusion of international norms advocating for peace and dialogue in conflict-affected states 
(Hartzell, Hoddie, & Rothchild, 2001). The Cold War variable equals 1 if the conflict occurred 
during the Cold War period, 0 otherwise. I take this variable from Ogutcu-Fu (2016).  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Type  Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Peace Negotiations Dichotomous .19 .39 0 1 
Elections  Interval  4.9 2.34 1 7 
Regime Age  Continuous 23.3 23.16 0 113 
Rebel Support (t-1) Dichotomous .45 .50 0 1 
Prior Negotiations Dichotomous .10 .30 0 1 
ELF Continuous  .61 .23 .04 1 
Conflict Duration 
(logged, in years) 
Continuous 2.01 .91 -.88 4.02 
Conflict Intensity (t-1)  Dichotomous  .36 .48 0 1 
Relative Military 
Strength (t-1) 
Dichotomous .05 .22 0 1 
GDP per capita (log) (t-1) Continuous 7.74 .94 6.18 9.82 
NSAs (t-1) Continuous  1.02 1.20 0 5 
Cold War  Dichotomous .38 .49 0 1 





Table 2. Description of Variables 
Variable Coding  Source  
Peace Negotiations Coded 1 if peace negotiations took place 
between a dyad in a given conflict-year, 
zero otherwise. 
Ogutcu-Fu (2016) 
Elections  Captures the strength of electoral 
mechanisms of accountability. The 
variable ranges from 1-7, with higher 
scores corresponding to more competitive 
elections and lower scores corresponding 
to weaker/non-existent electoral 
mechanisms of accountability.  
EIEC variable from the Database of 
Political Institutions (Cruz, Keefer, & 
Scartascini, 2018a).  
Regime Age  A continuous variable that “provides a 
running measure of the durability of the 
regime’s authority pattern for a given year, 
that is, the number of years since the last 
substantive change in authority 
characteristics (defined as a 3-point change 
in the POLITY score)” (Marshall et al., 
2018, p. 14).  
Durability variable from the Polity IV 
Project dataset, version 2017. (Marshall 
et al., 2018).  
 
Rebel Support  Coded 1 if the ability of the insurgents to 
mobilize domestic support is moderate or 
high relative to the civil war government, 0 
if the civil war government’s ability to 
mobilize domestic support is high relative 
to the civil war government.  
Mobilization Capacity variable from 
Non-State Actor dataset (Cunningham et 
al., 2013) 
Prior Negotiations Coded 1 if separate peace negotiation 
attempts took place between rebels and 
government in the previous year, 0 
otherwise. 
Ogutcu-Fu (2016) 
Ethnic Fractionalization This measures “the probability that two 
individuals selected at random from a 
country will be from different ethnic 
groups” (Fearon, 2003, p. 208).  
 
Fearon (2003) 
Conflict Duration  Number of years that have passed since the 
dyads began fighting (logged variable). 
Non-State Actor dataset (Cunningham et 
al., 2009) 
Conflict Intensity  Coded 1 if the conflict generates at least 
1000 battle-related deaths per year; coded 
0 if conflict generates between 25 and 999 
battlefield deaths per year. 
UCDP Dyadic Dataset (Harbom, 
Melander, & Wallensteen, 2008) 
GDP per capita   Gross Domestic Product (per capita) 
(logged variable). 
Gleditsch (2002) 
NSAs The number of other non-state violent 
groups fighting the civil war government.  
Non-State Actor dataset (Cunningham et 
al., 2009) 
Cold War Coded 1 for years of the Cold War period 
(1980-1989); coded 0 for years that 






Figure 1. Frequency plot, distribution of regime age. 
 
 
4.4. Qualitative Component  
There are several key benefits for conducting qualitative research. First, qualitative 
approaches, such as case studies, provide insights into the causal mechanisms by which 
independent variables influence dependent variables (see Bennett & George, 1997). Second, 
understanding the causal mechanisms has intrinsic value for policymakers seeking peace in 
conflict-affected countries. Even if the empirical evidence suggests that unconsolidated regimes 
are more likely to enter into peace negotiations, it would be critical to know the causal 
mechanisms that drive the relationship to “identify those mechanisms that policy interventions 
can affect” (Bennett & George, 1997, p. 3). Third, given a lack of theoretical inquiry into the 
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can help test the soundness of proposed theories (p. 75). Fourth, and related, a qualitative 
approach helps identify missed variables, including mediators and moderators, that affect the 
causal pathway between variables. Vennesson (2008) points out that case studies have been at 
the forefront in helping researchers explain drivers of political events (p. 223).  
There are several reasons why a qualitative component is particularly advantageous for 
this project. First, there exists relatively scant qualitative literature examining how behavioral 
factors related to public opinion and institutional characteristics of the state affect strategies 
adopted during civil wars. Most qualitative studies that do exist focus on assessing the soundness 
of ripeness theory, examining how variation in the relative military capacities of wartime 
adversaries or the length of conflict affect incentives for seeking peace during civil war (see 
Zartman, 1995; Salla, 1997). Behavioral factors related to public support for the rebels and the 
institutional features of the state have not been subject to thorough qualitative scrutiny. 
Understanding how changes in the political environment and public opinion affect the trajectory 
of civil war might help explain why there are nonconformities with the mutually hurting 
stalemate argument. Second, the theoretical arguments herein rely heavily on the civil war 
government’s decision-making calculus. Case studies, particularly those that leverage interviews 
made by government officials regarding decisions and actions taken during war, can help assess 
the soundness of my theoretical arguments (see Gerring, 2007, p. 174).  
Third, a critical component of the theoretical arguments centers on the role of domestic 
support for rebels relative to the government. The variable that I use in the empirical component 
of this dissertation, Rebel Support, serves as a proxy for my construct of interest. This variable is 
unable to capture the nature of rebel support or provide insights into whose preferences matter 
more for the government’s decision-making calculus regarding wartime policies. A number of 
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civil scholars examine which types of groups in society have the power to influence 
government’s wartime policies (see Wood, 2001; Nilsson, 2012; Daxecker, 2008). In the 
literature on peace negotiations, much less attention has been paid to understanding how citizen 
support for rebels shapes the government’s incentives for dialogue. Possibly, the preferences of 
certain actors in society may matter more than others. I expect that governments are more willing 
to engage in peace negotiations when members of their core constituency base, including 
government elites, politically active citizens, and economic elites, among others, favor peace 
negotiations or support the objectives of the rebels. The empirical analysis, however, is unable to 
capture the nature and variation in domestic support, and this is where the qualitative component 
fills the gap. Case studies will provide insights into what types of constituencies are more 
influential in shaping the policy decisions of political leaders. Finally, much less is known about 
interactive effects between characteristics of a country’s political regime and popular support for 
the rebels relative to the government. A qualitative method is hence better designed to examine 
how relative domestic support for the rebels works together with electoral institutions to 
influence conflict outcomes. 
4.4.1. Approach for the Qualitative Component  
The quantitative analysis of this project is complemented by two qualitative analyses: 1) 
a within-case analysis covering Indonesia’s experience with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), 
and 2) a comparative case analysis comparing Mexico’s experience with the Ejército Zapatista 
de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) and Peru’s experience with the Túpac Amaru Movement and the 
Sendero Luminoso. The actual design of a case analysis is critical for the support of causal 
arguments. Case studies may not necessarily substantiate claims of causality, however, specific 
research methods can help mitigate this concern and boost causal arguments (Gerring, 2007, p. 
172).  
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Within-case analysis: Indonesia and the GAM.  
The first part of the qualitative component provides a within-case analysis of Indonesia’s 
experience with the Free Aceh Movement. The Indonesia case provides several important 
advantages. First, the collapse of the Asian markets in the late 1990s, and not the civil conflict in 
Indonesia, led to regime change (Stanton, 2016, p. 148). Second, the case study provides 
significant temporal variation that can help better identify and tease out drivers of peace 
negotiations. Third, there is variability in the nature of the political regime over time. The 
country has adopted different political systems since its independence from the Dutch in 1945 
and onwards: After independence, the country had one of the longest-running authoritarian 
political systems in place (from 1960-1998), followed by a spell of regime change in 1998 that 
ushered in a new democratic regime (Schulze, 2004; Stanton, 2016). Finally, the availability of 
public opinion polls and interviews with citizens makes the Indonesia case particularly useful for 
understanding how opinions and preferences of citizens may shape wartime strategies (see IFES, 
2002, 2003). 
Peru and Mexico’s experiences with insurgencies.  
This project compares and contrasts two cases: the Mexican and Peruvian states’ 
experiences with insurgencies. This qualitative component will leverage a “most-similar design” 
which is based on the “method of difference” by Mill (as cited in Gerring, 2016, p. 62). The 
“most-similar design” will be used to test the soundness of my hypotheses and to better examine 
the causal mechanisms that influence negotiation behavior (Gerring, 2016, p. 62). The 
comparative case analysis helps bolster casual arguments given the availability of control and 
treatment cases (Gerring, 2016, p. 62). Here, the cases of Peru and Mexico share a number of key 
similarities (akin to control variables) except for the explanatory variable of interest (in this case, 
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the interaction effect of Elections* Rebel Support), “whose variance may account for the cases 
having different outcomes on the dependent variable” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 81). This 
method helps bolster causal arguments by providing the counterfactual case (Gerring & 
McDermott, 2007, p. 696; Gerring, 2016). In terms of similarities, the rebels in both Mexico and 
Peru were small groups, shared similar ideologies, and lacked coercive capacity relative to the 
government (see Rochlin, 2003; Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2012; Muñoz, 2006). Both countries 
were also undergoing major economic recessions (see Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2012; Cameron & 
Mauceri,1997).  
 
Table 3. Case Design  
  Key Explanatory Variable of Interest  Background variables (vector of control 
variables) 
 Interaction Term:  
 
Elections (X1) * Rebel Support 
Relative to Government (X2) 
ΣX: Economic conditions; rebel 
ideology; ethnic fractionalization; type 
of conflict; relative rebel strength  
Mexico  X2: Rebels enjoyed relatively higher 
popular support than the civil war 
government  
Similar  
Peru  X2: Civil war government enjoyed 
relatively higher popular support than 
the rebels  
Similar  
Table adapted from Gerring, 2016, p. 62. 
 
Although both countries experienced changes in their electoral institutions (the 
explanatory variable of interest), the popularity of the rebels relative to the government were 
different in both cases (the modifying variable). In Mexico, most citizens by and large supported 
the rebels and the granting of concessions (see Muñoz, 2006). However, in Peru, the civil war 
government enjoyed more popular support than the rebels (Palmer, 1992). Many citizens in Peru 
condemned the rebels and even formed their own defense communities to combat the insurgents 
themselves (La Serna, 2012). Overtime, the Túpac Amaru Movement and the Sendero Luminoso 
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became more unpopular with citizens (McClintock, 1984; CNN, 1997; La Serna, 2012) whereas 
the EZLN increased its support base throughout Mexico (Muñoz, 2006). By examining these two 
cases, I am able to understand how electoral institutions interact with relative popular support for 
rebels to influence policy changes during civil war.  
4.4.2. Sources for the Case Studies  
The qualitative components seek to trace the causal mechanisms that explain how 
behavioral and institutional factors explain negotiation outcomes. The case studies are intended 
to provide a more thorough understanding of the decision-making process of political leaders 
during armed conflict. As Gerring (2007) states, “When studying decisional behavior, case study 
research may offer insight into the intentions, the reasoning capabilities, and the information-
processing procedures of the actors involved in a given setting” (p. 45). The qualitative analyses 
are based on extensive research that exploits publicly available primary sources and secondary 
sources. The sources that I have used and consulted as part of my qualitative chapters include 
publicly available interviews, memoirs, newspapers, videos, reports, testimonies, academic 
books, journal articles, government reports, biographies, and non-governmental organization 
(NGO) reports. Primary sources include publicly available interviews with: 1) members of 
government, including presidents, senators, and political party members; 2) members of rebel 
organizations, including their leaders and fighters; 3) participants in peace processes; and 4) 
citizens. Primary sources were taken from dependable newspapers, books, and reports. I also 
triangulated evidence from as many other sources as possible to bolster the reliability of the 








CHAPTER 5.  AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF BEHAVIORAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS  
5.1. Introduction  
This chapter conducts an empirical evaluation to test the proposed hypotheses presented 
in the theory chapter. The following section will provide an overview of the statistical technique 
used to test the hypotheses. I will then present and discuss the empirical findings.  
5.2. Statistical Technique  
To test my hypotheses, this research employs a mixed-effects logistic regression. The 
dependent variable, Peace Negotiations, can take only two outcomes, peace negotiations or no 
peace negotiations. The model uses the dyad-year as the unit of analysis (Ogutcu-Fu, 2016). I use 
a mixed-effects logistic regression due to the nature of my data. A standard logistics regression 
model would require that observations are independent from one another (no observation is more 
related to another observation than any other observation) (Sommet, & Morselli, 2017). Given 
that I have multiple observations within each country, observations occurring in one country 
(i.e., Mexico) are more likely to be similar to one another than observations occurring in another 
country (i.e., Iraq). Also, dyads in my data are expected to be similar to one another over time 
than another group of dyads. Some dyads may have greater proclivity to negotiate than other dyads. 
The multilevel (logistic) modeling controls for two types of clustering: clustering within dyads and within 
countries. A mixed-effects logistic regression estimates both fixed effects (slopes) and random 
effects (intercepts) (Sommet, & Morselli, 2017).  
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5.3. Modeling Concerns  
Several issues are taken into consideration when modeling the relationship between my 
independent variables and my dependent variables. First, given the structure of the dataset, the 
yearly observations for each dyad are likely to be dependent on each other, leading to concerns 
about time dependence. To account for temporal dependence, I take the advice of Carter and 
Signorino (2010) and include the conflict duration variable alongside its squared term and its 
cubed term (duration, duration2, duration3) in my models.  
Second, dyads may engage in peace negotiations throughout the course of the civil war. 
Past negotiations may influence future negotiations efforts. Dyads may be more willing to meet 
again if they had prior experience in trying to settle the armed conflict via dialogue with one 
another. Alternatively, if dyads engaged in peace negotiations in the past that proved futile, they 
may be less willing to try again to settle the conflict at a later date (Urlacher, 2011, p. 86). To 
control for this possibility, I created a variable called Prior Negotiations, which captures whether 
separate peace negotiation occurs between dyads engaged in civil war in the previous year. This 
variable is from Ogutcu-Fu (2016). It is a dummy variable that is coded as 1 if the dyad 
attempted separate peace negotiations in the prior year and 0 otherwise. Third, I consider 
concerns regarding the timing of events. Peace negotiations may affect the strength of rebels or 
conflict intensity on the battlefield (Hultquist, 2013). To alleviate concerns of potential 
endogeneity, I employ one-year lags for a number of my covariates (Hultquist, 2013).  
5.4. Empirical Findings  
Table 4 and Table 5 provide the findings that assess the soundness of Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 
and 4. Table 4 provides parsimonious models that only include the explanatory variables of 
interest, excluding control variables. In general, the findings in Table 4 provide preliminary 
evidence that institutional and behavioral factors matter for negotiations.  
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In Table 5, the models include a range of control variables capturing battlefield, 
demographic, and economic conditions. In Table 5, three models test whether electoral 
institutions have a single, unconditional effect on the probability of peace negotiations between 
dyads during civil war. Models 8, 12, 14, and 15 include the interaction term Elections*Rebel 
Support to assess if the balance of popular support between the rebels and the civil war 
government conditions the effect between elections and the probability of peace negotiations (a 
test of Hypothesis 4).  
Hypothesis 1 predicts that peace negotiations are more likely to occur when the rebels are 
at least as popular as the civil war government. Across the models in Table 4 and 5 that do not 
include interactive effects, I find some evidence that negotiations are more likely to occur when 
the rebels are at least as popular as the civil war government. In Model 13 in Table 5, the 
coefficient on Rebel Support is positive and statistically significant (z=2.39, p<.05), suggesting 
that negotiations are more likely to occur when rebels are at least as popular as the civil war 
government. However, when I include the interaction term Elections* Rebel Support in all the 
models in Table 5, I find evidence that the balance of popular support between the government 
and the rebels plays a more nuanced role in the government’s decision to negotiate. There is no 
longer a single, unconditional effect (constant effect) of relative popular support on peace 
negotiations.  
Hypothesis 2 predicts that unconsolidated regimes are more likely to negotiate than 
consolidated regimes. Recall that I argued that unconsolidated regimes place a higher premium 
on strengthening their institutions than fighting wars. Reallocating resources from wartime 
fighting to building institutions allows the incumbent to shore up strength for his regime and his 
rule. Across all models in Table 4 and Table 5, I find consistent and strong evidence that Regime 
98 
Age exerts a negative and statistically significant effect on the probability of peace negotiations. 
Indeed, the inclusion of a greater range of control variables has no impact on the statistical 
significance of the Regime Age variable nor does it substantially alter the estimated coefficient. 
These findings support Hypothesis 2.  
Hypothesis 3 predicts that electoral institutions alone do not have an effect on the 
probability of negotiations. Hypothesis 4 predicts that regardless of regime consolidation, leaders 
who face stronger electoral institutions are more likely to negotiate when the rebels are at least as 
popular as the civil war government. In this political environment, elected leaders face a 
heightened risk of being voted out of office if they fail to provide concessions to the rebels. The 
accommodation of rebel demands is hence expected to reduce domestic political costs for 
incumbents who are likely to face disgruntled voters in future elections. In Table 5, three models 
test the unconditional effect of electoral institutions without the inclusion of the interaction term 
Elections*Rebel Support. In these models, there is some support that the variable Elections has a 
positive but weakly significant effect on peace negotiations. However in Model 13 in Table 5 
(which includes a fuller range of controls), the effect of electoral institutions on peace 
negotiations appears to dissipate given that the coefficient on Elections loses statistical 
significance.  
With models that include the interaction term Elections*Rebel Support, the interpretation 
of the coefficients for each of the constitutive terms that make up the interaction term changes. 
The coefficient on the variable Elections represents the effect of electoral institutions on the 
onset of peace negotiations when the Rebel Support variable equals 0, or alternatively, when the 
government enjoys more popular support than the rebels). Similarly, the coefficient on the 
variable Rebel Support represents the effect of popular support for the rebels relative to the 
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government on the onset of peace negotiations when Elections equals 0. It should however be 
noted that there are no cases in which Elections equals 0 in the data. The EIEC index used for the 
Elections variable ranges from 1 to 7 and the value of 1 already corresponds to cases where there 
are no elections that take place for the executive leader. Although the coefficient on Rebel 
Support is not a meaningful value, it is a mathematically necessary value needed for assessing 
the soundness of Hypothesis 4. 
For all models in Table 4 and Table 5 in which I include the interaction term 
Elections*Rebel Support, the variable Elections is not statistically significant at any level. The 
lack of statistical significance for the Elections variable suggests that the presence of electoral 
institutions alone has no meaningful effect on the decision for incumbents to negotiate when the 
government is more popular than the rebels. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 4. 
Finally, the control variables produce several expected findings. In terms of the control 
variables capturing the mutually hurting stalemate conditions, I see evidence that Relative Rebel 
Strength is positive and statistically significant across all specifications in Table 5. The variable 
Conflict Duration (and the temporal controls for time dependence) are not meaningful predictors 
of peace negotiations across Models 5–14 in Table 5. In Model 15 in Table 5, these higher-order 
temporal controls are omitted after a test of joint significance concludes that they jointly do not 
have an effect on the probability of peace negotiations. When the higher-order temporal controls 
are omitted, the variable for Conflict Duration becomes positive and statistically significant, 
suggesting that lengthier conflicts are more likely to experience peace negotiations.  
The findings from the other control variables are worth mentioning. Across all models in 
Table 5, I find strong evidence that the Cold War variable exerts a negative and statistically 
significant effect on peace negotiations. Dyads fighting during the Cold War period are less 
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likely to engage in peace negotiations than dyads fighting during the post–Cold War period. I 
also find evidence that separate peace negotiation attempts in the prior year is a strong predictor 
of peace negotiations in the subsequent year across all models in Table 5. I find weak evidence 
that the number of other armed groups concurrently fighting the state in the prior year increases 
the probability of peace negotiations in the subsequent year. Finally, GDP per capita, ELF, and 
Territorial Conflict fall short of conventional levels of statistical significance across all models 
in Table 5. 
 
Table 4. Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression on Peace Negotiations, Log-of-Odds Coefficients 
Reported (Parsimonious Models Without Controls) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   negotiation  negotiation  negotiation  negotiation 
Rebel Supporta (t-1) 1.052***   -0.004 
  (0.338)   (0.683) 
Regime Age  -0.024***   
   (0.007)   
Elections   0.235*** 0.100 
    (0.066) (0.101) 
Elections*Rebel 
Supporta (t-1) 
   0.213* 
     (0.123) 
Constant  -2.150*** -1.447*** -3.065*** -2.752*** 
  (0.327) (0.238) (0.434) (0.593) 
Country RI* Variance  1.740** 1.005** 1.933*** 2.504** 
  (0.686) (0.438) (0.735) (1.012) 
Dyad RI* Variance  1.579*** 1.825*** 1.990*** 1.664*** 
  (0.491) (0.495) (0.584) (0.546) 
Obs. 1261 1500 1452 1212 
No. Dyads 









RI*= Random Intercept  
Standard errors are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; a=dichotomous variable; b=logged variable 
 
 
Table 5. Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression on Peace Negotiations, Log-of-Odds Coefficients Reported (With Control Variables) 
    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 








































































































































































   -0.045*** 
(0.011) 






             
Elections   0.159* -0.038   0.143* -0.009 0.130 -0.025 -0.017 




    
0.327** 
(0.155) 









             
Territorial 
Conflicta 














             
ELF     -0.036 -0.038 -0.057 -0.019 -0.017 0.002 0.008 





































             
NSAs (t-1)     0.242* 0.147 0.282* 0.297** 0.230 0.214 0.186 
      (0.132) (0.132) (0.149) (0.148) (0.147) (0.146) (0.143) 
 
Cold Wara  






































































































             



























Standard errors are in parentheses  
RI*: Random Intercept 






5.4.1. Discussion  
I find strong support for a number of my hypotheses in my Model 15 (my final model). In 
Model 15 in Table 5, the coefficient on Regime Age is negative and statistically significant (z=-
3.75, p<.01), suggesting that younger regimes are more likely to negotiate than older regimes. 
This finding provides support for my Hypothesis 2. Figure 2 provides graphical depictions in 
support of Hypothesis 2. The highest substantive effects occur under regimes in their first year of 
existence, where the predicted probability of negotiations is nearly .3. Young political regimes in 
their first year of existence are nearly 10 percentage points more likely to negotiate than regimes 
that have endured for 15 years. Political regimes in their first year of existence are 20 percentage 
points more likely to negotiate than regimes that have endured for forty 40 years.  
I also find strong evidence that the effect of electoral institutions on negotiation onset is 
conditioned on relative rebel support. Stated differently, the effect of electoral institutions is 
dictated by whether the rebels are at least as popular as the government or not. In Model 15 in 
Table 5, the interaction term Elections*Rebel Support is positive and statistically significant (at 
the .05 level) after controlling for battlefield, demographic, and economic variables. This 
suggests that stronger electoral institutions increase the probability of peace negotiations when 
rebels were at least as popular as the civil war government in the prior year (z=1.97, p<.05). As 
seen in Figure 3, when the government is more popular than the rebels, Elections has no 
statistically significant effect on peace negotiations. The variable Elections exerts a statistically 
significant effect on peace negotiations when the rebels are at least as popular as the government 
(and not when the rebels are less popular than the government). The predicted probability ranges 
from .12 to .30 across the whole range of the electoral index. Countries that have the most 
competitive elections (a score of 7 on the electoral index) have a 15 percentage point higher 
predicted probability of negotiating than countries where executives face minimal institutional 
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mechanisms of accountability (a score of 2 on the electoral index). Countries that have the most 
competitive elections (a score of 7 on the electoral index) have an 11 percentage point higher 
predicted probability of negotiating than countries with moderately competitive elections (a 
score of 4 on the electoral index). Hence the effect of electoral institutions cannot be understood 
without accounting for the balance of popular support between the civil war government and the 
rebels. In sum, the effect of electoral institutions depends on whether the rebels are at least as 
popular as the government or not. In Model 15 in Table 5, the variable Rebel Support captures 
the effect of popular support for the rebels relative to the government when Elections equals 0. 
However, this coefficient is mainly meaningless given that there are no cases in which the EIEC 
score equals 0.  
Overall, I see strong evidence that institutional factors matter for peace negotiations, but 
popular support for the rebels relative to the government plays a much more nuanced role. There 
is no single, unconditional effect (constant effect) of popular support on negotiations. Relative 
popular support cannot be looked at in isolation from electoral institutions. In addition, the size 
of the effect of unconsolidated regimes is larger than other predictors of negotiations discussed 
next. 
5.4.2. Findings for Control Variables 
The findings for a number of my control variables in Table 5 in Model 15 are consistent 
with other findings in the literature. In terms of the variables capturing the mutually hurting 
stalemate logic, Rebel Strength continues to be a weakly significant predictor of peace 
negotiations in Model 15 in Table 5 (z=1.76 p<.10). When the Rebel Strength variable is varied 
from 0 to 1, the probability of engaging in peace negotiations in the subsequent year is 14 
percentage points greater if the rebels are at least as strong as the armed forces (holding the other 
covariates at their mean). This finding aligns with similar work that finds that rebel strength 
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influences the decision to find a political solution to the armed conflict (see Hultquist, 2013; 
Ogutcu-Fu, 2016). Specifically, Ogutcu-Fu (2016) and Ryckman and Braithwaite (2017) find 
evidence that rebel groups that pose a military threat to the government in terms of their fighting 
capacity are more likely to engage in peace negotiations. A stalemate condition may ensue from 
wars in which the rebels match the military strength of the state’s armed forces, forcing the 
wartime adversaries to settle (Hultquist, 2013). However, negotiations may also be used as a 
strategy by the civil war government to avoid an impending military defeat by the rebels 
(Thomas, 2012, p. 11; Hultquist, 2013).  
 In Model 15 in Table 5, Conflict Duration exerts a positive and statistically significant 
effect on peace negotiations (z=3.70, p<.01). Figure 4 illustrates this finding. In general, the 
predicted probability of peace negotiations increases as the war drags on. This finding 
contributes support to ripeness theory, which maintains that lengthy conflicts lead wartime 
adversaries to seek a political solution the war (see Zartman, 1995). A number of scholars also 
do find evidence that wartime adversaries engaged in lengthier wars are more likely to settle in 
both the qualitative and quantitative literature (see Urlacher, 2011; Thomas, 2012; Ryckman & 
Braithwaite, 2017). In the final model, I see no evidence that the Conflict Intensity variable 
exerts a significant effect on peace negotiations. In alternative models in which I use a 
continuous measure for battlefield casualties, I continue to find no evidence that deadlier 
conflicts are more likely to experience peace negotiation attempts than less deadlier conflicts. 
Ryckman and Braithwaite (2017) find no evidence that deadlier conflicts are related to the onset 
of peace negotiations. Kaplow (2016) also finds no evidence that deadlier conflicts, as captured 
by the extent that rebels use violence against citizens, exert a meaningful effect on the 
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probability of peace negotiations. Moreover, Fearon (2004) finds no evidence that civilian 
casualties have an effect on the length of civil wars.  
I also find evidence that dyads that had prior negotiation attempts are more likely to 
engage in peace negotiations (z=3.02, p<.01). Specifically, dyads that engaged in peace 
negotiations in the prior year have a 10 percentage point higher probability of engaging in peace 
negotiations in the subsequent year (holding all the other covariates at their mean values). This 
finding suggests that peace negotiations have a pacifying effect and generate trust-building 
between wartime belligerents. Urlacher (2011) and Ogutcu-Fu (2016) also find evidence that 
past negotiation attempts make it more likely that wartime adversaries will meet again to find 
ways to end the conflict.  
I also continue to find evidence that dyads fighting in the post–Cold War period are more 
likely to negotiate than dyads fighting during the Cold War period. The variable Cold War exerts 
a negative and statistically significant effect on peace negotiations (z=-7.83, p<.01). Dyads 
fighting during the post–Cold War period have a 23 percentage point higher probability of 
attempting peace negotiations (holding all other covariates at their mean values). 
As in previous models, the variables GDP per capita, ELF, NSAs, and Territorial 
Conflict fail to meet conventional levels of statistical significance in Model 15 in Table 5. 
Ryckman and Braithwaite (2017) also find no evidence that the type of conflict is related to the 
onset of peace negotiations. However, they do find evidence that civil war governments are more 
likely to enter into peace negotiations when they are fighting other violent opposition groups 





Figure 2. Effects of regime age on the probability of peace negotiations (with 95% CIs) (Model 




Figure 3. Effect of electoral institutions on the probability of peace negotiations, conditioned by 
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Figure 4. Effect of conflict duration on peace negotiations (Model 15 in Table 5). 
 
 
5.5. Why Do Regimes Change? 
To test the possibility that popular support for the rebels and other indicators of poor war 
performance for the government may affect regime change, I run a new multi-level logistic 
regression model with the dependent variable being political regime change as defined by 
Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers (2018, p. 35). According to the authors, a change in the political 
regime of a country occurs when a country undergoes a 3 point change in its polity score 
(Marshall et al., 2018, p. 35). Using the “regtrans” variable from the Polity IV project which 
codes the type and degree of change (Marshall et al., 2018, pp. 35-36), I create a dichotomous 
variable that equals 1 if a country had at least a 3 point change in its polity score in a given year, 
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captures the popularity of the rebels relative to the government in the prior year. This variable is 
taken from the Non-State Actor (NSA) dataset and is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the 
ability of the rebels to mobilize domestic support is moderate or high relative to the civil war 
government and 0 if the civil war government’s ability to mobilize domestic support is higher 
than that of the rebels (Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 2013). I also include a number of 
other explanatory variables in the model to capture poor wartime performance by the civil war 
government. I include the military strength of the rebels relative to the civil war government in 
the prior year, as captured by the Rebel Strength variable from Cunningham and colleagues 
(2009). I also use the duration of the conflict in the analysis, as captured by the Conflict Duration 
variable (Cunningham et al., 2009). Finally, I incorporate the intensity of the conflict in the prior 
year (Conflict Intensity variable) (Harbom et al., 2008). I find no evidence that any of these 
variables, including the Rebel Support variable, exerts a meaningful effect on regime change as 
shown in Table A.2. in the appendix.  
5.6. Robustness Checks 
To assess the robustness of my findings, I use different measures of variables and also 
test for possible confounding variables. First, it is possible that certain institutional features of 
unconsolidated regimes may drive the finding between regime consolidation and negotiations, 
such as whether the regime is a new democratic regime or a new autocratic regime. To test 
whether an institutional component may be driving the results, I run a mixed-effects logistics 
model to assess whether there is a statistically significant difference in the probability of peace 
negotiations between new democratic and autocratic regimes. Saideman and colleagues (2002) 
define young political regimes as those that have lasted for 20 years or less (p. 115). Adopting 
this definition, I created a dichotomous variable called New Regime that is coded as 1 if a regime 
lasted for 20 years or less and 0 otherwise. I include a measure of a country’s level of democracy 
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by using the revised Polity2 score (Marshall et al., 2018, p. 17). The revised Polity2 score ranges 
from -10 (very autocratic) to +10 (very democratic) (Marshall et al., 2018). For new regimes, I 
find no evidence that relatively more democratic regimes are more likely to negotiate than 
relatively less democratic regimes as shown in Table A.3. in the Appendix.  
I also use an alternative specification of conflict intensity. I use a continuous measure of 
battlefield deaths from the UCDP’s Conflict Encyclopedia (UCDP, n.d.-c). However, there are 
several concerns with using a count of battlefield deaths. First, data for the number of casualties 
between dyads is difficult to accurately determine during armed conflict (Urlacher, 2011, p. 98). 
Although I conducted additional data collection using the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia (UCDP, 
n.d.-c) to make up for missing data, an overview of the final data suggests that a significant 
number of observations appear to be missing in African and Middle Eastern countries. However, 
when I use a continuous measure of battlefield casualties, I continue to find no evidence that 
deadlier conflicts are more likely to witness peace negotiations given the lack of statistical 
significance for this coefficient. I still find support for my hypotheses using this alternative 
measure of conflict intensity as show in Table A.4. in the appendix. 
Finally, I examine whether my results are sensitive to differences in sample sizes. Across 
my models in Table 5, I lose observations as I introduce more control variables. When different 
samples are used across models, there is a risk that the observations that fall out of subsequent 
models are not missing at random, leading to concerns of bias. Given that the number of 
observations changes across the models, I need to assess whether my findings still hold if I use 
the same number of observations. To do this, I restrict my models to include the observations 
from the most restrictive model (which includes only my explanatory variables of interest). 
Subsequently, I rerun all of my models with just the observations from the restricted model. 
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Under the new models (Table A.5. and Table A.6. in the Appendix), my findings and results 
remain unchanged.  
5.7. Way Forward  
The following chapter proceeds to the qualitative portion of this research project, which 
serves numerous purposes. First, qualitative methods help to elucidate on causal mechanisms that 
link the explanatory variables of interest with the dependent variables (George & Bennett, 2005). 
There is a lack of literature that adequately focuses on how variation in political regime type of 
governments influences negotiation behavior, let alone its interactive effects. Second, a 
qualitative analysis for this research is better suited to shed light on the types of constituents that 
influence the government’s wartime policies. Third, the qualitative component will provide 
insights into the behaviors and actions of key actors. This is particularly critical given that the 
theoretical framework of this project focuses on the decision-making process of civil war 
governments.  
First, I will provide a within-case analysis of the Indonesian experience with the Free 
Aceh Movement (GAM). The Indonesian case somewhat mimics a natural experiment (Stanton, 
2016). A regime change occurred because of the economic recession that hit the region rather 
than because of the conflict itself (see Stanton, 2016, p. 148). Second, although civil conflicts 
such as the Aceh crisis have been studied by scholars in the qualitative research, they have not 
been properly interpreted via a cost-benefit lens (Stanton, 2016).  
Following my within-case analysis, I will then provide a comparative case analysis that 
assesses the Mexican and Peruvian experiences with their respective rebel groups. The 
comparative nature of this qualitative component helps better bolster arguments of causality by 
providing a plausible control case (Gerring, 2016). This project has been unable to identify any 
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CHAPTER 6.  THE INDONESIAN EXPERIENCE WITH THE FREE ACEH 
MOVEMENT 
6.1. Introduction  
Armed conflicts have been a common phenomenon in Indonesia since the Dutch 
renounced control of the country in 1945 (Schulze, 2004). The Indonesian government has faced 
three separatist groups since the 1960s. The Free Papua Movement (OPM) fought for an 
independent West Papua (Bertrand, 2014). At the same time, the Revolutionary Front for an 
Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) had been fighting against Jakarta in hopes of securing 
independence for the region of East Timor (Stanton, 2016). The Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), 
also known as the Free Aceh Movement, fought for the independence of Aceh from 1976 to 
2005 (Baikoni & Oishi, 2016).  
6.1.1. Goal of Chapter  
This chapter provides a within-case analysis7 of the Indonesian experience with the 
GAM,8 focusing primarily on understanding the motivations, strategies, behaviors, and intentions 
                                               
7 Stanton (2016) provides a case study that assesses how Indonesia’s regime change in 1998 changed the 
government’s use of brutality toward its citizens during the civil wars with the GAM and the East Timor rebels. In 
my chapter, I focus on peace negotiations as the outcome of interest, bring in new perspectives and evidence, and 
specifically test whether my hypotheses hold in the context of the armed conflict with the GAM.  
8 I focus my analysis on the GAM conflict for the following reasons. First, the East Timor conflict with the 
FRETILIN was settled via a referendum initiated by Habibe on August 30, 1999, under increasing international 
pressure from Australia’s other western states (Schulze, 2004). No face-to-face peace talks, however, took place 
between the Indonesian state and the FRETILIN (Cook & Lounsbery, 2017, p. 137). Second, there is a general lack 
of information (particularly in English) on the OPM conflict. Third, polling data is available for the GAM conflict 
and not the East Timor/OPM conflicts. Under Suharto, polling agencies were banned and it was not until 2000 (after 
the East Timor conflict ended) when polling agencies began to conduct surveys in Indonesia (see Stanton, 2016). 
Because my theoretical arguments have a public support dimension, the GAM case is better suited for analysis.  
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behind the government’s strategy against the rebel group during the course of the conflict. This 
within-case analysis leverages both pre-existing primary sources and secondary sources, 
including pre-existing interviews with politicians in the Indonesian government, rebel leaders, 
and persons present during the peace processes between the wartime adversaries to better 
understand the drivers of peace negotiations.  
In 2000, the Indonesian state shifted to a bilateral strategy that included military 
campaigns against the GAM alongside peace negotiations (Baikoeini & Oishi, 2016). This begs 
the question: Why did the Indonesian state engage in peace negotiations with the GAM? Why 
did the consolidated regime under Suharto maintain a strict military approach against the GAM? 
What role did public opinion play in shaping strategies adopted by governments during the civil 
war? Overall, do the findings in this case study support my theoretical arguments?  
6.1.2. Key Findings and Support for Theoretical Arguments  
The expectations laid out in the theory chapter about peace negotiations are assessed in 
this chapter. I find strong evidence that both institutional and behavioral factors influenced the 
civil war government’s decision to negotiate. The consolidated regime under Suharto remained 
steadfast in maintaining a unilateral military strategy against the rebels (Stanton, 2016). Under 
the unconsolidated regime in 1998, the Indonesian state experienced salient political costs for not 
negotiating—continued war prevented regime leaders from strengthening their immature 
regimes, which remained at risk for collapse. The political leaders under the unconsolidated 
regime prioritized strengthening institutions and promoting economic growth over fighting wars 
(see Kartasasmita, 2013; AP Archives, 2015). Moreover, I find evidence that incumbents were 
concerned with securing financial resources from other countries and aid organizations that they 
believed were necessary in promoting the endurance of the regime (Stanton, 2016), including the 
need to secure revenues emanating from the foreign-controlled oil sector in Aceh, made 
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negotiations a more attractive choice for leaders presiding over the unconsolidated regime (Coll, 
2012).  
I also find evidence that as the balance of popular support shifted in favor of the rebels, 
peace negotiations occurred (Schulze, 2004; Stanton, 2016). The balance of popular support 
between the rebels and the civil war government favored the latter during the Suharto years 
(Barter, 2009, p. 14). Indeed, during the initial stages of the conflict during the 1970s, only one 
village in Aceh viewed the rebels favorably (Schulze, 2007, p. 88). However, the civil war 
government’s routine use of repression during the armed conflict alienated the public. 
Subsequently, the government’s wartime polices tipped the balance of domestic support in favor 
of the rebels near the end of Suharto’s tenure (Barter, 2009, p. 14). By June 2001, nearly 70% of 
the population supported peace negotiations. The vast majority of Indonesians sympathized with 
the GAM and disapproved of the government’s military logic in Aceh by 2001 (see Miller, 2009; 
Barter, 2009). Following this shift in public opinion, costs of maintaining law and order in Aceh 
and in other parts of Indonesia became exorbitantly high for the civil war government (TAPOL, 
2003). Evidence also shows that passive support helped the rebels fight a protracted war (The 
Asia Society, n.d.). Subsequently, the government entered into peace negotiations to try and end 
the conflict with the GAM. 
6.1.3. Roadmap of Chapter  
The chapter proceeds as follows. I will first provide an overview of the political 
characteristics of the consolidated regime under Suharto followed by the discussion of the 
origins of the GAM. I will then discuss the handling of the conflict of the GAM under Suharto, 
while tracing the changes and variation in popular support over time. I will then proceed to 
discuss the nature of the unconsolidated regime, followed by a discussion on the drivers of peace 
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negotiations that occurred under the immature regime. I will then provide an assessment of my 
findings.  
6.2. Institutional Characteristics of the Consolidated Regime  
In 1945, Indonesia secured its independence from the Dutch (Schulze, 2004, p. 6). Since 
1959, Indonesia had shifted towards an authoritarian regime following then president Sukarno’s 
declaration of “Guided Democracy,” a program that boosted the powers of the executive branch 
while simultaneously weakening democratic institutions, including the checks and balance 
system (Pauker, 1964, p. 1059). President Suharto, who came into power in 1961, relied heavily 
on the use of force and overt repression to contain all forms of dissent, showing no tolerance for 
political opposition to his rule or sharing of powers. In 1965, the sanctioning of the state’s main 
security apparatus, the Kopkamtib, cemented Suharto’s monopoly on political power (Crouch, 
1988). According to historian Harold Crouch (1988), this security unit wielded “virtually 
unlimited power” (p. 223). Crouch (1988) further describes, “The Kopkamtib became the 
government’s main instrument of political control, dealing with a wide range of such civilian 
dissidents as student and Muslim demonstrators” (p. 223). Subsequently, repression became 
widespread and human rights abuses, including the indiscriminate killings of alleged political 
detractors of the regime, became a hallmark of the government’s approach against dissent 
(Schulze, 2004). Juwono Sudarsono, Suharto’s cabinet minister, described the political regime as 
one that allows for the “overconcentration of political and economic power in one person” 
(Journeyman Pictures, 2016). Suharto’s vice president at that time, B.J. Habibe, also confirmed 
the monopoly of political power under Suharto by stating in a speech: “Indonesia was faced with 
a difficult dilemma. Indonesia was at that time constitutionally in the hand of one man” 
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016).  
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Recall that I argued that effective governance characterizes consolidated regimes—that 
is, rules regarding the allocation of political power are clear and entrenched throughout society 
and political rulers are able to effectively enforce and implement the rules and policies of the 
government (Göbel, 2011; Weingast, 1997). Under Suharto, the governance capacity of the 
regime was strong. The bureaucratic apparatus of the state was solidified, patronage networks 
were institutionalized, rival elites had been successfully co-opted and essentially silenced from 
threatening the president, and Suharto’s Golkar party enjoyed the monopoly on political power 
(Mietzner, 2018). The regime’s security institutions wielded considerable power (Laxer, 2009, p. 
87). The consolidation of the regime was complete after the regime “fused with a wide range of 
political, security and societal actors, leaving only few non-governmental groups outside of its 
reach” (Mietzner, 2018, p. 86). Moreover, the regime enjoyed a stable reservoir of financial 
resources (Mietzner, 2018).  
Under the consolidated regime, the armed forces played an important role in political 
decision-making. Suharto’s frequent purges aimed at eradicating alleged detractors within 
military circles and providing his family and close friends with positions in the military helped 
win the hearts and minds of the armed forces and allowed Suharto to leverage “the military for 
his own purposes” (Rinakit, 2005, p. 52). Under Suharto, “The military, then, showed that it was 
under executive control and its actions were only to implement government policy” (Rinakit, 
2005, p. 39).  
As a result of the institutional restructuring, the military exercised meaningful influence 
on public policies; the legislature during the authoritarian years existed only in name and served 
as a mouthpiece for the ruling political elites (Ziegenhain, 2008, p. 139; Rüland & Manea, 2013, 
p. 124-126). Suharto himself hand-picked those in the parliament (Freedman, 2006, p. 89). 
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General Suharto even granted the armed forces the ability to wield considerable power in the 
legislative branch (Rüland & Manea, 2013, p. 126). In this capacity, Rinakit (2005) concludes 
that the military buttressed policies aimed at promoting the regime’s practices of repression “in 
order to control society” (p. 44). Indeed, under the consolidated regime, the military assumed 
greater powers and functioned as “the dominant political force” in the country (Amnesty 
International, 1994, section 1: “Military Power”). 
6.3. The Free Aceh Movement 
The regime embarked on a series of industrialization programs in the early 1970s in Aceh 
that fueled discontent and sowed the seeds for rebellion (Prasetyo & Birks, 2010, p. 48). 
Suharto’s policies further alienated some Acehnese who already disapproved of the central 
government’s control of the province following Indonesia’s independence from the Dutch in 
1945 (Schulze, 2004). Many people in Aceh considered themselves culturally dissimilar from the 
rest of the country and felt betrayed by Jakarta’s control over the region, pointing out that a 
formal agreement between the United Kingdom and the Acehnese ruling elite in 1819 formally 
designated the region as a sovereign country (Schulze, 2004, p. 6).  
 In 1971, the government began to extract Aceh’s oil resources, funneling the bulk of 
wealth back to Jakarta (Prasetyo & Birks, 2010, p. 48). The government industrialization projects 
in Aceh coincided with a deterioration of the province’s social and economic fabric; pollution 
levels soured, displacement of families became common, and prices became unaffordable, 
creating fertile ground for disagreement between some Acehnese and the political elites in 
Jakarta (Prasetyo & Birks, 2010).  
Subsequently, a group of government detractors came together in 1976 to form the Free 
Aceh Movement (GAM) to combat Jakarta’s influence in Aceh, including the government’s 
policies in the region (Prasetyo & Birks, 2010). Hasan de Tiro, the founder and leader of the 
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GAM, considered himself a sultan and dictated the military and political strategy of the 
movement in consultation with his health and state ministers, Zaini Abdullah and Malik 
Mahmud, respectively (Schulze, 2004). In defending Aceh’s sovereignty, di Tiro (1976) argued 
in a statement made in December 1976: “Our fatherland, Acheh, Sumatra, had always been a free 
and independent sovereign State since the world begun” (para. 2). De Tiro (1976) further 
expressed his disappointment with the central government’s control of Aceh: 
This illegal transfer of sovereignty over our fatherland by the old, Dutch, colonialists to 
the new, Javanese colonialists, was done in the most appalling political fraud of the 
century: the Dutch colonialist was supposed to have turned over sovereignty over our 
fatherland to a "new nation" called "indonesia". But "indonesia" was a fraud: a cloak to 
cover up Javanese colonialism. Since the world begun, there never was a people, much 
less a nation, in our part of the world by that name. (para. 5)  
 
Subsequently, Di Tiro (1976) expressed how he hoped for Aceh to be “free and 
independent from all political control of the foreign regime of Jakarta and the alien people of the 
island of Java” (para. 1). Di Tiro (1976) further goes on to explicate the separatist goals of the 
Acehnese people: 
We, the people of Acheh, Sumatra, would have no quarrel with the Javanese, if they had 
stayed in their own country, and if they had not tried to lord it over us. From no on, we 
intend to be the masters in our own house: the only way life is worth living; to make our 
own laws: as we see fit; to become the guarantor of our own freedom and independence: 
for which we are capable; to become equal with all the peoples of the world: as our 
forefathers had always been. In short, to become sovereign in our own fatherland! (para. 
7)  
 
6.3.1. Military Strength and Popular Support for the GAM During the 1970s  
Throughout the 1970s, the civil war government under Suharto was militarily stronger 
than the rebels (Abuza, 2016, p. 29). The rebels numbered no more than 200 active fighters and 
were poorly equipped to fight. Moreover, the rebels were less popular than the government; 
according to qualitative research, the rebel group was a largely unknown organization that lacked 
any recognition in Aceh (Abuza, 2016, p. 29).  
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6.4. Counterinsurgency Campaigns Against the GAM in the 1970s 
To pressure the government to agree to its demand for independence, the movement 
relied heavily on guerilla tactics beginning in 1976. Suharto responded only with the use of 
force. The Indonesian military, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), carried out routine and 
wide-scale counterinsurgency missions to eliminate the rebel threat (Schulze, 2004; Kingsbury, 
2006; Prasetyo & Birks, 2010). Hasan de Tiro and his affiliates subsequently absconded to 
Sweden as a result of the government’s crackdown against the rebels during the mid- to late 
1970s (Schulze, 2004; Prasetyo & Birks, 2010).  
During this time, the rules pertaining to military involvement in politics were entrenched 
and durable. Toward the end of the 1970s, 20% of the seats in the legislature were allocated to 
the military (Rüland & Manea, 2013, p. 126). Suharto had a massive amount of military power 
supplied from key institutions and political actors. Under Suharto, security institutions, including 
the military, espoused principles of the regime, including that of war and repression (Amnesty 
International, 1994). The security and military institutions showed strong allegiance to the 
ideologies of the prevailing political system (Crouch, 1988; Schulze, 2004). Amnesty 
International (1994) concluded that during the Suharto years, “Counter-insurgency campaigns in 
Aceh, East Timor and Irian Jaya display a chilling uniformity. Normal legal procedures are 
relaxed or simply ignored by the authorities, and the protection of human rights, limited at the 
best of times” (section 2: “Armed opposition and counter-insurgency”).  
In describing the role of the armed forces, Rinakit (2005) concludes: “The military’s 
blind loyalty paralysed the economic and political superstructures, particularly the bureaucracy, 
parliament and the people’s assembly. Its function was no more than a rubber stamp for 
Soeharto” (p. 53).  
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6.5. Counterinsurgency Campaigns Against the GAM in the 1980s and 1990s  
During the 1980s, the GAM remained less popular than the civil war government, even 
within Aceh, according to qualitative research. The president’s political party, Golkar remained 
popular in Aceh—for the first time in its political history, the party secured the majority of votes 
in the 1987 legislative election in Aceh (Abuza, 2016, p. 29). Research by Abuza (2016) found 
that groups that used violence in an attempt to induce political change were frowned on in Aceh. 
As such, the Acehnese welcomed the armed forces in Aceh to combat the GAM. The 
counterinsurgency did not generate significant human rights abuses, which helped shield the 
armed forces from public condemnation (Abuza, 2016, p. 29).  
Noticeably, the armed forces’ augmented powers in the political sphere corresponded 
with an increase in human rights violations (Stanton, 2016; Rüland & Manea, 2013, p. 127). 
Government troops routinely scouted out and targeted alleged political detractors of the regime, 
including civilians (Prasetyo & Birks, 2010, p. 56; Amnesty International, 1994). By the late 
1980s, the armed forces “had no bargaining position towards Soeharto” (Rinakit, 2005, p. 50). 
The Indonesian military continued to slaughter thousands of people during its counterinsurgency 
campaigns in Aceh in the 1980s (Amnesty International, 1993). 
Fearful of losing control over Aceh, the government increased its grip over the embattled 
province by placing it under the control of the military in 1989 (Prasetyo & Birks, 2010; Kwok, 
2001). By 1990, 12,000 soldiers had been dispatched to fight the insurgents in Aceh (Smith, 
2002, p. 76; Amnesty International, 1993, p. 9). Within just a few years, counterinsurgency 
operations targeting the GAM took the lives of an estimated 2,000 people (Amnesty 
International, 1993, p. 16). Suharto remained resolute in his attempt to maintain control over 
Aceh and to defeat the rebels. According to a statement made by an anonymous person, “the only 
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tool available” for the regime in its fight against the GAM was force (as interviewed and cited in 
Stanton, 2016, p. 131).  
In defending his brutal policies and indiscriminate targeting of the civilians, the book 
Pikiran, Ucapan, dan Tindakan Saya (as translated and cited in Amnesty International, 1993) 
note how Suharto stated: 
The peace was disturbed. It was as if there was no longer peace in this country. It was as 
though all there was was fear... We had to apply some treatment to take some stern 
action. What kind of action? It had to be with violence. But this violence did not mean 
just shooting people, pow! pow! just like that. No! But those who tried to resist, like it or 
not, had to be shot...  Some of the corpses were left [in public places] just like that. This 
was for the purpose of shock therapy... This was done so that the general public would 
understand that there was still someone capable of taking action to tackle the problem of 
criminality. (p. 20)  
 
The government’s military operations severely hurt the GAM’s coercive capacity to carry 
out violent attacks throughout most of the 1990s (Prasetyo & Birks, 2010; Baikoeni & Oishi, 
2016). Numerous sources document an increase in public support for the GAM in the province of 
Aceh as a result of the armed forces brutal policies (see Baikoeni & Oishi, 2016, p. 27). The 
armed forces, numbering 30,000 troops, engaged in acts of human rights violations, including 
torture, indiscriminate killing of rebel sympathizers, and large-scale annihilation of villages 
(Abuza, 2016, p. 30). The Acehnese continued to lend their support to the rebels, out of 
compassion, following human rights abuses by the regime despite a momentous shift in the 
relative military power in favor of the Indonesian state (Baikoeni & Oishi, 2016). The 
consolidated regime, however, remained unfazed by criticism both internally and internationally 
(Stanton, 2016).  
The international community, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and a 
handful of countries, denounced the human rights violations of the Indonesian military and 
subsequently slashed foreign assistance to the civil war government (TAPOL, 1992). The United 
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States government under President Clinton intended to punish Suharto in the late 1990s by 
formally designating Indonesia as an authoritarian regime and halting military assistance 
(Baikoeni & Oishi, 2016, p. 28). However, condemnation against the regime did not incentivize 
Suharto to change his approach to the GAM conflict (Stanton, 2016). Suharto, who did not face 
scrutiny at the ballot box, remained steadfast in his military approach against the GAM and 
continued to target both active fighters and alleged affiliates and collaborators of the rebels 
(Baikoeni & Oishi, 2016; Stanton, 2016). 
6.6. The Unconsolidated Regime of 1998  
The financial crisis occurring in the region in the late 1990s ended Suharto’s iron-fisted 
rule that spanned nearly three decades. The international crisis severely damaged the Indonesian 
economy. Following widespread demonstrations against the regime, Suharto voluntarily 
relinquished political power in 1998 (Prasetyo & Birks, 2010, p. 57). Suharto’s vice president, 
B.J. Habibe, became president, a move approved and sanctioned by Suharto himself (Prasetyo & 
Birks, 2010, p. 57). In a speech reflecting on his coming to power, Habibe describes how the 
economic conditions led to the end in authoritarian rule: “[T]he situation became worse hourly 
… inflation was over 70% and interest rate even higher” (Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2016).  
6.6.1. The Institutional Characteristics of the Unconsolidated Political Regime Under 
Habibe  
Recall that I argued that unconsolidated regimes are marked by the following problems: 
1) underdeveloped rules regarding the allocation of political power, which has implications for 
the incumbent’s political security; 2) weak implementation of the regime’s policies (Göbel, 
2011; Weingast, 1997); and 3) a need to build and maintain international aid which is critical for 
strengthening the regime’s institutions (Stanton, 2016). Under the immature regime, political 
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rules remained undetermined and the contours of political decision making were contested by 
rival political elites, all vying to secure a greater slice of political representation under the new 
regime (Ziegenhain, 2008). Habibe remained at odds with members of his own government over 
roles and responsibilities and with rival political parties (Ziegenhain, 2008, p. 78). In immature 
regimes such as the one in Indonesia, “not much is settled” with regard to power relations, roles, 
and responsibilities (Ziegenhain 2008, p. 83). According to Hartono, a member of the parliament, 
(as cited in Ziegenhain, 2008), “new rules had not been created” and “anarchy” best described 
the dynamics in the legislature (p. 84). Following the political transition, political parties sprang 
up and sought greater power, including conservative parties, religious parties, and liberal parties 
(Freedman, 2007, p. 205). Moreover, groups representing the prior regime, including the 
military, sought to maintain some level of political power under the new political order 
(Ziegenhain, 2008; Hainsworth, 2000; Kurniawan, 2017). Even Suharto’s Golkar party sought 
greater access to political power (Ziegenhain, 2008, p. 85). Under the immature regime, 
“legislators as well as all other political actors struggled to find their new place in the changed 
environment” (Ziegenhain, 2008, p. 84). As a result of the institutional uncertainty during this 
time, the political incumbent was preoccupied with developing rules and institutions of the new 
regime (Ziegenhain, 2008).  
Following the collapse of the authoritarian regime in 1998, Habibe focused on 
developing the institutional rules for security institutions. The armed forces did not fully back the 
political elites of the new regime (Rinakit, 2005). In particular, the military often became 
involved in disputes with the president regarding military policies, rules, and regulations 
(Rinakit, 2005, pp.114-115). Rumors of a coup against Habibe even circulated within military 
and government circles. Specifically, the granting of the vote for independence in East Timor 
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and the removal of the armed forces in Aceh contributed to a weakening in relationship between 
Habibe and the armed forces (Rinakit, 2005, p. 114). Moreover, the regime’s bureaucratic 
capacity had yet to be effectively developed and entrenched throughout the territories (Miller, 
2008; Freedman, 2006). Recall that Suharto spent years promoting the consolidation of his 
regime: Under his rule, the regime had in place clear and self-enforcing political power 
arrangements that protected the incumbent’s political security (Mietzner, 2018). Suharto’s 
promotion of economic growth helped build broad-based allegiance to the government and 
subsequently enhance the durability of the regime (Mietzner, 2018). With the institutional rules 
of the game entrenched in society and accepted by all politically relevant actors (Mietzner, 
2018), Suharto faced a lower opportunity cost for continuing the war against separatist 
movements.  
Recall that I argued that new leaders presiding over unconsolidated regimes are in need 
of greater revenues for shoring up the strength of their institutions (see Stanton, 2016). During 
this time, the unconsolidated regime lacked sufficient financial resources to deal with a severe 
economic crisis, often finding itself turning to other countries for assistance (Stanton, 2016).  
6.6.2. Policies of Habibe 
Even though Suharto hand-selected Habibe to take over the presidency, authoritarian 
politics by and large ended. Habibe subsequently began an ambitious project to develop and 
strengthen the institutions of the regime (Baikoeni & Oishi, 2016). Political incumbents funneled 
their resources and energy to shoring up the stability of the regime (including strengthening 
institutions) rather than fighting wars (Miller, 2009). Habibe (as cited in Ressa, 1998) affirmed 
his priority was to jumpstart “the economy back into the right track.” He also sought to focus his 
attention on developing and promoting the institutions and rules of the regime, by, among other 
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actions, permitting opposition political parties to form and flourish, promoting legislation aimed 
at ensuring competitive elections, and loosening restrictions on censorship (He, 2007, p. 10; 
Ziegenhain, 2008, p. 79).  
In reflecting on his first year in office, Habibe stated how people thought during his early 
days in office that he “would not survive more than 100 hours” but he affirmed, in his own 
words, how he “survived 570 days” where he stated he made “new laws every day” (Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2016). Acknowledging his low political legitimacy, Habibe 
stated: “Maybe people hate me now but in 30 years they’ll all be saying that I'm the one who 
restored democracy to Indonesia” (as cited in O’Clery, 1999, para. 6). Habibe’s political 
advisor, Indria Samego (as cited in Tesoro, 1999, para. 2), stated that the new president “wanted 
legitimacy based on performance.” In this capacity, Habibe initiated a series of rapid political 
reforms in an attempt to build and strengthen the institutional foundation for the regime 
(Ziegenhain, 2008, p. 79). Subsequently, the country became more democratic as a result of 
these reforms. The checks and balances system strengthened under Habibe as the Indonesian 
legislature effectively became an autonomous institution, independent of the executive branch 
(Ziegenhain, 2008, p. 139).  
Habibe also had to address several ongoing separatist wars. Following regime change in 
1998, the GAM resurged and widened its support base (Aspinall, 2005, p. 3). Although the GAM 
had been weakened throughout most the 1990s and maintained a low profile, civil society in 
Aceh grew and began to protest in favor of the GAM (Prasetyo & Birks, 2010, p. 57). The GAM 
and Acehnese civilians, including university students, took advantage of the new political 
environment by pressuring the government to remove armed troops stationed in Aceh (Prasetyo 
& Birks, 2010. p 60).  
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6.6.3. Domestic Pressures for a Political Solution Under Habibe  
With regard to the ongoing secessionist wars, Habibe worked to implement policies 
aimed at finding a political solution. As a first step, the president agreed to hold a referendum in 
East Timor to have its inhabitants decide whether to secede or not from mainland Indonesia in 
August 1999 (Stephan, 2006). According to Habibe’s Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Dewi 
Fortuna Anwar (2000), “The East Timor issue had badly damaged Indonesia’s international 
image and Indonesia’s entry into East Timor in fact violated Indonesia's own commitment to 
oppose all forms of colonialism” ( p. 20). Weldemichael (2013) states that the domestic demands 
for a political solution to the East Timor conflict “left Jakarta cornered” (p. 260). In reference to 
Habibe’s decision to issue a referendum in East Timor in 1999, Martin Griffiths, a mediator from 
the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, reflected on how dialogue rather than the use of force 
against the insurgents was accepted by key politicians, a number of who wanted to impress 
international audiences (Martin, 2006, p. 71). Habibe’s decision to settle the conflict in East 
Timor had been done, according to Dewi Fortuna Anwar (2000), as a strategy “to strengthen his 
democratic credentials at home and his credentials abroad” (p. 20).  
As discussed in the theoretical chapters, unconsolidated political regimes face more 
salient costs for not negotiating than consolidated regimes. Continued war prevents 
unconsolidated regimes from securing critical aid needed to shore up the endurance of the regime 
(Stanton, 2016, p. 40). President Habibe, who did not want further harm the country’s reputation 
or lose international support, sought to avoid a repeat of the East Timor9 problem with the GAM 
conflict (Prasetyo & Birks, 2010, p. 58). 
                                               
9 In an attempt to reverse foreign aid cuts and to address international pressure (particularly from Australia) to end 
the East Timor conflict, Habibe agreed with the FRETILIN’s claim for independence, a political reorientation that 
128 
Under this political environment, Habibe undertook a series of measures that set the 
foundation for a political solution with the GAM. In this capacity, Habibe began to scale back 
government troops, funneled humanitarian aid into Aceh, approved amnesty for GAM fighters, 
and moved to establish rapport with the Acehnese officials (Prasetyo & Birks, 2010, p. 58-61). 
The government managed to put together a series of autonomy laws for Aceh ready for 
circulation and review in August 1999 (just several days before the East Timor referendum took 
place) (Miller, 2009, p. 50). However, the proposed allocation of resource rents emanating from 
natural resources in Aceh became a source of contention with the province’s politicians (Miller, 
2009, p. 48).  
Unlike in the prior decades, the GAM in the late 1990s enjoyed unprecedented popular 
support across Indonesia (Abuza, 2016, pp. 30-31). The granting of a referendum in East Timor 
on August 30, 1999, led to a seismic effect within Aceh: Following the East Timor referendum, 
popular support for the GAM rebels spiked in Aceh, with millions of citizens demanding that the 
central government grant the Acehnese the same opportunity to decide the political fate of their 
own province, including whether to secede (Aspinall & Crouch, 2003, p. 6; Schulze, 2004, p. 41; 
Kingsbury, 2009, p. 20; Cohen, 1999a, 1999b).  
6.6.4. Push for a Political Solution to the GAM Conflict  
Government officials also began to seriously reconsider a political solution to the Aceh 
conflict as popular support for the rebels became more salient and protests against the military 
                                               
even surpassed expectations of international supporters of peace (Daley, 2008). According to a statement by the 
former prime minister of Australia, John Howard during a taping of the series the Howard Years on ABC: 
“It is true that none of us had envisaged that's what Dr Habibie would've done. Dr Habibie went further but 
the direction in which he travelled was the same direction that was requested in the letter. It's just that he 
went much further. He was 20 miles instead of five.” (as cited in Daley, 2008)  
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increased. At this time, Indonesians in general supported granting the rebels concessions (Miller, 
2009). Miller (2009) concludes that during this time, citizens generally favored giving the 
insurgents an autonomy arrangement short of actual independence (p. 52).  
Parliament as a whole generally favored a system of self-government in Aceh short of a 
grant of independence (Miller, 2009, p. 52). The legislature feared that any grants of secession 
would create a domino effect that would lead to the disintegration of Indonesia (King, 1999, 
Miller, 2009). The chairman of the legislature, Amien Rais, feared: “if Aceh separates we break” 
(as cited in King, 1999, section: “Referendum-Wahid style”). Religious, moderate, and 
conservative parties as well as military representatives and members of the Golkar party 
(Suharto’s party) in the parliament expressed their support for an autonomy package that 
provided decentralization in Aceh (Miller, 2009, p. 52).  
Some members of the armed forces and parliament, however, were hesitant to engage in 
peace negotiations with the GAM. These members were worried that the GAM would push for 
secession during peace talks (Aspinall & Crouch, 2003, p. 3). A unilateral military strategy 
against the GAM was the only solution for the less dovish members of the armed forces (Coll, 
2012, p. 100).  
6.7. Negotiations Under President Abdurrahman Wahid10 
In June 1999, the first elections in nearly 40 years took place in Indonesia, bringing into 
power President Wahid (Freedman, 2007, p. 204). A semi-elected assembly selected Wahid as 
president (Mietzner, 2009, p. 101). The rules of the game for the armed forces remained 
undetermined, which frequently led to turf wars between the president and the military over 
                                               
10 President Wahid’s nickname was “Gus Dur.” Source: Freedman (2007, p. 204). 
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organizational restructuring and wartime policies (Rinakit, 2005, pp. 199-200, 229). 
Consequently, the military functioned as an entity that did not adhere to a uniform agenda or 
policy (Freedman, 2007, p. 206).  
6.7.1. Focus on Strengthening the Regime Rather Than Fighting Wars  
Following the end of authoritarian rule, Abuza (2016) notes that all presidents under the 
new regime became too busy juggling “a host of other and greater economic and political 
problems” than the armed conflict (p. 35). In a speech following his inauguration, President 
Wahid recognized the need to end wars to strengthen the regime. Recall that I argued in my 
theoretical discussion that promoting economic growth increases allegiance to unconsolidated 
regimes, which in turn helps strengthen regimes (see Anderson, Møller, Rørbæk, & Skaaning, 
2014; Albertus, Fenner, & Slater, 2018). President Wahid had to decide whether to focus on 
promoting the institutional resilience of the unconsolidated regime or focusing his attention on 
winning civil wars; during the presidential campaign, balancing the importance of these 
presidential responsibilities had been a key theme (Soesastro, 2000). During his presidency, 
Wahid focused his attention relatively more on promoting institutions rather than trying to win 
wars—indeed, Wahid preferred a softer approach to the Aceh conflict, in which he “successfully 
kicked the ball back to the Acehnese court” (Soesastro, 2000, para. 3). Wahid’s other main 
priority was to revitalize the failing economy, which was critical for stabilizing the regime. 
According to Kartasasmita (2013), a former official in Suharto’s cabinet, the goal for Wahid was 
to strengthen the institutions of the regime and “to make it endure and to bring tangible benefits 
to the lives of the people. For this, Gus Dur’s first priority should be to strengthen the economic 
recovery that he had inherited from the previous government” (p. 293). In one speech, Wahid 
stated: 
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We have to concentrate on overcoming the economic problem, based on the principle of 
profit motive as well as our inclusion within the free international trade. And based on 
that we can develop our own new economic orientation, and that is the income of the 
ordinary citizens shall be increased gradually. (AP Archive, 2015) 
 
 Fighting wars, Wahid believed, would be detrimental to regime consolidation. In this 
capacity, Wahid stated, “We will also concentrate on making Indonesia unified again” (AP 
Archive, 2015).  
6.8. Salience of Popular Support for the GAM and Protests Costs in 1999 
Like his predecessor, Wahid also continued to face growing pressure to resolve the GAM 
conflict politically (Prasetyo & Birks, 2010, p. 62). Support for the GAM and demands for a vote 
on independence from the Acehnese, particularly from student organizations, became more 
salient in November and December 1999 (Prasetyo & Birks, 2010). Pro-GAM organizations, 
including those led by university students, sprang up and dominated the political landscape in 
Aceh (Aspinall & Crouch, 2003, p. 6). Thousands to millions of people participated in 
demonstrations during the end of 1999, calling for the government to permit a referendum to 
decide the political fate of Aceh (Kingsbury, 2006, p. 10). 
A number of Acehnese pointed out how internal pressures for a political solution would 
continue to make the country harder to control for the government’s armed forces. A drawn-out 
war with the Acehnese rebels was expected in this political environment. The armed forces’ 
military tactics would have no effect on pro-independence supporters according to a pro-human 
rights reformer named Humam Hamid (as cited in Aglionby, 1999). Tengku Yahia, a religious 
activist, pointed out how a military approach was no longer a viable and sustainable strategy in a 
socio-political environment in which the rebels enjoyed broad-based support and in which the 
government’s counterinsurgency was widely condemned: “To solve the conflict that is 
happening in Aceh there is no other way but with a referendum” (as cited in Aglionby, 1999). 
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Approximately 1 million citizens congregated in the capital of the embattled province in 
November of 1999 demanding the civil war government to allow a vote for independence (Head, 
2000). According to Teungku Ali Bayek, a leader in the Muslim community, secession would 
allow Aceh to control its own distribution of rents emanating from natural resources, which 
would help improve the province’s social development: “If Aceh is free, we’ll see an end to 
poverty and repression” (as cited in Cohen, 1999b, p. 16). One student activist, Faisal Ridha, 
reflected on the popularity of the GAM’s objectives of independence in Aceh: “The people will 
not accept special autonomy. They all want independence. If the referendum is not held, we’re 
worried that there will be a revolution. The people will run amok, or there will be war” (as cited 
in Cohen, 1999a, p. 18). Reflecting on these demonstrations, Kingsbury (2006) states: 
If there was ever any doubt about how Acehnese people felt, a rally by almost one in four 
of the population - most from outside the capital of Banda Aceh - was a stunning 
confirmation of a desire for the opportunity to determine their own political status. (p. 10) 
 
Abuza (2016) also reflects on the popularity of the GAM during this time by finding that the 
separatist group boasted up to 20,000 rebels, with domestic support for the movement having 
reached its peak (p. 31).   
Demands for granting the GAM political concessions also became more salient 
throughout Indonesia. According to Akbar Tanjung, a legislator: “We reject the security 
approach and military action to resolve the problems in Aceh. We want a real dialogue set up to 
reconcile the Acehnese people with the rest of the nation” (as cited in The Associated Press, 
1999, para. 11).  
The costs of maintaining law and order in dealing with the pro-GAM protests became 
exorbitantly high for the civil war government during this time (Fujikawa, 2017). By the end of 
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1999, frequent protests in Aceh, which attracted up to thousands of people, made the military 
reconsider its plans of implementing martial law in Aceh (The Associated Press, 1999). 
By 2000, the security budget as a percentage of GDP had fallen below 1% (Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, 2019), the lowest ever recorded during the conflict (see 
SIPRI, 2019). Prasetyo and Birks (2010) note, “The security forces could not tolerate this 
formidable assertion of ‘people power,’ particularly the calls for a referendum” (p. 62). By this 
time, the rebel’s objective for secession became more popular in more areas in Aceh 
(Sulistiyanto, 2001, p. 446).  
 Faced with growing domestic support for the GAM, President Wahid took measures 
aimed at appeasing the demands of the demonstrators. On numerous occasions, he expressed his 
willingness to hold a referendum that would allow the Acehnese to choose autonomy 
arrangements that did not include the choice of secession (King, 1999). Wahid expressed, in his 
own words: “for a long time I have said that I agree with a referendum for Aceh” (as cited in 
Aspinall & Crouch, 2003, p. 9). He continued to express interest in holding a referendum during 
subsequent public appearances. During one meeting, Wahid affirmed: “I support a referendum as 
their right. If we can do that in East Timor, why not in Aceh? But the question is when it will be 
held” (as cited in Cohen, 1999a, p. 17). The president’s support for a referendum paved the way 
for a “cooling down process” according to one lawmaker based in Aceh, T. Syaiful Achmad (as 
cited in Cohen, 1999a, p. 18). In response to the president’s conciliatory tone toward Aceh, local 
politicians in Aceh began to put together potential autonomy laws (Cohen 1999a, p. 18).  
6.9. Concerns of the Unconsolidated Regime: Revenues for Institution Building 
Leaders are expected to shore up financial support for their unconsolidated regimes 
otherwise they risk collapsing and experiencing a regime change (Stanton, 2016). The benefits of 
negotiations are clear for leaders presiding over unconsolidated regimes: Ending civil wars 
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allows governments to win support from external actors, including international aid 
organizations and western countries who are often critical of ongoing civil wars (Stanton, 2016).  
The Indonesian government sought to maintain foreign corporations in the country that 
was considered vital in developing the institutions of the new regime (Coll, 2012). The vast 
majority of citizens also cited the importance of international support: In an International 
Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) poll conducted from December 1998 through February 
1999, 86% of respondents had a pessimistic view of the economy (Wagner, 1999a, p. 10). 
Moreover, 48% of respondents answered “Mainly Beneficial” to the following question: “In your 
opinion, has the presence of foreign companies in Indonesia mainly been beneficial to the 
economy, or have foreign companies mainly been harmful to the economy?” (Wagner, 1999a, p. 
14). By August 1999, 73% of respondents agreed that foreign entities played a critical role in 
Indonesia (Wagner, 1999b, pp. 20-21).  
 In 2000, the unconsolidated regime’s need for financial support became salient. The 
regime’s need to preserve a steady supply of oil revenues in Aceh increased the costs of 
continued war, which ultimately decreased the costs of negotiating with the GAM. The 
insurgency in Aceh affected the daily operations of foreign oil companies11 operating in Aceh 
(Spillus, 2001). The effects of any oil shutdown would be detrimental for the fragile regime. The 
economic success of the country was contingent on oil revenues (Arnold, 2004).  
Coll (2012), a journalist covering the conflict, noted that the U.S. ambassador to 
Indonesia during this time, Robert Gelbard, felt that the armed conflict in Aceh reached a 
                                               
11 During the Suharto years, the GAM targeted foreign oil-producing corporations  (Schulze, 2014). The presence of 
natural resources in Aceh has often been implicated as the driver for Suharto’s brutal military strategy in Aceh, 
including the use of repression by armed forces (Arnold, 2001; Schulze, 2014). Following the end of authoritarian 
rule, oil companies came under attack once again by GAM rebels in Aceh (Renner, 2002, p. 164).  
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breaking point, becoming too precarious for foreign workers in the energy sector (p. 100). 
During a meeting with Indonesian officials, Gelbard disclosed, “Some G.A.M. leaders are now 
even boasting about shutting down ExxonMobil” (as cited in Coll, 2012, p. 116).  
Given that unconsolidated political regimes are inherently weak and lack effective and 
self-enforcing institutions, their leaders view financial assistance as critical for supporting the 
institutional development of the regime (Stanton, 2016). Resource rents from the oil sector allow 
the incumbent presiding over the unconsolidated regime to improve the economy—which is 
often damaged during armed conflict— and to build institutions (see Stanton, 2016, p. 40). From 
Gelbard’s perspective, the foreign oil sector provided the regime and its political leaders with 
critical revenue needed for building institutions and promoting the legitimacy of the political 
elites; without the oil sector, the regime would be at risk of collapsing (Coll, 2012, p. 100). 
According to Coll (2012), “Indonesia had embarked only recently on a shaky, unstable 
democratic transition after decades of military rule. The country’s president, Abdurrahman 
Wahid, could ill afford the loss of taxes and royalties from ExxonMobil’s Aceh gas fields” (p. 
100). Coll (2012) goes on to find that the oil sector in Aceh, particularly ExxonMobil’s profits, 
“was critical to the country’s young democracy” (p. 112). Representatives of parliament also did 
not take light any possibility of a reduction in oil production in Aceh. Fearing a loss in revenue, 
Coll (2012) recalls, “Politicians threatened to nationalize the gas fields… politicians spoke 
darkly about American conspiracies to undermine Indonesia’s fragile democratic government” 
(p. 113).  
Gelbard himself believed that democratic strengthening would be possible if the conflict 
ended (Coll, 2012, p. 100). Even Gelbard himself realized the important role of the oil sector in 
helping promote the stability of the regime (Coll, 2012, p. 100). Without a steady supply of oil 
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revenue, the civil war government would not be able to reduce its national debt (Arnold, 2001). 
National oil companies would lose US$1.2 billion per year stemming from any stoppage in oil 
production in Aceh (Arnold, 2001). Not only would Indonesia’s economy suffer, but the impacts 
would be felt across the region, particularly in neighboring countries dependent on Aceh’s oil 
and gas sources. Griffiths (as cited in Martin, 2006, pp. 78-79) even recalls how concerns over 
the need to maintain international support—particularly to keep oil companies in Aceh which 
provided sustained financial resources to the armed forces—nurtured enthusiasm in Indonesia for 
a peace deal with the insurgents.   
 Prior to the 1997 regional economic crisis, over two-thirds of the military’s budget was 
provided by Chinese businesses, however the economic collapse siphoned off the financial 
support line emanating from these businesses, which had strong repercussions on the viability of 
the military under the new regime (Rinakit, 2005, p. 105). The armed forces, which had 
historically been vehemently opposed to any sort of peace negotiations, even adopted a more 
conciliatory tone toward the handling of the conflict (Russell, 2000). The head of the armed 
forces, Widodo Adi Sutjipto, also softened his rhetoric by questioning the viability and 
practicality of the strict military strategy used by his political superiors during the country’s 
autocratic years: “I truly understand that maybe the security approach alone is quite incorrect” 
(as cited in Asia Pacific Solidarity Network, 2005, section: “Peace Accord”).  
The unconsolidated regime’s need to build its institutions via oil rents reduced the costs 
of entering into peace negotiations. In January 2000, Wahid launched peace negotiations with the 
GAM in Switzerland (Sukma, 2004, p. 18). This finding is in line with my theoretical prediction 
that unconsolidated regimes have strong incentives to negotiate to maintain financial support 
needed to shore up the endurance of the regime (Stanton, 2016). In contrast, Suharto’s 
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consolidated regime was characterized by a strong and stable institutional apparatus, which 
allowed him to more readily allocate resources to prosecuting the war (Schulze, 2014).  
6.10. Peace Negotiations in January 2000  
Hassan Wirajuda, an official for the government, and Hasan di Tiro both attended the 
first round of peace negotiations that took place in early 2000 (Akebo, 2017, p. 75). These peace 
talks took place under the auspices of the Henry Dunant Center, a non-governmental 
organization based in Switzerland that focuses on conflict resolution (Akebo, 2017; Baikoeni & 
Oishi, 2015, p. 30). The peace negotiations occurred at a time where there was strong support for 
concessions in Aceh. By 2000, half of the districts in Aceh supported independence, according to 
estimates provided by a top member of the armed forces (as interviewed and cited in Rabasa & 
Chalk, 2001, pp. 33-34). Most political elites in Aceh, however, risked losing their political 
positions in the central government if Aceh broke away from Indonesia (Rabasa & Chalk, 2001, 
p. 34). 
Subsequent peace talks in March and April of the same year took place (Akebo, 2017, p. 
75). The dialogue between the wartime adversaries produced a ceasefire agreement in May 2000 
known as the Humanitarian Pause (Schulze, 2004, p. 44). The agreement called for a lull in 
fighting until September 2000. During the ceasefire, development programs aimed at rebuilding 
Aceh would be implemented (Sukma, 2004, p. 19). The IMF approved a $400 million loan to the 
Indonesian state following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding with the GAM 
(Head, 2000). Indeed, the civil war government recognized the importance of having the support 
of the international community. Burhanuddin Abdullah, from the Bank of Indonesia, reflected on 
why he wanted to secure international assistance for the Indonesian state: “I will try to restore 
good relations with the I.M.F. by completing all tasks agreed in the pact. Why is this important? 
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Because we badly need confidence from the international community” (as cited in Landler, 
2001a).  
In a statement printed in the Jakarta Post, the Minister of Security under Wahid—Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono—suggested that ending civil wars was necessary for the unconsolidated 
regime to stabilize: 
Without stability, law and security, our country will become a sea of mayhem, violence 
and worry. This uncertainty will have a severe impact, not only on the political front, but 
also in economic, social and security fields. (as cited in Spillus, 2001) 
 
6.11. Law and Order Costs Stemming from Popular Support for the Rebels  
By 2001, the rebels effectively ruled a little over two-thirds of Aceh (International Crisis 
Group, 2001, p. 5). However, the government could only afford to allocate one-fourth of its 
resources for maintaining law and order (International Crisis Group, 2001, p. ii). According to 
the Indonesian Observer newspaper (as cited in Schulze, 2005, p. 35) figures provided by 
General Widayadi—a representative of the police department revealed that 69 security personnel 
(including police officers and armed troops) were killed in just one month of fighting in early 
2001. Political assassinations, bombings of oil facilities, demolition of schools, and protests 
against the state in which citizens were “motivated by revenge” drained the security sector 
financially and continued to augment war costs (Schulze, 2005, p. 38). Passive support for the 
rebels allowed the GAM to flourish: Maintaining law and order continued to be a costly, 
unmanageable, and an impractical strategy for the security sector given the extent of domestic 
support for the rebels (see Schulze, 2005, p. 38). By June 2001, public opinion polls revealed 
that 12% of respondents favored using only a military strategy against the rebels. In comparison, 
nearly two-thirds of respondents (69%) favored negotiations (IFES, 2002, pp. 13-14). In 2001, 
two representatives of the GAM, Kamaruzzaman and bin Marzuki (as interviewed and cited in 
Schulze, 2005), stated that a key goal of the GAM was to make the Indonesian state realize that 
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the pro-independence movement in Indonesia would be too much for security forces to handle: 
“We want to tie down as many of their troops as possible in Aceh. We want them to spend more 
money on this operation. We want to exhaust them financially” (p. 35).  
6.12. Peace Negotiations Under Megawati (July 2001–October 2004)  
Subsequent peace negotiations conducted under the unconsolidated regime focused on 
resolving other substantive issues of the conflict. Wahid’s vice president, Megawati, assumed the 
presidency following the formal removal of Wahid due to charges related to corruption 
(Mietzner, 2010, pp. 402-403; Landler, 2001b). Although Megawati was considered a more 
hardline president than her predecessor, she still maintained peace negotiations with the GAM. 
Indeed, peace negotiations still ensued even when international demand for peace declined 
following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States (He, 2017, p. 21; Hiebert 
& McBeth, 2002). During this time, the United States not only overturned and dismantled past 
financial security injunctions on Jakarta but also funneled a little over $650 million dollars to 
Megawati to help combat insurgent groups (He, 2007, p. 21).  
 Even though the GAM continued acts of violence, the civil war government offered the 
rebels another round of peace negotiations in hopes of settling the conflict (Sukma, 2004, p. 21). 
Fighting the GAM on the battlefield, according to Sukma (2004, p. 21), was viewed more as a 
“last resort” for the civil war government. The government even approved legislation to permit 
Aceh to exercise some form of self-government (Baikoeni & Oishi, 2016, p. 33).  
Shadia Marhaban, from the International Network at the Aceh Referendum Information 
Center described the state of popular support in Aceh for the GAM, including how passive 
support has helped the rebels to prolong the war: 
Anybody can say they are GAM; many do. Just about everybody you ask will say they 
support both GAM and AGAM. They are seen as the cutting edge of the independence 
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struggle. GAM and AGAM are largely supported by contributions from the Achenese 
people. (as interviewed by Nermeen Shaikh and cited in The Asia Society, n.d.)  
 
In February 2002, peace negotiations between Jakarta and the GAM took place in 
Switzerland under the auspices of foreign government officials from a handful of countries 
including Sweden, Australia, and the United States (Aspinall & Crouch 2003, p. 32). By April 
2002, the vast majority of the national public and the Acehnese preferred a political solution to 
the conflict (Figure 5). National support for peace negotiations remained relatively unchanged—
69% of the public supported a political solution to the war (IFES, 2002, pp. 13-14). In Aceh, 
65% of those polled favored peace negotiations as seen in Figure 6 (IFES, 2002, p. 13). 
 In December 2002, nearly 11 months later, the peace negotiations culminated with the 
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) (Aspinall & Crouch 2003, p. 32). The COHA 
contained a number of key provisions aimed at ending the war, including: 1) the disbursement of 
development assistance in Aceh; 2) a greater role for monitoring agencies to oversee the peace 
process, including the previously defunct Joint Security Committee; 3) the withdrawal of armed 
forces from Aceh; 4) the removal of weapons by the GAM through a structured disarmament 
process; and 5) the creation of a system of local government in Aceh (Aspinall & Crouch 2003, 
pp. 32-33; Baikoeni & Oishi, 2016, p. 33). Foreign aid funneled to Aceh from the international 
community, including from the World Bank and the United States, was contingent on sustained 
peace (Sukma, 2004).  
Disputes over the implementation of the agreement, however, prevented the wartime 
adversaries from moving forward with peace (Baikoeni & Oishi, 2016, p. 33; Aspinall & Crouch, 
2003, pp. 37-38). By May 2003, both the GAM and the government intensified their armed 
campaigns against one another. The government expanded its scope of military power and 
carried out wide-scale counterinsurgency operations (Mapes, 2003, p. 22). The new rounds of 
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fighting killed a little over 300 people according to the police in Indonesia (Mapes, 2003, p. 22). 
According to an international aid worker from Indonesia: “people are still going to be killed until 
there’s a return to the negotiating table” (as cited in Mapes, 2003, p. 22).  
Following the breakdown of the COHA in August 2003, support for peace negotiations 
declined but still was preferred by a majority of Indonesians over a unilateral military strategy. 
According to an IFES poll conducted in June and July 2003 throughout Indonesia, nearly 50% of 
respondents favored strategies that incorporated peace negotiations with the GAM, whereas 30% 
favored a strict unilateral military strategy against the insurgents (IFES, 2003, p. 22). Even 
during this time, President George W. Bush publicly expressed his support for Megawati’s 
counterinsurgency strategy against the rebels in October 2003:  
President Megawati has confronted this evil directly. She was one of the first leaders to 
stand with me after September the 11th. Under her leadership, Indonesia is hunting and 
finding dangerous killers. America appreciates Indonesia's strong cooperation in the war 
on terror. America believes that freedom and democracy are critical to defeating terror, 
because free nations that respect human rights do not breed hatred, resentment, and the 
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Figure 6. Breakdown of support for peace negotiations versus a military strategy against the 





6.13. Unsustainability of Law and Order Costs  
Even though the civil war government dispatched 45,000 troops to fight the rebels in 
Aceh and to maintain law and order following the breakdown of the COHA in May 2003, the 
costs of the armed conflict continued to skyrocket (TAPOL, 2003), which eventually drove the 
wartime adversaries back to the negotiating table. The armed forces were not able to vanquish 
the GAM despite enjoying the military advantage in terms of troop size. Not only did the GAM 
control most of the province but it also enjoyed stronger popular support in Aceh than the 
government (TAPOL, 2003). The economic costs of continued war became very salient even for 
the Minister of Security, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who was also facing pressure to end the 
civil war government’s scaled-up military operations in Aceh (TAPOL, 2003).  
6.14. Peace Negotiations Under Yudhoyono (October 2004–August 2005)  
 In 2004, popular elections brought to power Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono alongside his 
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Yudhoyono at the polls, in an election described by Freedman (2006) as devoid of “massive 
fraud, and were open, free, fair, and contested by a multitude of parties and candidates” (p. 91).  
6.14.1. Securing Critical Financial Resources  
During this time, the government continued to face high political costs of continued war 
that remained detrimental to the unconsolidated regime. According to an Indonesian specialist 
involved in the oil sector, John Phipps, the  country’s natural resources is valuable for the regime 
(as cited in Arnold, 2004). Securing oil revenue, according to Phipps, “is a critical issue for 
Indonesia” (as cited in Arnold, 2004, para. 4). The civil war government was expected to lose 
more than one-fourth of revenue emanating from the natural resource sector in Aceh as a result 
of the ongoing insurgency with the GAM (Arnold, 2004). Continuing the civil war would have 
significant implications on the decision for foreign companies to stay or leave Aceh (Arnold, 
2004).  
New peace negotiations took place with the GAM under Yudhoyono’s leadership in 
January 2005 (Baikoeni & Oishi, 2016, p. 37). Both sides had agreed to hold these new rounds of 
peace negotiations under the auspices of the Crisis Management Initiative, a Finnish organization 
dedicated to conflict resolution (Aspinall, 2005, p. viii; Baikoeni & Oishi, 2016). In mid-2005, 
Kalla made the following statement to the Indonesian press: “In our history, resolving problems 
must always be achieved through dialogue” (as cited in Aspinall, 2005, p. 15). The President of 
Finland, Martti Ahtisaari (who also participated in the Helsinki peace talks), stated in an 
interview, “The new administration was important and a breakthrough in terms of credibility and 
confidence building” (as cited in Conciliation Resources, 2008, p. 23).  
After five series of peace negotiations, the wartime adversaries finally struck a political 
deal in 2005. Per the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) approved in August, both sides 
made significant concessions: The GAM gave up its original demand for secession and accepted 
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the government’s autonomy proposal, an arrangement also supported by Ahtisaari (Baikoeni & 
Oishi, 2016, p. 38). The agreement allowed the rebels to nominate candidates for public office in 
Aceh (Sindre, 2010, p. 215). The agreement also addressed a critical issue at the heart of the 
GAM’s grievances: the central government’s exploitation of natural resources. As part of the 
deal, the government promised to funnel back to the Acehnese a little over two-thirds of the rents 
emanating from mining (Aspinall, 2005, p. 44). The agreement also created a third-party 
monitoring organization staffed with members from a handful of Asian and European countries 
and tasked with overseeing the disarmament of the rebels (Baikoeni & Oishi, 2016; Aspinall, 
2005, p. 82). Hamid Awaluddin (2008), who represented the central government during the 
peace negotiations in Helsinki, Finland, describes why the concessions made peace sustainable: 
The Acehnese government was to be allowed to keep 70 percent of Aceh’s revenues. 
These revenues can undoubtedly propel the economy forward, which was ruined during 
the war. Such a high percentage of revenues was an unimaginable hope during the war. In 
short, the unfairness of the previous share of revenues led to three decades of bloody 
conflict. This is now over. Aceh is developing a better economy now (p. 25). 
 
Indeed, the new government even won accolades from the public for improving the 
security situation in Indonesia. Nearly half of Indonesians polled rated the Megawati government 
lower in terms of effectiveness in combating unrest than Yudhoyono (IFES, 2005, p. 20).  
6.15. Summary and Evaluation of Alternative Explanations 
The armed conflict ended following the 2005 peace agreement (see Baikoeni & Oishi, 
2016). The evidence suggests that that both behavioral and institutional factors incentivized the 
government to enter into peace negotiations with the GAM. The government changed its strategy 
toward the GAM shortly following regime change in the late 1990s. Under Suharto, the 
government relied strictly on a military strategy against the rebels. The regime showed no 
interest in negotiating even when the international community threatened to cut foreign support 
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and when public support for the GAM, at least in Aceh, increased (Stanton, 2016; Baikoeni & 
Oishi, 2016). However, the analysis finds that civil war policy reorientations occurred under the 
Habibe, Wahid, Megawati, and Yudhoyono administrations. Although Habibe set the foundation 
for peace by assembling an autonomy package for Aceh, Wahid ultimately launched peace 
negotiations with the GAM (Schulze, 2004). Evidence suggests that the leaders presiding over 
the unconsolidated regime sought to win over the approval of other countries by ending the civil 
war (Stanton, 2016). The unconsolidated regime’s need to preserve a steady supply of oil 
revenues in Aceh increased the costs of continued war, which ultimately decreased the costs of 
negotiating with the GAM (see Coll, 2012). Public opinion played a critical role in the 
government’s decision to negotiate. As the balance of popular support tipped in favor of the 
rebels, the government faced very salient costs for both fighting the rebels and maintaining law 
and order (TAPOL, 2003), which increased the benefits of negotiations.  
A number of different explanations have been advanced to explain the onset of peace 
negotiations between the GAM and the government. Perhaps one of the most commonly given 
reasons for the peace negotiations is the tsunami in 2004 (see Kingsbury, 2006). Some research 
finds that environmental catastrophes are drivers of peace settlements (see Kreutz, 2012). 
However, as the evidence shows, the government and the GAM began negotiations four years 
earlier, in 2000, before the tsunami hit (Akebo, 2017).  
A second argument focuses on the types of leaders presiding over unconsolidated 
regimes. This argument suggests that compared to leaders presiding over more consolidated 
regimes, leaders in unconsolidated regimes tend to hold less hawkish policies and are open to 
more conciliatory approaches during civil wars (Stanton, 2016, p. 146). In the context of peace 
negotiations, all leaders presiding over the unconsolidated regime continued to maintain a 
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military strategy against the GAM. Megawati, the daughter of Sukarno, was considered a 
hardline president who did crack down on the GAM, often forcefully at times (He, 2007; 
Stanton, 2016).  
A third argument centers on military parity. This line of argument suggests that civil war 
governments are more likely to enter into peace negotiations with rebels that are at least as strong 
as the state’s armed forces in terms of size (see Hultquist, 2013). However, throughout the 
conflict, the government remained militarily stronger than the rebels (Aspinall, 2013, p. 59; 
Rabasa & Haseman, 2002; Stanton, 2016).  
Finally, another line of argument suggests that preferences from the international 
community, including the United States, shaped the wartime strategies of the Indonesian state. 
Following the end of authoritarian rule, the Indonesian state faced growing pressure from 
western states, including from the United States, to end conflicts at the negotiating table (He, 
2007). However, in 2001, the civil war government negotiated with the GAM even when 
international demand for a peaceful solution dramatically declined (He, 2007). In fact, following 
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, the U.S. government favored a 
tougher stance against the rebels. However, the civil war government opted for peace 
negotiations (Baikoeni & Oishi, 2016).  
6.16. Assessment of Support for Theoretical Predictions  
How does this case study conform with my theoretical expectations? Overall, I find 
strong support for a number of my hypotheses that I am able to assess in this case study. Recall 
that Hypothesis 1 posited that peace negotiations are more likely to occur when the rebels are at 
least as popular as the civil war government. Presumably, the GAM lacked public support at the 
beginning of the war in the 1976; even in Aceh, public support for the GAM was virtually non-
existent and the Acehnese in general favored the Indonesian state over the rebels, condemning 
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the GAM for resorting to violence to achieve its political goals (Abuza, 2016). As the armed 
conflict with the GAM progressed (and in particular, when the counterinsurgency became more 
brutal in nature), popular support for the rebels increased over time, to a point where the balance 
of popular support favored the rebels (Barter, 2009, p. 14). By June 2001, nearly 70% of the 
population supported peace negotiations. Indonesians disapproved of the government’s military 
logic in Aceh, which generated broad-based sympathy for the GAM throughout the country 
(Miller, 2009). Passive support from citizens helped the rebels fight a protracted war (The Asia 
Society, n.d.). Moreover, the government had to allocate scarce resources not only to fighting the 
war but also toward policing and maintaining law and order (see TAPOL, 2003; International 
Crisis Group, 2001), which increased the costs of war. The institutional capacity of the security 
sector for maintaining law and order over both the short- and long-term suffered as the popular 
support base of the rebels increased (TAPOL, 2003). Subsequently, the government entered into 
peace negotiations to try and end the conflict with the GAM. Ultimately, the government 
launched peace negotiations, lending support to Hypothesis 1.  
Recall that Hypothesis 2 posited that that unconsolidated regimes are more likely to 
negotiate than consolidated regimes. I find strong support for this hypothesis. Under the 
consolidated regime of Suharto, the government only used force against the GAM. However, the 
unconsolidated regime adopted an integrated strategy that included peace negotiations (Stanton, 
2016; Baikoeni & Oishi, 2016). I find evidence that the immature regime under Habibe and 
subsequent leaders prioritized strengthening institutions and promoting economic growth over 
fighting wars (AP Archive, 2015; Ressa, 1998) . Moreover, I find evidence that the need to 
secure international assistance increased the costs of continued war.  
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Hypothesis 3 maintains that electoral institutions alone do not have an effect on peace 
negotiations. Hypothesis 4 maintains that stronger electoral institutions increase the probability 
of negotiations only when the rebels are at least as popular as the civil war government [and not 
when the government is more popular than the rebels]. It is difficult to assess the validity of 
Hypothesis 4 given than I do not have a scenario in which electoral institutions improved in a 
political environment where the government enjoyed more support than the rebels. I do find 
though that when popular elections were implemented and strengthened in the late 1990s, the 
government leaders negotiated in a political environment in which the rebels enjoyed broad-
based support in Indonesia. Between 1998 and 2004, constitutional amendments increased the 
competitiveness of elections; by 2004, the president was no longer elected via a semi-elected 
assembly but by the adult voting population (Freedman, 2006, p. 90; Freedman, 2007, p. 205). 
As the competitiveness of elections increased, particularly during the first half of 2000, the 








CHAPTER 7.  A COMPARATIVE CASE ANALYSIS OF MEXICO AND PERU’S 
EXPERIENCES WITH REBEL MOVEMENTS  
7.1. Introduction 
Mexico and Peru have both been battlegrounds for leftist-inspired insurgencies. The 
Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) rose up in arms against the Mexican state, 
demanding political rights for indigenous populations (Muñoz, 2006).The Túpac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) and the Sendero Luminoso (alternatively called the Shining 
Path) sough to overthrow the Peruvian regime and implement a socialist-inspired form of 
government (Nieto, 2011). Although the rebellions occurred in different countries, they shared 
several key similarities: The rebel movements were under-powered leftist movements that 
claimed to represent the interests of the poor and working class (Rochlin, 2003; Nieto, 2011).  
Across both countries, the movements operated within similar political and economic 
contexts: Peru and Mexico had both recently undergone democratic regime change and both 
countries held popular elections for their political leaders (see Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2012; 
Stokes, 1996). Moreover, both countries had been experiencing economic recessions during their 
respective conflicts and suffered from widespread unemployment and poverty (Roett, 1985; 
Velasco, 2005). The governments in both countries also began their respective civil wars with 
similar levels of popular support: In both countries, citizens were generally optimistic that 
leaders of their new regimes would continue to strengthen institutions (Palmer, 1984, p. 85; 
Miller, 1989).  
Despite these similarities in Mexico and Peru, the outcomes of the conflicts have been 
drastically different. The Peruvian state never entered into peace negotiations with the Sendero 
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Luminoso or the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Nieto, 2011; Burt, 2007). However, 
the Mexican state entered into peace negotiations with the EZLN after roughly six weeks of 
fighting (Muñoz, 2006). This begs the question: What explains such divergent experiences?  
7.1.1. Goal of Chapter  
The comparative case study traces the divergent experiences with negotiations for the two 
cases to better understand under what conditions electoral institutions shape incentives for peace 
negotiations. I selected cases that exhibit variation in the interaction term (Elections*Rebel 
Support) but have similar background factors. The key feature of theoretical interest in this 
chapter is hence the interaction between electoral institutions and the balance of popular support 
between the rebels and the civil war government. The EZLN in Mexico was relatively more 
popular than the civil war government. The rebels enjoyed overwhelming popular support from 
politically important segments in society, including the voting population, rival political parties, 
and even some members of the ruling party in power in office (Muñoz, 2006). In Peru however, 
the rebel movements remained less popular than the civil war government throughout the course 
of the war (St. John, 1984; Kent, 1993; La Serna, 2012). In both cases, I hold economic 
conditions, rebel ideology, the level of ethnic fractionalization, the type of conflict, and relative 
military strength constant. 
7.1.2. Key Findings  
In general, the comparative case analysis provides support for my argument that stronger 
electoral mechanisms of accountability increase the probability of peace negotiations only when 
the rebels are at least as popular as the civil war government. In Mexico, the stronger electoral 
mechanisms of accountability that were rolled out throughout the 1990s increased the 
incumbent’s accountability to public preferences, which in turned increased the costs of 
continued war and hence made the incumbent seek out a political solution to the conflict (La 
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Botz, 1995). Political leaders facing at least moderately strong electoral mechanisms of 
accountability faced the prospects of losing re-election if it they did not negotiate and provide 
political concessions (Davison, 1994a; Scott, 1994; Munoz, 1994; La Botz, 1995). As elections 
became more competitive, incumbents became more sensitive to continued war, which increased 
the costs of not negotiating. Subsequently, incumbents negotiated more frequently and even 
more intensively at times with the opposition (Manaut, Selee & Arnson, 2006). Although Peru 
also did experience improvements in electoral institutions, no peace negotiations took place with 
any of the rebel groups (Burt, 2007). Interestingly, I find evidence that all presidents in Peru, 
regardless of whether they faced stronger or weaker electoral mechanisms of accountability, 
leveraged popular opinion that favored the elimination of the rebels as a justification to continue 
the war (CNN, 1997). Moreover, I find no evidence that rival political elites in Peru took 
advantage of the brutality of the civil war, such as the number of human casualties or the 
government’s atrocities and human rights abuses, to delegitimize the electoral chances of 
competitively elected incumbents to win public office.  
7.1.3. Roadmap  
The chapter proceeds as follows. I will first provide an overview of the political context 
of the armed conflict in the Mexican case and trace the changes in relative popular support and 
electoral institutions over time. I conduct a similar assessment with the Peruvian case, which 
serves as the control case, and then provide a juxtaposition of both cases followed by a summary 
of my findings.  
7.2. Authoritarian Regime of Mexico  
For most of the 1990s, an authoritarian regime ruled Mexico. The Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) ran virtually a one-party state and instituted tight controls over all 
political spheres of life since its formation in 1929 (Haber, Klein, Maurer, & Middlebrook, 2008, 
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p. 1). The PRI adopted a hard power approach to its rule; the party prohibited meaningful 
political competition from taking place. Targets of the government’s harsh measures of 
repression and harassment included civil rights organizations, rival parties, the media, and other 
alleged detractors of the regime (Haber et al., 2008; Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2012, p. 72).  
7.2.1. Toward a New Political Environment: Electoral Reforms in the Late 1970s 
The 1976 presidential elections brought considerable notoriety to Mexico’s electoral 
practices. Due to fractionalization within rival parties and electoral regulations in favor of the 
ruling party, no other political party competed in the 1976 national elections, leading Portillo to 
win by default. Following the elections, the PRI party became mired in corruption accusations 
(Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2012, p. 83-84). 
After winning the national election on December 1, 1976, President Jose Lopez Portillo 
moved to appease discontent emanating from the elections (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2012, p. 84). 
The Federal Law of Political Organizations and Electoral Processes (LFOPPE) granted rival 
parties the rights to form and operate by 1977. The LOFPPE intended to reduce the seat share of 
the PRI in the legislative chamber (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2012, p. 84; Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 
2009, p. 99). Under the new law, the PRI made significant political concessions; in particular, 
González (2008) concludes that rival political parties at this time now had the ability to make 
political gains than before (pp. 73-74). Despite this change, the electoral reforms did not pose a 
considerable threat to the PRI’s monopoly on power. Moreover, allegations of the PRI stacking 
election results in its favor continued to persist despite the new electoral law of 1977 (Edmonds-
Poli & Shirk, 2012; Haber et al., 2008).  
The PRI-led government, however, lacked domestic support. Both conservative and 
liberal opposition parties engaged in turf wars with the PRI over policies, threatening the security 
of Portillo (Ramirez de la O, 1990, p. 175). The PRI party itself lacked unity, and institutional 
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mechanisms for helping shore up support for the government had yet to be developed (Ramirez 
de la O, 1990, p. 175). To appease discontent, the government implemented a battery of 
economic policies aimed at reversing the economic sluggishness of the late 1970s (Edmonds-Poli 
& Shirk, 2012, p. 85). In this capacity, the government expanded its control over key sectors of 
the economy (particularly the banks) and relied on economic rents emanating from natural 
resource extraction to reduce its debt (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2012). However, these policies 
turned out to be futile. The government could not even meaningfully bring down its debt despite 
amassing a 1500% increase in oil wealth in a four-year period between 1978 and 1980 
(Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2012, p. 85). 
7.2.2. Presidency of De La Madrid (1982 to 1988) 
After having secured over two-thirds of the popular vote, Miguel de La Madrid from the 
PRI became president in 1982 (González, 2008, p. 74). The new government’s attempt to remedy 
the economic downturn, however, proved futile and generated further discontent against the PRI 
party. During the 1980s, the PRI strengthened its control in the economic sphere by moving 
toward an autarkic form of economy. In this capacity, the government extended its control over 
private production and cut trading relations with outside countries (Haber et al., 2008, p. 1). The 
country lost nearly US$8 billion (a figure enough to pay off nearly two-thirds of its foreign 
loans) from the sharp decline in the world price of oil that occurred in the mid-1980s (Bernal, 
1990, p. 166). Private enterprises turned to other political parties for economic assistance, 
threatening the support base of the PRI (Haber et al., 2008, p. 130). Disenchantment with pubic 
policies affected the cohesiveness of the PRI party itself: Members of the PRI banded to together 
to form competing political parties, such as the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) 
(Haber et al., 2008, p. 124).  
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7.2.3. EZLN: Origins and Evolution of Domestic Support  
By 1986, nearly 60% of respondents surveyed by The New York Times had a pessimistic 
outlook for the country (as cited in Ramirez de la O, 1990, p. 175). Subsequently, a group of 
revolutionaries, disenchanted with the country’s institutional and socio-economic trajectories, 
banded together to create the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) (O’Connor & 
Oikonamakis, 2015; Manaut, Selee & Arnson, 2006; Washbrook, 2005; Muñoz, 2006). The 
Chiapas, considered the base of the EZLN’s movement, has historically been characterized as an 
underdeveloped region (Manaut et al., 2006; Muñoz, 2006). The national government’s policies 
had particularly perverse effects for the poor in this region (Manaut et al., 2006; Washbrook, 
2005, p. 426; Wager & Schulz, 1995, p. 6; Muñoz, 2006). The government’s policies aimed at 
meeting its dual goals of economic integration in international markets and the closing of the 
national debt inadvertently worsened the poverty rate in the Chiapas (Muñoz, 2006). Throughout 
most of the 1980s, inflation reached unsustainable levels as wages lost nearly 40% of their 
purchasing potential (Lustig, 1995, p. 46). Apart from economic policies, the government’s 
routine use of repression in the Chiapas further exacerbated tensions between the ruling elites 
and farmers (Washbrook, 2005). The government’s industrial penetration and expansion in the 
Chiapas produced massive displacement of farmers, furthering decreasing the government’s 
political legitimacy in these areas (Washbrook, 2005, p. 426). The government’s policies 
“contributed to the demise of the plantation economy that had been established in Chiapas,” 
setting the stage for rebellion (Washbrook, 2005, p. 426). Within this political environment, the 
EZLN emerged as a movement that represented the welfare of indigenous groups hurt by the 
government’s policies (Manaut et al., 2006; Washbrook, 2005).  
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7.2.4. EZLN: Domestic Support in the 1980s 
The EZLN leveraged the poor socio-economic conditions in the Chiapas to build support 
for its movement and its subsequent revolt against the central government. The rebels, adopting a 
platform of non-violence against citizens, sought to win the hearts and minds of communities in 
the Chiapas and elsewhere by promising to promote indigenous rights (O’Connor & 
Oikonomakis, 2015; Muñoz, 2006). To win loyalty and legitimacy with communities and to set 
itself apart from the state, the EZLN filled the public service gap by establishing and operating 
health centers in the Chiapas (O’Connor & Oikonomakis, 2015, p. 393). The provision of these 
services augmented support for the rebels. Communities found themselves immersed in rebel 
life; opportunities for participating in political discussions became strategies used by the EZLN 
to build support (Muñoz, 2006, p. 253; Greebon, 2008, p. 73; Ronfeldt, Arquilla, Fuller, & Fuller 
1999, p. 34; Washbrook, 2005, p. 420-421). An upsurge in popular support for the rebels 
stemmed from the EZLN’s mobilization efforts. Indigenous and welfare organizations, which 
formed following the government’s controversial economic policies in the 1980s, pledged their 
support for the objectives of the EZLN (Manaut et al., 2006, pp. 136-137; Wager & Schulz, 
1995, p. 6).  
7.2.5. Electoral Reform and Economic Policies Under Salinas in 1988  
While the EZLN was garnering support for its objectives, the PRI party in power 
continued to face accusations of corruption and electoral fraud. The national elections of 1988 
served as a key trigger for the dismantlement of the authoritarian regime and a move toward 
greater electoral accountability (Haber et al., 2008, p. 133). During the 1988 presidential 
campaigns, Carlos Salinas de Gortari (PRI party), Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (PRD party), and 
Manuel Cloither (National Action Party [PAN] party) sought to cut into one another’s voter base 
(Rohter, 1988). Eventually, Carlos Salinas de Gortari of the PRI party vanquished Cuauhtémoc 
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Cárdenas, despite the latter candidate having the electoral edge and being projected to win based 
on initial vote counts (Haber et al., 2008, p. 133; Washbrook, 2005). The outcome had a two-fold 
effect on the PRI: First, the political legitimacy of the PRI declined following the election results 
as accusations of vote rigging by the PRI became salient. Second, the elections generated 
condemnation from rival parties, forcing the president to co-opt rival political elites, including 
members of the PAN. In this capacity, the incumbent offered his political rivals a greater share of 
political power in the government (Haber et al., 2008, pp. 133-134; Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 
2012, p. 90).  
Shortly following the controversial elections of 1988, Salinas moved to promote more 
meaningful electoral accountability to increase domestic trust in the PRI (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 
2012, p. 91). Under Salinas, a series of electoral reforms came into fruition. The 1990 Federal 
Code of Electoral Institutions and Processes (COFIPE) contained two key provisions. First, the 
law changed rules and regulations to make it easier for other parties, apart from the PRI, to 
control the lower house in the legislature. Second, the law created the Federal Electoral Institute, 
an institution tasked with ensuring free and fair elections (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2012, p. 106). 
These reforms subsequently curbed the ability of the executive branch to engage in vote rigging 
during elections (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2012, p. 91; Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2009, p. 106). 
Subsequently, the democratic measures taken in the late 1980s paved the way for a reduction in 
the political monopoly of the PRI; the once powerful political party lost seats in state, legislative, 
and local elections (Inclán, 2018, pp. 49-50).  
7.2.6. Institutional Characteristics of the Semi-Democratic Regime of 1988 
By 1988, the country had moved towards a more democratic-style of government 
(Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2012). Even though institutions of the regime were yet to be developed, 
the public generally were optimistic that leaders would promote public policies and institutions 
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beneficial to the public (Miller, 1989). Recall that I argued that unconsolidated regimes are 
marked by the following problems: 1) incomplete rules regarding the allocation of political 
powers, which lead to turf wars between the incumbent and rival political parties; 2) weak 
bureaucratic capacity (Weingast, 1997; Göbel, 2011); and 3) concerns regarding building and 
maintaining international aid to strengthen the regime (Stanton, 2016). In Mexico, the 
institutions of the regime remained largely fragile and incapable of functioning effectively. 
Moreover, opposition parties that emerged in the new socio-political climate engaged in turf 
wars with the PRI party and the incumbent regarding the institutional rules of the game and 
public policies (Craig & Cornelius, 1995, p. 267). Unlike the 1970s when opposition parties were 
more successfully co-opted by the PRI, rival parties in mid- to late 1980s challenged existing 
institutional rules and demanded to have a role in developing political rules and structuring 
political power distributions, particularly regarding electoral laws and regulations (Craig & 
Cornelius, 1995, pp. 267-268).  
Recall that I also argue that political leaders presiding over unconsolidated regimes need 
to focus their attention on building the bureaucratic apparatus of the regime. Under the 
unconsolidated regime, Salinas focused his efforts on enhancing public service delivery, 
including addressing extreme poverty (Brewster, 2005; Velasco, 2005, p. 71). In 1991, Salinas 
allocated public resources to improve economic mobility through his National Solidarity 
Program, popularly known as PRONASOL (Brewster, 2005, p. 140; Velasco, 2005, p. 71; 
Dresser, 1991, p. 1). Velasco (2005) finds that the program helped the incumbent secure more 
domestic support (p. 71). Salinas also took steps to increase the country’s competitiveness in the 
global economy by dismantling foreign trade restrictions (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2009, p. 106).  
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7.2.7. January 1994 Armed Conflict  
The socioeconomic conditions of the Chiapas served as the impetus for armed conflict. 
Wager and Schulz (1995) present a dismal depiction of the living conditions of Chiapas, noting: 
The contrast between the situation in Chiapas and that of the rest of Mexico is both 
striking and sobering. Whereas only 29% of the Mexican populace as a whole lives in 
rural areas, that figure rises to 60% in Chiapas. Similarly, though Mexico registers just 
13% illiteracy for the country overall, that figure reverses itself—to 31%—for the 
chiapanecos. (p. 3)  
 
Other assessments also provide similar findings. Starvation affected more than two-thirds 
of children in the Chiapas, with thousands of children dying prematurely from a host of diseases, 
especially diarrhea (La Botz, 1995, pp. 22-23). In the Chiapas, 90% of people lacked basic 
literacy skills and the vast majority of workers struggled to earn more than $4 a day (La, Botz, 
1995, p. 22). The government’s ethnic assimilation policies further estranged the population of 
the Chiapas and led to a worsening of race relations (La Botz 1995, p. 23).  
Subcommander Marcos, the leader of the EZLN, describes the socioeconomic conditions 
of the Chiapas in one of his public documents from 1994: “Chiapas produces 55 percent of 
Mexico’s hydroelectric energy, and 20 percent of all the nation’s electricity. However, only one-
third of the Chiapaneco homes have electricity. Where do the 12,907 gigawatts produced 
annually by Chiapas’s hydroelectric plants go?” (EZLN, 1994, p. 22, as translated and cited in 
La Botz, 1995, p. 21). 
On describing the state of the education system in Mexico, Marcos writes:  
The worst in the country. In primary school, 72 of every 100 children do not finish the 
first grade. More than half the schools offer only up to the third grade, and half the 
schools have only one teacher. (EZLN, 1994, p. 23 as translated and cited in La Botz, 
1995, p. 22) 
 
The EZLN also publicized wider societal problems in Mexico in order win over greater 
swathes of the population. In a message dated January 6, 1994, the EZLN write:  
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The serious state of poverty shared by our compatriots has a common cause: lack of 
liberty and democracy. We consider genuine respect for liberty and the democratic will of 
the people are indispensable requisites for the improvement of economic and social 
conditions. (as cited in Scott, 1994, para. 12)  
 
On January 1, 1994, the EZLN launched its rebellion against the government, the day that 
Mexico signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Muñoz, 2006). Armed 
with several thousand fighters, the EZLN swept through a handful municipalities in southern 
Mexico (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2012). The government used both air power and ground power 
against the rebels (Muñoz, 2006, p. 254; Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2012, p. 198). The EZLN faced 
12,000 armed forces of the Mexican army (Ronfeldt et al., 1998, p. 133). A series of bloody 
clashes resulted in roughly 145 deaths (Darling, 1994; Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2012, p. 198). The 
military supremacy of the armed forces eventually led the EZLN to scale back its efforts 
(Ronfeldt et al., 1998, p. 133).  
In under two weeks from the outbreak of the war, support for the rebels increased 
(Manaut et al., 2006, p. 132). In the media, news circulated of the government killing scores of 
civilians during its counterinsurgency, including unarmed children (Brewster, 2005, p. 152). 
Even during the civil war, protests against the government’s atrocities took place (Brewster, 
2005, p. 152; Davison, 1994a).  
Within just twelve days of the conflict, the government scaled back military troops from 
the Chiapas and announced a unilateral ceasefire on January 12, 1994 (Muñoz, 2006, p. 254; 
Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2012, p. 198; La Botz, 1995, p. 9). The government called for peace 
negotiations with the EZLN despite the government troops boasting a far superior army and in 
the absence of a military stalemate (Ronfeldt et al., 1998, p. 133; Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2012, 
p. 198).  
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7.2.8. Constituents Who Threatened the Electoral Success of the PRI 
Why did the PRI-led government initiate a unilateral ceasefire only after twelve days of 
fighting? The evidence strongly suggests that electoral mechanisms of accountability forced the 
president to respond to the demands of the public, which in turn increased the costs of continued 
war and hence made peace talks the more attractive choice (La Botz, 1995). Fearing punishment 
from the electorate incentivized the incumbent to engage in peace negotiations with the EZLN. 
La Botz (1995) maintains that the “political advantage” of the insurgents helped to compensate 
for their lack of fighting power against the civil war government (p. 9). As a result, the political 
survival of the PRI rested on the incumbent’s handling of the conflict (La Botz, 1995, p. 8). 
7.2.9. Domestic Constituents: Reform Movements and Citizens  
The demands of the EZLN reverberated favorably across the population, raising the 
government’s domestic political costs for continuing the civil war given fears of being held 
accountable and punished by the electorate in subsequent national elections. By the early 1990s, 
the EZLN enjoyed support from even non-indigenous populations, which make up the vast 
majority of the population. The rebel movement generated wide appeal by promulgating political 
and economic problems of the country—including failed economic policies and rampant 
corruption—that resonated with many Mexicans (Scott, 1994). Indeed, in the 1990s, the poor 
made up more than 50% of the population (Velasco, 2005, p. 61). According to Brewster (2005), 
Marcos, the leader of the EZLN, “became a national obsession” (p. 154). Referring to Marcos, a 
college student named Guadalupe Sánchez states: “Everyone around here is reading what he 
writes” (as cited in Golden, 1994a, para. 3). A non-indigenous woman from San Cristobal de las 
Casas provided her reasoning for the popular support of the EZLN in January 1994:  
I understand them. I have seen the way the Indians are treated when they bring 
their harvests to market. The intermediaries make fun of them and pay them 
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whatever they want. There is too much social injustice in Chiapas. (as cited in 
Wirpsa, 1994, p. 17) 
 
 The Mexican writer Carlos Monsiváis, reflected on the popularity of the EZLN in the 
following interview:  
They have gone to the propaganda battle with great results so far. Wherever you go, with 
middle-class people, taxi drivers, whomever, everyone is talking about Subcomandante 
Marcos. He has taken them from a guerrilla force that was going to try to overthrow the 
Government to one that is carrying on a dialogue with public opinion. (as cited in 
Golden, 1994a, para. 8)  
 
In discussing why he sides with the rebels, one citizen named Guillermo states: 
We help the {Zapatista} army with food because they are our army. The government says 
the Mexican army is there to protect us, but this is not true. Those soldiers only come to 
repress the peasants, to beat us. But this army, the Zapatista army, it is ours. (as cited in 
Wirpsa, 1994, p. 17) 
 
In 1994, a quarter of a million people gathered in Mexico City in support of the EZLN 
(Khasnabish, 2010, p. 151). According to a poll conducted by Market Opinion Research 
International on January 7, 1994, nearly 60% of Mexicans backed the EZLN (see Figure 7) (as 
cited in Golden, 1994b). A government advisor to Manuel Camacho Solis (the negotiator 
representing the government during the subsequent peace talks) elucidated on the effectiveness 
of the EZLN’s propaganda strategy in garnering domestic support in a statement in February of 
1994:  
They know exactly how to get their message across. For Mexico, they send out these 
scary photos of guerrillas with rifles and ski masks. At the same time, they're sending out 
photos to Europe of dead Zapatistas clutching sticks carved to look like rifles (as cited in 
Robberson, 1994, para. 5).  
 
Although earlier demonstrations attracted primarily indigenous communities, an 
explosion of civil society groups formed demanding similar change espoused by the EZLN. 
Other groups were inspired by the EZLN’s platform, including the Chiapas State Council of 
Indigenous and Farmers Organizations (La Botz, 1995, p. 12).  
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At this time, rallies became a common phenomenon in 1994 (La Botz, 1995, p. 13; 
Inclán, 2015). Political parties, including the PRD, PRI, and PAN, worked strenuously to adopt 
policies that would guarantee them a victory in elections (Velasco, 2005, p. 20). In particular, the 
PRI perceived a heightened electoral loss for not taking into consideration the popularity of the 
rebels (La Botz, 1995, pp. 7-8). The PRI party faced re-election loss in the upcoming August 
1994 elections for not negotiating given that the vast majority of the public agreed with the 
objectives of the rebels and wanted the government to produce policies in line with these 
objectives. According to the following statement by Cuauhtémoc Cardenas, the presidential 
nominee for the PRD party, “The vast majority, including the EZLN (the Zapatista Front, which 
launched the Chiapas uprising,) seek a political solution to the crisis we are living” (as 
interviewed and cited in Munoz, 1994). In reflecting on the prospects for the PRI candidate 
winning the August 1994 elections given the overwhelming support for the EZLN, Cuauhtémoc 
Cardenas had a bleak outlook: “I don’t know if there is a way for the PRI to win… there is no 
way he can pull many votes” (as interviewed and cited in Munoz, 1994).  
 The protests increased the salience of not only the EZLN’s local grievances but also 
embarrassed the PRI politically (Scott, 1994; Muñoz, 2006). As demonstrations in favor of the 
EZLN mounted, the PRI party’s grasp on political power hung on a thread. Lorenzo Meyer, a 
detractor of the civil war government, reflected on the electoral risks faced by the PRI-led 
government in subsequent elections: 
Salinas was seen as the little Superman south of the border, able to change ‘everything’ 
without having to resort to populism. Meanwhile, the authoritarianism, corruption, 
repression, and electoral fraud were kept in the background. Now everyone is aware 
inside and outside Mexico that Salinas is not a little Superman.” (as cited in Scott, 1994, 
para. 4)  
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Meyer further elaborates on the expected electoral troubles faced by Salinas: “Now, you’re 
seeing the fruits of frustration sown by past policies. How else can you explain a revolt in the 
most PRI of states?” (as cited in Scott, 1994, para. 10).  
7.2.10. Rival Elites: Taking Advantage of an Unpopular War  
Recall that I argued that competitively elected leaders are sensitive to continuing wars if 
rival parties can leverage public opinion related to the war to win support for their candidates 
running for office (Velasco, 2005). In Mexico, 61% of citizens backed the rebels, according to a 
poll conducted by Market Opinion Research International on January 7, 1994 (as cited in 
Golden, 1994b). At this time, the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) forged a 
relationship with the EZLN, both of which remained in frequent contact with one another during 
the armed conflict (Inclán, 2018, p. 85). Rival political parties that aligned their platforms with 
the EZLN hoped to win enough support to oust the PRI from power (Scott, 1994). Already, the 
PRI faced a heightened risk of electoral loss, particularly given the gradual reduction of the 
party’s monopoly on political power in congress as a result of the electoral laws passed in the 
1980s and 1990s (Velasco, 2005, p. 21).  
7.2.11. International Considerations  
“The investors will drop you like a hot potato. You will not realize the economic gains 
that you want. So I hope you’ll consider that as you make your decision” (Jones as interviewed 
by and cited in Deare, 2017, p. 141). These were the words spoken by Jim Jones—an American 
diplomat during the Chiapas crisis—to Salinas in reference to the civil war (Deare, 2017, p. 
140). Jones had warned Salinas that continued war would cost his administration significant 
political costs, in the form of lost foreign investment (Deare, 2017, p. 141).  
Ending civil wars allows incumbents presiding over unconsolidated regimes to function 
more like a stable state, which is critical for shoring up international aid and for the political 
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survival of the incumbent (Stanton, 2016). Brewster (2005) noted that the Mexican state wanted 
to project an image as “a stable, prosperous, modern country on the brink of First World status” 
(p. 151).  
Following the outbreak of the armed conflict, the Mexican currency plummeted 
(Robberson, 1995). Larry Birns, a Latin American specialist from the Council on Hemispheric 
Affairs, prognosticated on the expected international costs for the unconsolidated regime if it 
continued to fight the EZLN: “Now we face the possibility of having a kind of cadaverous Nafta. 
If Mexico is not considered a reliable investment environment, then investors are going to say, 
‘Why go to Mexico? We go to Bangladesh’” (as cited in Davison, 1994b, para. 4). According to 
Daniel Goldstein, a banking specialist based in Mexico, “You can’t send a bunch of troops down 
to Chiapas and create a military confrontation, and then expect the financial markets to regard 
this as a measure to restore stability” (as cited in Robberson, 1995, para. 7).  
During the civil war, the United Nations (UN) condemned the Mexican government’s 
handling of the conflict. Mary Robinson, the High Commissioner for Human Rights at the 
United Nations at this time, concluded that government troops engaged in “serious violations of 
the rights of the indigenous people” in the Chiapas (as cited in Servicio Internacional para la 
Paz, 1998, section: “International Criticism of Mexico”). The Mexican government had been 
criticized for continuing the civil war by a handful of U.S. congressmen (Muñoz, 2006, p. 262; 
Depalma, 1995). Democratic congressman Robert Torricelli hinted at serious repercussions for 
continued war, including the possibility of terminating the NAFTA agreement: “We’re going to 
make clear to the Salinas Administration what kind of political reforms are expected and 
required before that happens” (as cited in Depalma, 1994a, para. 11).  
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7.2.12. Actions of the Civil War Government Following the Unilateral Ceasefire of January 
1994  
With national elections just months away, the government sought a political solution to 
the conflict to appease constituents who sympathized with the rebels. Following the unilateral 
ceasefire on January 12, 1994, Salinas began crafting the groundwork for what he hoped to be 
meaningful negotiations aimed at reaching a peace settlement with the EZLN (Muñoz, 2006). 
As a first step, he reshuffled his cabinet by hiring government officials with experience in 
promoting human rights (La Botz, 1995, p. 8). A pro-peace agency was set up on January 12, 
1994, to facilitate the dialogue with the rebels (Deare, 2017, p. 141). Manuel Camacho Solís, a 
member of the PRI who had a flair for appealing to the masses, became the lead negotiator for 
the government (La Botz, 1995, p. 8; Deare, 2017, p. 141).  
In his address to the country on January 12, 1994, Salinas and his administration made a 
number of guarantees to appease voters who would hold him responsible for not seeking a 
political solution to the conflict and providing concessions to the insurgents (La Botz, 1995). 
Among other concessions, Salinas stated that he would focus on improving “the social demands 
of the indigenous community in the highlands and the jungle of Chiapas” (as cited in La Botz, 
1995, p. 9). Manuel Camacho Solis echoed similar sentiments in a statement made in January of 
1994: “We are about to begin a major change in the political relations of our country” (as cited in 
Depalma, 1994b, para. 6). 
During this time, sympathy toward the rebels continued to increase. A February 1994 poll 
by Market Opinion Research International (as cited in Golden, 1994b) found a spike in popular 
support for the rebels since the prior month: nearly two-thirds of Mexicans polled in February 
accepted the objectives of the rebels (as shown in Figure 7).  
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 January 7, 1994 Survey  February 18, 1994 Survey  
Accept the EZLN demands 61% 75% 
Survey results from Market Opinion Research International as cited in Golden, 1994b 
Figure 7. Percent of respondents in Mexico who agree with the EZLN, survey results. 
 
7.2.13. Peace Negotiations, February 1994–June 1994 
On February 21, 1994, the wartime adversaries attended formal peace negotiations in the 
Chiapas, nearly six weeks after the unilateral ceasefire declared by the government (La Botz 
1995, p. 11). Subcomandante Marcos and Manuel Camacho Solís represented the EZLN and the 
government in the first round of peace negotiations, respectively (La Botz, 1995). By March 2, 
1994, less than two weeks after the start of peace negotiations, the government assembled a 
peace agreement tailored primarily to the promotion of indigenous rights. The agreement 
included a series of self-government, health, and infrastructural reforms (La Botz, 1995, p. 11). 
However, assurances for broad-based political reform, the EZLN argued, were not incorporated 
in the negotiated settlement (Manaut et al., 2006, pp. 138-139). Democratic reform, which was a 
key concern for the insurgents, was downplayed during the peace process (Marcos, 2001, p. 45).  
Following the first round of peace negotiations, popular support for the EZLN continued 
to grow (Manaut et al., 2006, p. 139). By April 1994, circulating brochures read: “The people are 
with the EZLN. They are not alone” (as cited in Davison, 1994a, para. 6). In April 1994, 
government officials, including those belonging to the PRI party, presaged that the PRI would be 
ousted from the executive office (Davison, 1994a). Rival political parties voiced their frustration 
against the ineffective policies of PRI-led government while lending their support to the 
objectives of the EZLN (Davison, 1994a). The Bishop of the Chiapas town of San Cristobal, 
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Samuel Ruiz, comments on the soft power of the EZLN in a statement made in May 1998 to the 
Los Angeles Times: 
What they were trying to do was to shake up the sociopolitical conscience of the citizens 
of this country and ask them to participate in creating a transitional government until a 
more democratic government was in place. Their strength did not come from military 
might but from the power they had to organize the people of Mexico, not only Chiapas, 
into a more democratic society. They had the social and political power to be heard. (as 
cited in Munoz, 1998) 
 
7.2.14. Balance of Popular Support Between the Rebels and Government from 1994–1995  
In early August 1994, shortly prior to the national elections, 6,000 people attended the 
EZLN-sponsored convention on institutional reform held in the Chiapas (Stephen, 1995, p. 88). 
One citizen named Aurelio provided the following reason as to why the PRI faced unpopularity: 
“The present government has trampled on the rights of the peasants” (as cited in Gunson, 1994, 
p. 11).  
However, the PRI escaped an electoral upset in 1994. Roughly 49% of voters gave the 
PRI another chance with the victory of Ernesto Zedillo in the August elections (Dominguez, 
1999, p. 5). Although the PRI maintained its political power in the national government, the 
margin of victory was much lower than in prior years. Moreover, the PRI-led government still 
faced demands to end the civil war (Depalma, 1995). By February 1995, Manaut and colleagues 
(2006) conclude that the insurgents were supported by the majority of the population (p. 139).  
Having campaigned on a platform that promised the promotion of indigenous rights, 
Zedillo sought to continue the dialogue with the EZLN. In his own words, Zedillo stated, “A 
political solution demands political will. And political will is proved with actions, not just with 
words” (as cited in Depalma, 1995).  
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7.2.15. The San Andrés Peace Negotiations, October 1995–February 1996  
Towards the end of 1995, the wartime adversaries met again to talk (Manaut et al., 2006, 
p. 140). Unlike prior negotiations, these peace negotiations were more inclusive in nature. The 
Commission for Concord and Pacification (COCOPA) was also involved in peace talks. Local 
communities and civil society were given a stake in influencing the peace process in San Andrés 
(Manaut et al., 2006, p. 140).  
The negotiations once again covered local grievances. However, Marco Bernal (the lead 
negotiator for the government) and Comandante David (the lead negotiator for the rebels) were 
at odds over the scope and scale of indigenous rights. To the disapprobation of the government, 
the EZLN sought to win concessions that provided the group greater governance rights in the 
Chiapas (Manaut et al., 2006, pp.141-142).  
As both sides engaged in turf wars over definitional issues, pressure to end the war 
continued to increase within the PRI-led government. By this time in early 1995, even the PAN 
and the PRD were against prolonging the civil war against the rebels (Velasco, 2005, p. 45). 
However, the civil war government became concerned for its survival in office because of a lack 
of cohesion amongst the ruling politicians (Velasco, 2005, p. 45). By November 1995, the PRI 
continued to face increasing political costs for not finding a political solution to the conflict at 
the negotiating table: Rival parties (including those sympathetic to the EZLN) were cutting into 
the PRI’s seat shares in local elections; 35% of the state capitals in Mexico were now under the 
control of the PAN (Gunson, 1995, p. 013). Political elites, including rival parties, discredited the 
political legitimacy of the government in hopes of winning political support (Velasco, 2005). 
Members of the PAN and the PRD clashed with the government regarding the use of force 
against the insurgents (Velasco, 2005, p. 45).  
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The EZLN also witnessed an increase in domestic support following the peace talks 
during the first half of 1995, which set the impetus for future negotiations (Manaut et al., 2006, 
p. 140). Scores of people attended conferences to discuss indigenous rights alongside the rebels 
in 1996 (Gilberth & Otero, 2001). Gilbreth and Otero (2001) find that the rebels in particular 
secured more domestic support in the north (p. 16).  
The peace negotiations culminated with the San Andrés Accords of 1996. Per the terms 
of the agreement, the EZLN scored significant concessions: The government formally 
acknowledged the rights of indigenous communities and agreed to allow the EZLN to exercise 
greater autonomy in the Chiapas (Manaut et al., 2006, p. 141). Despite the peace agreement 
acknowledging the rights of the indigenous groups, the nature of the concessions remained vague 
and subsequently became a source of dispute between the wartime adversaries. By March 1997, 
the peace agreement had yet to be implemented, leading to a tense atmosphere where rebel 
supporters were pitted against newly formed militias (Manaut et al., 2006, p. 143). Following the 
peace negotiations, around 45 civilians in the Chiapas were gunned down by the militias 
(Stahler-Sholk, 1998, p. 63; Lacey, 2007). The regime’s reputation took a severe hit as a result of 
the event (Lacey, 2007). Following the massacre, relations between the government and the 
EZLN became glacial (Weiner, 2000).  
7.2.16. Competitive Elections and Wartime Policies  
By 1997, the country’s progress in electoral democracy that began under earlier reforms 
(Velacso, 2005, p. 64). These stronger electoral institutions threatened the political survival of 
political incumbents who advanced unpopular policies. During this time, the Federal Electoral 
Institute (created under the prior administration) worked more effectively to ensure clean and 
competitive elections. Furthermore, new formulas for seat allocation in Congress were instituted, 
intended to prevent any one political party from amassing too much power in the legislative 
170 
branch (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2012, p. 93). The PRI continued to see its seat share decline in 
the legislative branch (Navarro, 1997). Indeed, by the end of the 1990s, the PRI routinely lost 
elections at local levels of government (Haber et al., 2008, pp. 150-151).  
7.2.17. Polices Under Vincente Fox  
By the end of 1999, competitive elections ousted the PRI from government (Teichman, 
2010, p. 120). The victory of Vincente Fox from the PAN party broke the PRI party’s nearly 70-
year-long tenure in power in the national government (Velasco, 2005, p. 64). With the inability 
of Zedillo to seek another presidential bid because of term limits, Fox capitalized on both 
national problems facing Mexico and the conflict to win support during the elections. In this 
capacity, he had promised to fight corruption and promote indigenous rights (Thompson, 2000). 
Velasco (2005) also concludes that, “No one questioned the electoral legitimacy of the new 
administration” (p. 48).  
The new president believed he would only need “15 minutes” to end the civil war with 
the EZLN (as cited in Weiner, 2000, para. 1). Fox outspokenly affirmed his support for a 
political solution to the conflict: “We’re saying goodbye to military logic and embracing political 
logic. The suffering of Mexican Indians is unacceptable. The need to change our policy toward 
these people is obvious” (as cited in Weiner, 2000, para. 5). 
The lack of governmental action on a four-year-old piece of legislation on Indian rights 
became a central focus for the EZLN at this time (Velasco, 2005, p. 48; Inclán, 2018). The 
imprisonment of Zapatista fighters made relations between the new government and the rebels 
difficult. Moreover, the presence of army troops in the Chiapas also became a source of concern 
for the rebels (Velasco, 2005; Inclán, 2018). To facilitate an end to the conflict, the president 
moved to meet the demands of the rebels by sending the stalled piece of legislation to the 
legislative branch for review. Congressional leaders, however, made amends to the scope and 
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scale of political decentralization in the Chiapas (Manaut et al., 2006, p. 145; Inclán, 2018, p. 
17). These modifications in the content of the agreement left the EZLN partially satisfied. 
Despite scaling back army troops from the Chiapas (Inclán, 2018, p. 17), the civil war 
government did not engage in further negotiations with the rebels (Manaut et al., 2006). The 
wartime belligerents remained locked in an environment akin to an “armed peace” (Manaut et 
al., 2006, p. 131). By 2003, the EZLN adopted its own interpretation of the agreement: The 
rebels established local self-government arrangements throughout the Chiapas region (Velasco, 
2005, p. 49).  
7.3. The Peruvian Experience with the Sendero Luminoso and the Túpac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement 
7.3.1. Introduction 
Recall that I argued that political incumbents who face stronger electoral mechanisms of 
accountability risk being ousted from office if they continue to prosecute civil wars in a political 
environment in which the rebels are at least as popular as the civil war government. In Mexico, 
the case study revealed that electoral mechanisms of accountability compelled presidents to be 
accountable and sensitive to the preferences of the public, which increased the costs of not 
negotiating with the insurgents (La Botz, 1995). Failing to engage in dialogue and provide 
concessions with the EZLN threatened the electoral chances of the ruling party in elections (see 
Scott, 1994; Davison, 1994a; Muñoz, 2006; La Botz, 1995).  
The Peruvian case serves as a counterfactual case to the Mexican case: Do stronger 
electoral institutions matter for peace negotiations when the government enjoys more popular 
support than the rebels? Even though the rebels are less popular than the government (Palmer, 
1992; La Serna, 2012; Kent, 1993), is there any evidence to suggest that presidents facing 
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stronger electoral mechanisms of accountability fear that down the road they and their political 
party will be ousted out of public office for being involved in a civil war? 
Unlike in the Mexico case, the Túpac Amaru Movement and the Sendero Luminoso, two 
rebel groups seeking to control the Peruvian government, failed to garner any meaningful 
support from the public, including support from rival political elites. The Sendero Luminoso lost 
domestic support over time (McClintock, 1984) as did the Túpac Amaru Movement (Long, 
1993; CNN, 1997), which reduced the government’s costs of maintaining a strictly unilateral 
military approach. Interestingly, all presidents during the armed conflict, regardless of whether 
they faced stronger or weaker electoral mechanisms of accountability, leveraged broad-based 
public contempt against the rebels to fight a protracted and bloody war in hopes of defeating the 
rebels (Leger, 1987a, Long 1993; CNN, 1997).  
7.3.2. Toward a New Political Regime 
Between 1968 and 1980, Peru had been under the control of an authoritarian regime led 
by Juan Velasco Alvarado (Cotler, 1995, p. 333). Under the regime, Velasco moved to swiftly 
cement his monopoly on political power by banning rival political parties (Cotler, 1995, pp. 333-
334). Massive demonstrations against the authoritarian government paved the way for regime 
change in 1978 following unpopular public policies that granted the government an increased 
role in the private sector (Cotler, 1995, p. 334; Mauceri, 1997a, pp. 17-18). The meetings 
between a handful of political parties (representing leftist, conservative, populist, and centrist 
platforms) set the foundation for their political domination in local and national politics 
(Mauceri, 1997a, p. 19; Stokes, 1996, p. 58).  
Winning together on average 92% of the total votes in the first half of the 1980s, the four 
parties enjoyed the monopoly of political power in politics (Dietz & Myers, 2001, p. 26, as cited 
in Van Cott, 2005, p. 168) The four parties secured varying levels of political power in both the 
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local and national levels of government (Van Cott, 2005). In the first popular elections in 1980, 
the Right party prevailed and also held the majority of the seats in the legislature. After securing 
just under 50% of the national votes, Fernando Belaúnde Terry from the Acion Popular party 
(Right) become president following the first elections under the unconsolidated regime (Cotler, 
1995; Bourque & Warren, 1989, p. 9).  
7.3.3. Institutional Characteristics of the Unconsolidated Regime in the Early 1980s 
Recall that unconsolidated regimes are marked by a lack of broad-based support 
regarding political power arrangements (Weingast, 1997; Göbel, 2011) and concerns with 
securing  international aid (Stanton, 2016). Competition among rival elites for power was quite 
salient during this time; in particular, leftist parties often times refused to work with Belaunde’s 
party during the 1980s (Cotler, 1995, p. 340). 
Democratic institutions that were implemented following the end of the military regime 
remained largely ineffective and incapable of carrying out their main functions and 
responsibilities (Cotler, 1995, p. 337). Institutions of the prior regime continued to persist under 
the new political order (Stokes, 1996, p. 60). Despite transitioning away from an autocratic form 
of government, Cameron and Mauceri (1997) argue that institutional remnants of “corruption, 
clientelism, and authoritarianism” thwarted the implementation of democratic rules and 
institutions (p. 5). Mauceri (1997a) also finds that democracy was hindered by elements of the 
prior military regime (p. 15). Graham (1990) also draws similar conclusions regarding the 
fragility of the regime’s institutions during the 1980s: “The nation’s institutions, both political 
and economic, had proved incapable of coping with the demands placed upon them by society” 
(p. 84)  
Moreover, the military did engage in disputes with presidents (Jaskoski, 2013; 
McClintock, 1989). Within this nascent institutional landscape, political incumbents were often 
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reliant on international aid organizations (Schönwälder, 2002, p. 74). The newly elected 
president inherited an economy suffering from a chronic debt crisis and hyperinflation brought 
on by prior economic policies implemented in the 1970s. However, efforts under Terry aimed at 
ameliorating the fractured economy were futile (Bourque & Warren, 1989, p. 9). Terry’s 
liberalization policies backfired, and unemployment persisted under the new regime (Graham, 
1990, pp. 84-85; Schönwälder, 2002, pp. 74-75). Austerity measures consequently became a 
hallmark of the Terry administration’s strategy to jumpstart the economy. However, these 
measures once again did not promote economic growth (Schönwälder, 2002, p. 74). Despite the 
institutional deficiencies, the Peruvian public by and large had high hopes that democracy would 
improve under Belaunde (Krause, 1980).  
7.3.4. The Sendero Luminoso and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement  
Since the shift away from a purely authoritarian system of government in 1980, the 
unconsolidated political regime of Peru faced several domestic threats to its rule. Peru’s political 
transition had been met with a wave of political violence emanating from two Maoist-inspired 
violent groups, the Sendero Luminoso and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Nieto, 
2011; Rochlin, 2003). Although the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement was relatively 
weaker than the Sendero Luminoso in size, both groups were militarily much weaker than the 
Peruvian state (McClintock & Vallas, 2003; Nieto, 2011, p. 520). The following section will 
describe in more detail the aims and activities of both movements.  
Sendero Luminoso  
Formed in 1980, the Sendero Luminoso was the first insurgent organization to attack the 
Peruvian government under the new democratic regime (Rochlin, 2003, p. 23). The rebels 
espoused a Maoist ideology and purported to represent the interests of peasants (Jaskoski, 2013, 
p. 39). According to its manifesto, the insurgents sought the “demolition of the Peruvian State” 
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(Sendero Luminoso, 1988, as translated and cited in Rochlin, 2003, p. 56). To this end, the 
Sendero Luminoso employed brutal tactics, including killing unarmed civilians, bombings, 
kidnappings, and assassinations. Headed by Abimael Guzman, the Sendero Luminoso operated 
both political and military wings and viewed terror and fear as ingredients vital for a successful 
revolution (Rochlin, 2003). The movement’s armed struggle, according to Rochlin (2003), aimed 
“to achieve power by instilling intense fear among the population through the awesome use of 
force” (p. 57). According to a statement by Guzman (taken by Degregori, 1997, and translated 
and cited in Rochlin, 2003, p. 58): “triumph of the revolution will cost one million deaths.”  
The Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement  
Formed in the early 1980s, the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement emerged in the 
same milieu of economic recession (Cook & Lounsbery, 2017). The movement sought to 
overthrow the government and establish a socialist system of government (Rochlin, 2003, p. 72). 
Isaac Velazco, a member of the insurgent movement, cites income inequality as the main 
grievance of the movement, arguing: “For 500 years, the people of Peru have been exploited by 
colonialists and neo-colonialism, while a small class of rich people have lived in wealth” (as 
translated and cited in Arm the Spirit, 1996, para. 6). Those attracted to the Túpac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement came from different swathes of society. The poor, the educated, and 
even drug dealers actively participated in the movement’s activities (Rochlin 2003, p. 44). The 
size of the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement dwarfed in comparison to the Peruvian 
military and the Sendero Luminoso (Rochlin, 2003, p. 72). The Túpac Amaru Revolutionary 
Movement claimed no more than 1,500 active fighters (Rochlin, 2003, p. 44), although some 
estimates put the figure well under 1,000 fighters (see Nieto, 2011, p. 520). Indeed, during its 
insurgency, the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement never wielded any coercive power that 
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significantly threatened the government’s forces (Nieto, 2011, p. 520). The movement attempted 
to compensate for its military weakness by adopting guerilla tactics. Abductions of government 
officials and destruction of state property became hallmark strategies used by the Túpac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement during the civil war against the Peruvian state (Nieto, 2011; Rochlin, 
2003, pp. 72-73).  
7.3.5. Comparing Both Rebel Groups 
Both the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement and the Sendero Luminoso faced a 
strong Peruvian army during their civil wars (Rochlin, 2003). However, the Túpac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement was eclipsed in fighting strength by the Sendero Luminoso. Both 
groups routinely engaged in turf wars over territory, including in the Upper Huallaga Valley, a 
fertile ground for coca cultivation and illegal cocaine smuggling (Kent, 1993). The muscle power 
of the Sendero Luminoso often affected the ability of the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary 
Movement to maintain an enduring presence in the departments the movement had infiltrated 
(Kent, 1993; Long, 1993).  
Unlike the Sendero Luminoso, the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement opposed the 
use of intentional violence against civilians (Rochlin, 2003, p. 72). Movement leaders believed 
that restraint toward civilians would help win hearts and minds, which would be critical for 
helping induce political change. The Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement habitually 
publicized the killings committed by the Sendero Luminoso in an attempt to discredit its rival 
and to win legitimacy from the domestic public (Rochlin 2003, p. 44).  
7.3.6. Public Support for Marxism Prior to the Armed Conflicts in 1978 and 1980  
Although both the Sendero Luminoso and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement 
dominated the political landscape in the 1980s, there is scant data on the extent of public support 
for each group prior to their armed conflicts. However, a few sources offer some insights. 
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Fernando Soldevilla’s study (as cited in McClintock, 1984) provides data on the level of public 
support for Marxism prior to the outbreak of the armed conflicts. According to Soldevilla (as 
cited in McClintock, 1984, p. 56), 29% of voters selected Marxist candidates during the 1978 
Constituent Assembly meetings that focused on drawing the contours of political decision-
making under the new political order. When broken down by department, Soldevilla finds that 
the Ayacucho department, the power base of the Sendero Luminoso, possessed one of the highest 
percentage of Marxist voters (37%) (as cited in McClintock, 1984, p. 57).  
 
Table 6. Trends in Support for Marxism in Conflict Zones in Peru and Nationwide, in 1978 and 
1980 (Percent of Voters)  
Region in Peru  Support for Marxism in 
1978  
Support for Marxism in 
1980 
Huancavelica Department  39% 22% 
Ayacucho Department  37% 27% 
Nationwide  29% 18% 
Source: Tuesta Soldevilla, F. (1983). Elecciones municipales: cifras y escenario político. Deseo, 
Lima, as translated and cited in McClintock (1984, p. 56). Table adapted from McClintock 




Increased domestic contempt against the Sendero Luminoso.  
During the start of the armed conflict in 1980 with the Sendero Luminoso, Soldevilla’s 
study (as cited in McClintock, 1984, p. 56) finds that public support for Marxism declined 
throughout the country; nationally, the vote share allocated to Marxist candidates fell by 11 
percentage points (from 29% to 18%). As shown in Table 6, Soldevilla finds that Ayacucho and 
the Huancavelica, two departments designated as Emergency Zones by the Peruvian government 
shortly following the outbreak of the civil war with the Sendero Luminoso, also experienced a 
reduction in the total vote share allocated to Marxist candidates between 1978 and 1980 (as cited 
in McClintock, 1984, p. 56). In Huancavelica, the vote share declined by 17 percentage points 
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(from 39% to 22%) (Soldevilla as cited in McClintock, 1984, p. 56). In the Ayacucho 
department, Soldevilla (as cited in McClintock, 1984, p. 56) finds that the vote share declined by 
10 percentage points (from 37% to 27%). This decline has been attributed to Sendero 
Luminoso’s use of terrorism against the population (McClintock, 1984).  
7.3.7. The Regime’s Strategies Under Terry (1980–1985) 
The Sendero Luminoso initiated its first rounds of violence against the state during the 
first half of 1980. However, a lack of information regarding the danger posed by the rebels led to 
a delayed counterinsurgency response (Rochlin, 2003, p. 60). Following a series of high-profile 
rebel attacks against government targets, including the assassinations of politicians and the 
destruction of public infrastructure, the civil war government began its military response 
(Jaskoski, 2013, p. 41; Nieto, 2011, p. 525). Terry used the term “criminals” to describe 
members of the Sendero Luminoso (as cited in St. John, 1984, para. 3). President Terry also 
enjoyed the support of the public in his counterinsurgency efforts against the rebels. Indeed, 
citizens routinely pressured Terry to take a tougher stance against the insurgents (Schumacher, 
1982). Not even socialist parties lent their support to the rebels (Schumacher, 1982).  
By the end of 1982, the police and the military began a more comprehensive and full-
scale counterinsurgency against the rebels (Roberts & Peceny, 1997, p. 196). As part of his 
counterinsurgency measures, Terry created regional security apparatuses in a handful of 
provinces in rebel strongholds, including in the Ayacucho region in Peru (Roberts & Peceny, 
1997, p. 196). These military institutions had powers to make decisions without the approval of 
the courts, lawyers, or politicians (Nieto, 2011, p. 525; Roberts & Peceny, 1997, p. 196). In 
1984, over 500 people were killed in the armed conflict with the Sendero Luminoso, forcing the 
president to strengthen his counterinsurgencies against the rebels (Simons, 1984).  
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In the early 1980s, a greater area of southern and northern departments, including the 
Puno, Andean, and Huallaga Valley, became infiltrated by the Sendero Luminoso. By 1983, 
nearly half of the country’s 24 departments were penetrated by the rebels (McClintock, 1984, p. 
52). Subsequently, the military augmented its decision-making powers in more departments 
where the rebels carried out their insurgency against government targets and civilians (Kent, 
1993; McClintock, 1984; Roberts & Peceny, 1997). As one example of indiscriminate violence, 
nearly 70 civilians in the Ayacucho department were massacred by the Sendero Luminoso 
(Nieto, 2011, p. 520).  
In 1984, violence between the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement and the Peruvian 
government began (UCDP, n.d.-d). In September, the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement 
engaged in a series of attacks against government targets, including bombing homes of 
government officials, police departments, and hospitals (UCDP, n.d.-d). At this time, the rebels 
had limited capacity to extend their insurgencies beyond the vicinity of Lima (De Izcue, 2004, p. 
55).  
The armed forces committed extensive human rights abuses in insurgent strongholds 
during the war (Roberts & Peceny, 1997, p. 196). The judiciary, however, by and large remained 
sidelined and powerless in zones of active conflict where Terry’s directive granted the military 
the monopoly of decision-making power (Roberts & Peceny, 1997, p. 196). 
 
7.3.8. Increase in Public Contempt Toward Both Rebel Groups Under Terry (1980–1985) 
The Sendero Luminoso’s use of intentional violence and terrorism against civilians 
coincided with an increase in public condemnation against the movement in the early 1980s 
(Kent, 1993; La Serna, 2012). Most accounts suggest that the general public, including peasants, 
became antagonistic toward the Sendero Luminoso. In general, citizens categorically condemned 
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and rejected the rebels, viewing their use of terrorism as morally reprehensible and contributing 
to the destabilization of the country (McClintock, 1984, p. 50). Civilians who did not support the 
uprising against the civil war government were not spared any harm by the rebels (De Izcue, 
2004, p. 54).  
Peasant communities formed their own defense organizations, called “rondas 
campesinas,” to protect themselves against the Sendero Luminoso (La Serna, 2012, pp. 168-
172). As the Sendero Luminoso spread geographically, La Serna (2012) describes how the socio-
political landscape of Ayacucho transformed significantly as a result of the presence of these 
defense organizations (p. 171). The Comisión Investigadora (as cited in La Serna, 2012, p. 169) 
found that nearly a dozen rebels were killed by these defense organizations by a handful of 
Iquichano peasants in Huanca.  
Public opinion polls suggest that the Sendero Luminoso lacked broad-based national 
support. In 1982, a Datum poll (as cited in McClintock, 2001, p. 88) found that 69% of 
respondents surveyed in Lima preferred a country ruled by a democratic government, compared 
to 13% who preferred the country ruled by a socialist regime that came into power by force. 
According to a Datum poll conducted in 1984 (as cited and translated by McClintock, 1984, p. 
50), only 13% of Peruvians sanctioned groups that use revolutionary means to implement a 
socialist system of government. In contrast, the same Datum poll (as cited and translated by 
McClintock, 1984, p. 50) found that 72% of Peruvians favored leaders who are elected via the 
ballot box (and not who come into power by force). By 1984, most Peruvians rejected the 
methods of the Sendero Luminoso. St. John (1984), a journalist who interviewed President 
Terry, concluded that by 1984, “The Sendero Luminoso has no national support. Even the 
multitude of factions making up the Peruvian left have rejected it as a radical fringe movement” 
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(para. 5). St. John (1984) estimates that up to 2,000 rebels formed the movement. Moreover, up 
to 2,000 citizens also provided passive support to the movement (St. John, 1984). Julio Cotler (as 
cited in St. John, 1984, para. 6) further elucidates on the reasons for the lack of support: “The 
Sendero Luminoso is anti-Western, anti-industrial, and anti-modern, and the contradictions 
between its policies and those of Mao are considerable.”  
Although data on the public perceptions of the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement is 
limited, statements by public officials suggest that the movement perhaps had much less public 
support than the Sendero Luminoso. According to McCormick (1993), the Túpac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement functioned “without a meaningful popular base” despite being an 
organization that aimed to appeal to the domestic public (p. 53). According to the Comisión de la 
Verdad y la Reconciliación (as cited in De Izcue, 2004, p. 58), even Marxist-based political 
parties such as the Izquierda Unida failed to lend support to the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary 
Movement. 
7.3.9. Policies of Alan García (1985–1990) 
The elections of 1985 were more competitive than the election five years earlier. A new 
set of rules introduced runoff elections; a runoff election would be held to determine the winner 
of the presidency if a candidate did not secure at least 51% of the national votes in the first round 
of elections (Morón & Sanborn, 2006, p. 11). In 1985, elections based on “proportional 
representation” were rolled out for congressional elections (Morón & Sanborn, 2006, p. 11). 
Presidential elections in 1985 brought to power Alan Garcia, from the Center party, after 
winning nearly 50% of the national vote (Bourque & Warren, 1989, pp. 9-10). Legislative 
elections in the same year gave Garcia’s political party control of Congress (Stokes, 1996, p. 59).  
Like his predecessor, Garcia continued to pursue a strictly military strategy against the 
rebels (Nieto, 2011). By the time he took office, public disenchantment with the direction of the 
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country was high: The security environment was deteriorating as a result of the armed conflicts 
and half of Peruvians were not gainfully employed (Roett, 1985, p. 279). Key segments of the 
population supported the elimination of the rebels, including citizens, military, and even Marxist 
political groups (Riding, 1986). There is no evidence to suggest that President Garcia feared that 
continued war with the rebels would hurt his party’s re-election chances in subsequent elections 
or that rival political parties leveraged the bloody civil war, including the human rights abuses 
committed by the armed forces, to try and delegitimize the ruling party’s electoral chances in 
executive office. Indeed, during this time, thousands of reports circulated that highlighted the 
civil war government’s repressive practices against citizens during the course of the armed 
conflict (Randall, 1987; p. 13A). Overall, I have yet to find evidence that improvements in 
electoral competitiveness shape incentives to end the conflict (in a political environment in 
which the rebels are less popular than the civil war government).  
During Garcia’s early years in office, the scope of insurgency intensified (Council on 
Hemispheric Affairs, 2010). In 1985, at least four departments throughout Peru, including San 
Martin, Punu, Ayacucho, and Huanuco, became infiltrated by the Sendero Luminoso (De Izcue, 
2004, p. 53). The Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement also continued its civil war against the 
state after taking a short hiatus from violence in 1985 following an unsuccessful bid to win hearts 
and minds (De Izcue, 2004, p. 55). In 1987, the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement began 
targeting economic elites to take hostage, a move that further alienated the domestic public (De 
Izcue, 2004, p. 56). The Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement continued to infiltrate a handful 
of cities in the north (De Izcue, 2004, p. 56).  
In response to the severity of the domestic unrest, Garcia moved to forcefully curb the 
threat emanating from the Sendero Luminoso and Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement. 
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Under the approval of Garcia, the military undertook wide-scale counterinsurgency operations 
targeting rebel hotspots. In this capacity, the civil war government scouted out and executed 
alleged members and sympathizers of the both insurgent groups via “hit-squads” (Nieto, 2011, p. 
525).  
The counterinsurgency remained brutal in nature. During the course of the war, 
paramilitary groups arose to fight alongside the government. The civil war government’s 
counterinsurgency efforts were also aided by the self-defense organizations led by citizens 
(Holmes, 2001, p. 101). The counterinsurgency measures of Garcia resulted in a high number of 
casualties despite domestic support for the government. Nearly 70,000 people died in the 
intrastate conflicts between 1980 and 2000 (Ball, Asher, Sulmont, & Manrique, 2003, p. 7). Half 
of the casualties occurring toward the end of the 1980s were caused by the Sendero Luminoso 
(McClintock & Vallas, 2003, p. 69). Between 1980 and 2000, the government was responsible 
for one-third of wartime casualties (Ball et al., 2003, p. 7). President Garcia (as cited in Leger, 
1987a, p. H4) justified his military strategy against the rebels: “I don’t want to convert Peru into 
a police state, but (terrorism) is hurting the life of our citizens and the development of our 
economy.” Indeed, the term “accomplices of subversion” was used by Garcia when describing 
human rights organizations that criticized the nature of his counterinsurgency (as cited in 
Holmes, 2001, p. 103). 
7.3.10. Public Contempt Against Both Rebel Groups from 1985–1990  
Existing evidence continues to suggest that both rebel groups failed to achieve 
meaningful public support for their objectives. The political regime was by and large shielded 
from destabilization and breaking down given that the rebels lacked support from the general 
public (McCormick, 1993, p. 55). The Sendero Luminoso also had limited success in winning 
hearts and minds of the very groups it purported to represent, particularly the peasants. Indeed, 
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the movement’s popularity was even limited in the rebel stronghold of the Upper Huallaga 
Valley (Kent, 1993). Similar to early years, Kent (1993) finds that political parties and citizens, 
particularly peasants, opposed of the strategies employed by the Sendero insurgents in the city of 
Puno (p. 451). A poll conducted by Datum in 1986 (as cited in McClintock, 2001, p. 88) found 
that only 6% of respondents favored a socialist regime ruled by leaders who took power via 
force. For comparison, the same poll conducted by Datum found that 88% of respondents 
favored a system of government where leaders come into power via elections (as cited in 
McClintock, 2001, p. 88). In 1987, a little over 40% of Peruvians surveyed in a Datum poll (as 
cited in Leger, 1987a, p. H4) designated terrorism as the country’s top priority. A member of the 
government commented on the general unease amongst Peruvians caused by the rebels: 
“Everyone is afraid” (as cited in Leger, 1987b, p. H3).  
By the end of the 1980s, public support for the rebels continued to remain low despite the 
spread of both movements throughout Peru (Kent, 1993, p. 452). The Túpac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement was present in 62% of the country’s departments by 1988 
(McCormick, 1993, p. 38). In 1989, nearly 180 battlefield casualties were recorded in the civil 
war between the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement and the government (UCDP, n.d.-d). 
Indeed, by 1989, the armed conflict with the Sendero Luminoso threatened the lives of nearly 
50% of the population (Brooke, 1989). In April 1989, an insurgency attack by the Túpac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement, dubbed the Battle of Los Molinos, killed nearly 70 people. Most of 
those killed were rebel fighters (Reuters, 1989; Álvarez, Arroyo, Carhuallanqui, Copestake, 
Jaurapoma, Lavers, Obispo, Paúcar, Reina, & Yamamoto, 2008, p. 35). Public condemnation 
against the rebels soared following the deadly battle (Nieto, 2011, p. 519). Public disapproval 
against the Sendero Luminoso also became more salient by the end of the 1980s. In reference to 
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the Sendero Luminoso, an anonymous woman (as cited in Leger, 1989, p. H1) from Lima stated: 
“I think they should all be killed.”  
A military expert based in Peru, Enrique Obando, believes that the Túpac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement had at least 3,000 fighters by 1990 (as cited in Long, 1993). However, 
most assessments continue to find that the civil war government remained by and large more 
popular than the rebels by the early 1990s. Nearly 6,000 Sendero militants fought against the 
Peruvian state by the end of the 1990s (Palmer, 1992, p. 76). In explaining why the rebels had 
some sympathizers, one jobless Peruvian (as cited in Brooke, 1989) blamed the civil war 
government’s handling of the economy: “Prices go up and there is no work.” However, still, 
most of the public did not support the Sendero rebels. Ricardo B. Hernandez, a mayor, (as cited 
in Brooke, 1989, para. 26), explains that “[w]hile we have poverty, while we have unfair 
distribution of wealth, alternatives like Sendero will always rise up. Only economic 
development—water, sewers, schools—will take away the flags of Sendero Luminoso.” La 
Serna (2012) elucidates on the state of public opinion of the Sendero Luminoso by 1990, noting 
in particular how civilians even killed the rebels themselves (p. 171).  
7.3.11. Fujimori’s Unconsolidated Regime  
On April 8, 1990, Alberto Fujimori from the Cambio 90 party (a centrist-right party), 
won the presidential elections after nearly two-thirds of voters selected him at the polls in the 
runoff election (Rousseau, 2009, p. 47). During this time, the insurgent threat continued to 
persist. In the year 1991 alone, the Comisión Especial de Investigación y Estudio sobre la 
Violencia y Alternativas de Pacificación (as cited in Holmes, 2001, pp. 104) found that 1,428 
rebels—from both the Sendero Luminoso and the Túpac Amaru Movement—were killed during 
the armed conflicts, with the former group responsible for nearly two-thirds of the casualties. 
Similar to his predecessors, Fujimori continued to prosecute the war in hopes of defeating the 
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rebels. Tapia (as cited in Jaskoski, 2013, p. 43) identifies military manuals from 1991 that stated 
how the counterinsurgencies against the rebels were, “highly offensive and aggressive.” 
Moreover, Tapia (as cited in Jaskoski, 2013, p. 43) also notes that the same military manuals 
state “that the best subversive is a dead subversive; therefore, prisoners will not be taken.”  
During Fujimori’s second year in office, the executive branch engaged in turf wars with 
the judiciary and legislative branch over roles and responsibilities, eventually leading the 
president in 1992 to eradicate the checks and balance system, an event dubbed as the autogolpe12 
(Rousseau 2009, p. 37; Mauceri, 1997b, p. 901). Sources suggest that regime change occurred 
due to disputes between congressional members and Fujimori on economic reform and issues 
with corruption (rather than due to the armed conflict) (Mauceri, 1997b). Following the regime 
change, Fujimori established a considerably less inclusive regime: In this capacity, political 
powers of the president expanded and became the ultimate source of policymaking in the country 
(Rousseau, 2009, p. 49). Democracy hence became essentially defunct as a result of Fujimori’s 
institutional purges (Rousseau, 2009, pp. 49; Mauceri, 1997b, p. 901). Within military circles, 
allegations of a planned coup spread (Mauceri, 1997b, pp. 901-902).  
Although elections still remained in place, Thorpe and Parades (2010) conclude they 
were mostly a façade used protect the new regime, using the word “mockery” to describe them 
(p. 171). Levitsky (1999) also describes how electoral mechanisms of accountability at this time 
had weakened under Fujimori, noting how the civil war government replaced staff in top 
                                               
12 Despite returning toward a more autocratic form of government, Fujimori’s autogolpe received domestic support; 
a handful of public opinion polls (including from Datum and Apoyo) reported that over two-thirds of people 
surveyed approved of the coup (as cited in Conaghan, 1995, p. 236). Indeed, Fujimori’s popularity increased by 26 
percentage points following his authoritarian backsliding according to a Datum poll (as cited in Conaghan, 1995, p. 
236). To justify his authoritarian impulses, Fujimori leveraged the public opinion polls during his time in public 
office (Conaghan, 1995, p. 236).  
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electoral agencies with those who were committed to the incumbent and revised electoral 
regulations that disadvantaged rival parties from threatening the ruling party in power (p. 79).  
With regard to the war, Fujimori, like his predecessors, leveraged public contempt 
against the rebels to justify his administration’s unilateral wartime policy (CNN, 1997). The 
public generally condemn the waves of insurgent attacks carried out by the rebels (Arce, 2003).13 
As a response, Fujimori implemented a much more aggressive counterinsurgency operations 
against both the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement and the Sendero Luminoso. Under 
Fujimori, civilian-led armed militias became more powerful (Arce, 2003, pp. 575-576). The 
regime continued the tradition of the “hit squads” that began under the predecessor government 
(Nieto, 2011, p. 525). Finally, military courts, rather than civilian courts, became a key vehicle 
for punishing rebel recruits and their alleged sympathizers (Arce, 2003, pp. 575-576). In 1993, 
Fujimori remained steadfast in his military strategy against the rebels, stating that “winners of 
wars do not negotiate” (as cited in Burt, 2007, para. 5). This finding is contrary to my theoretical 
argument, which expected that leaders presiding over unconsolidated regimes are more likely to 
negotiate to consolidate power and to build stability for their institutions. 
The president remained confident that his staunch military approach against the rebels 
would lead to a military victory. In a statement made to the press in Chile, Fujimori affirmed: 
“No one here in Peru any longer doubts that the MRTA will be defeated this year” (as cited in 
Long, 1993). The counterinsurgency measures of the government not only curbed the number of 
rebel attacks but also led to key military triumphs for the state. Government forces apprehended 
                                               
13 Arce (2003) find that “a one-unit increase in guerrilla activities increased presidential approval for Fujimori by 
4.73 percentage points” (p. 580).  
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and later jailed the main leaders of the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement and the Sendero 
Luminoso in 1992 (Nieto, 2011, pp. 519-520).  
Fujimori’s victory over the rebels helped him secure a second term in office. In the 1995 
presidential elections, nearly two-thirds of voters cast votes for the incumbent (Mauceri, 1997b, 
p. 899). By 1995, about 6% of the total national vote went to the four main political parties that 
have historically dominated the political landscape (Crabtree, 1995, p. 1).  
However, Fujimori faced another crisis. During the end of 1996, prominent government 
officials were held captive by the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement at the embassy of 
Japan for nearly four months (Silke, 2001; Schemo, 1997; Nieto, 2011). The rebel group 
promised to release the hostages only if the government released its fighters who were in state 
custody (McClintock & Vallas, 2003, p. 73). Over the next few days, the Túpac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement set deadlines, but the government, with the support of the domestic 
public, refused to compromise. Diana Schemo, a journalist for The New York Times, describes 
how Fujimori “was loath to use the word ‘negotiations’ -- with the rebels” during the hostage 
standoff (Schemo, 1997, para. 33). Eventually, the rebels did not accept the civil war 
government’s proposals aimed at ending the hostage predicament (McClintock & Vallas, 2003, 
p. 73-74). When asked in an interview conducted by Lucia Newman in January 1997 about any 
possible peace negotiations with the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, Fujimori described 
how such an action had very little support domestically: 
This proposal is made by very, very few people from the opposition side. The majority of 
the opposition are supporting the government measure. We don’t agree in making an 
agreement in Peru, because MRTA or any terrorist group -- they are isolated groups. (as 
cited in CNN, 1997, para. 30)  
 
In a statement made during a press conference in Canada in February 1997, Fujimori (as 
cited in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1997) goes on to say: 
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Over the past several years in Peru, the people have observed reality—and those of you 
who are well versed with the situation in Peru, I am sure, will understand this—in Peru, 
we do not have guerrillas. There is no public support for terrorist acts. In other words, 
there is no support for terrorism which would provide a basis for a peace pact (Section I: 
“Opening Statement by President Alberto Fujimori of the Republic of Peru”). 
 
Fujimori also sought international assistance in the handling of the hostage situation 
(McClintock & Vallas, 2003; Faiola, 1997). The militaries of the United States government and 
Peru even worked together, often sharing intelligence with one another, to secure the release of 
the hostages (McClintock & Vallas, 2003, pp. 73-74).  
Eventually, the embassy was raided by armed troops following the orders of Fujimori. 
During the raid, fourteen rebels were killed by government troops (Silke, 2001, p. 59; Rochlin, 
2003, p. 74). Over two-thirds of citizens in Peru opposed any plan to free the captured Túpac 
Amaru Revolutionary Movement fighters (McClintock & Vallas, 2003, p. 73). In a press 
interview, Fujimori (as cited in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1997) affirmed his 
harsh stance against the rebels: 
To repeat myself, there will be absolutely no release of MRTA prisoners. For many 
years, we have suffered from terrorism in Peru. The incident this time is a single incident 
triggered by the MRTA, but we would not like to go back to the past. The international 
community should be fully convinced of the following: Some potentially dangerous 
people will not simply threaten the peace and security of Peru, but also may threaten the 
safety and security of the international community, and we shall not release such people. 
In this sort of incident there will not be a release of the prisoners. We cannot in any way 
release such incarcerated people. (Section III: “Questions and Answers”)  
 
After the government’s success with the hostage situation in 1997, nearly two-thirds of 
the public supported the president (Schemo, 1997). President Fujimori routinely leveraged public 
opinion in his justification for his unilateral military strategy against the Túpac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement. Fujimori’s military strategy against the rebels significantly paid off in 
terms of promoting security: Within eleven years (between 1989 and 1998), rebel violence fell 
by 90% (Arce, 2003, p. 576).  
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The electoral mechanisms of accountability weakened at this time; although the voting 
population could cast votes in the 2000 national elections, the electoral rules were stacked in 
favor of the president’s party. In fact, no opposition candidates ran against Fujimori in the 2000 
elections (Campbell, 2000). Although Fujimori came out victorious, the elections were 
designated as non-competitive by international standards (Cushman, 2000).  
7.4. Summary of Findings, Alternative Explanations, and Assessment of Theoretical 
Arguments  
The comparative case study traces the divergent experiences with negotiations for two 
cases. Although the Peruvian government never attempted peace talks with the Túpac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement or the Sendero Luminoso in the 1990s, the Mexican government 
engaged in negotiations with the Zapatistas after nearly six weeks since the start of the conflict 
(Muñoz, 2006). In Mexico, electoral mechanisms of accountability forced presidents to be 
accountable to the preferences of the public, which increased the costs of not negotiating with the 
rebels. Despite having a considerably smaller fighting force than the government, the popularity 
of the EZLN helped compensate for the group’s lack of military strength (Washbrook, 2005; 
Muñoz, 2006). In contrast, the balance of domestic support favored the democratic government 
in Peru because most citizens denounced the ideologies and the use of violence by the rebels, 
particularly the Sendero Luminoso (Palmer, 1992; St. John, 1984; Kent, 1993). I find no 
evidence that leaders who faced stronger accountability mechanisms were more likely than 
leaders who faced weaker accountability mechanisms (such as Fujimori) to consider a negotiated 
settlement to the war. I also find no evidence that rival political parties exploited the civil war 
government’s involvement in the armed conflicts to try and delegitimize the party in power in 
future competitive elections. All leaders in Peru leveraged public contempt against the rebels to 
continue to prosecute a bloody and protracted war. Indeed, all presidents were highly motivated 
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to secure a military victory against the rebels (Nieto, 2011). There also appeared to be consensus 
within the government and with rival political parties that leaders should take a tougher military 
stance against the rebels (Riding, 1986).  
Overall, I do not find evidence in the Peru case that improvements in electoral institutions 
exerted any effect on the decision to negotiate, a finding supported in my empirical component. 
Although it is reasonable to assume that leaders who face competitive elections should continue 
fighting wars when the rebels have less support than the civil war government—given that they 
will risk losing in subsequent elections for going against the preferences of the public— leaders 
who face weaker accountability mechanisms also benefit from continuing to prosecute civil wars 
when public support is in their favor. Domestic support allows unelected leaders (or leaders who 
face weaker electoral mechanisms of accountability) to mobilize recruits to fight on behalf of the 
government, which increases the civil war government’s chances of winning the war.  
Other theoretical arguments that have been advanced in the literature for affecting the 
decision to negotiate should be also assessed. One argument is that peace negotiations and peace 
deals should be more likely to occur in deadlier conflicts—as captured by the number of 
battlefield casualties (Urlacher, 2011; Ogutcu-Fu, 2016; Mooradian & Druckman, 1999). In 
Mexico, the civil war killed around 145 civilians (see Darling, 1994, p. A7; Edmonds-Poli & 
Shirk, 2012, p. 198), whereas in Peru, close to 70,000 people were killed in the armed conflicts 
with the rebels between 1980 and 2000 (Ball et al., 2003, p. 7). However, the Peruvian state did 
not enter into peace negotiations with either rebel group despite being involved in civil wars that 
produced far greater casualties. A second line of argument claims that conflicts fought during the 
post–Cold War period should be more likely to end in a political settlement than those fought 
during the Cold War period. The Peruvian state fought against the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary 
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Movement and the Sendero Luminoso during the Cold War period in the 1980s (Nieto, 2011). 
However, the civil wars with both rebel groups dragged on through the post–Cold War period. 
Although both the Mexican and Peruvian governments were fighting rebels in the 1990s, only 
the former entered into peace negotiations. A third line of argument focuses on the relative 
military strength of rebels compared to the government. Both the Mexican and Peruvian armed 
forces were stronger militarily than the rebels (see Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2012, p. 198; Nieto, 
2011, p. 520). Though this argument suggests that both governments should be more willing to 
fight than settle, this argument is unable to explain why the Peruvian government continued to 
fight the rebels whereas the Mexican government entered into peace negotiations. A fourth line 
of argument maintains that peace settlements are more likely to occur during wars in which there 
is a military stalemate (see Zartman, 1995, 2001). However, there was no evidence of a military 
stalemate condition in the Mexican context. Presumably, if this argument held, the Peruvian state 
should have entered into peace negotiations given that it fought a lengthier war with the rebels 
than the Mexican state. However, contrary to the expectations of this argument, the Peruvian 
state opted to just fight the rebels. The role of international pressure also requires attention. Both 
the Mexican and Peruvian governments were condemned by human rights organizations and for 
their wartime efforts (see Holmes, 2001, p. 103; Servicio Internacional para la Paz, 1998), yet 
this argument cannot explain why only the Mexican government entered into peace negotiations. 
A related argument focuses on pressure from the United States. In the Mexican case, the U.S. 
government preferred a political solution to the armed conflict with the EZLN (Muñoz, 2006) 
while in Peru, the U.S. government supported Fujimori’s wartime effort against the rebels 
(McClintock & Vallas, 2003). However, in the 1980s, the United States did not approve of the 
Peruvian state’s involvement in the war (McClintock, 2000). This argument cannot explain why 
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the Peruvian state continued to fight rather than settle with the rebels. Finally, the number of 
non-state actors also fighting the state differs between the two cases. The Peruvian state was 
battling the Sendero Luminoso alongside the Túpac Amaru Movement (Rochlin, 2003). The 
Mexican state only faced the EZLN. Civil war governments that are also simultaneously fighting 
other non-state groups and factions are expected to provide concessions to a rebel group as a 
strategy to reduce the war burden of the state (Driscoll, 2012; Cunningham, 2011). Given that the 
Peruvian state never entered into peace negotiations, the differences in the number of non-state 
groups fighting in each case does not threaten my argument.  
What about support for my theoretical predictions? The comparative case analysis 
provides moderate support for my theoretical arguments. In some instances, I am able to assess 
the validity of my hypotheses within individual cases. Recall that Hypothesis 1 stated that peace 
negotiations are more likely to occur when the rebels are at least as popular as the civil war 
government. In the Mexican case, I cannot refute this argument. Although it is unclear if the 
rebels enjoyed greater popular support than the civil war at the beginning of the war, it did 
appear that as the rebels increased their support over time, the government entered into peace 
negotiations. Across the two cases, the evidence also does suggest that relative popular support 
played an important role in the government’s decision to negotiate—Mexico and Peru had 
similar background factors but differed regarding the balance of popular support for the rebels, 
which may explain the variation in negotiation behavior. However, unlike in the Indonesia case, 
I do not find evidence that the government experienced steeper security costs in a political 
environment where the rebels had overwhelming popular support, including high costs for 
maintaining law and order during the pro-EZLN protests. A better explanation considers how 
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relative popular support and electoral mechanisms of accountability work together to influence 
the decision to negotiate, which is a test of Hypothesis 4.  
Recall that Hypothesis 2 posited that unconsolidated political regimes are more likely to 
engage in peace negotiations than consolidated regimes. However, only Mexico’s unconsolidated 
regime negotiated with the rebels (Muñoz, 2006). Mexico was an immature semi-democratic 
regime during the armed conflict (Haber et al., 2008). I find evidence that negotiations were 
attempted more under Salinas (in 1994-1995) than in subsequent years (Manaut et al., 2006) 
when democracy became more consolidated (Velasco, 2005). Under Salinas, the unconsolidated 
regime viewed an end to the war as critical for securing and protecting international support 
needed to stabilize the regime (Depalma, 1994a). The NAFTA agreement, in particular, was 
viewed as a critical source of international support by Salinas (Golden, 1993). Evidence suggests 
that continued war increased the risk that international support would end for the unconsolidated 
regime under Salinas, thereby increasing the benefits of negotiations (Depalma, 1994a). In Peru, 
I do not find support for Hypothesis 2, including any evidence that suggests that political leaders 
wanted to end the war to secure international assistance. The unconsolidated regimes that came 
into power in 1980 and 1992 did not engage in peace negotiations despite my theoretical 
predictions (Nieto, 2011; CNN, 1997; Long, 1993). The unconsolidated regimes not only 
continued their unilateral military strategy against the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement 
and the Sendero Luminoso but also implemented a more intense counterinsurgency strategy in an 
attempt to defeat the rebels (Long, 1993).  
Hypothesis 3 maintained that electoral institutions alone do not have an effect on peace 
negotiations. Both countries experienced improvements in their electoral mechanisms of 
accountability during their armed conflicts (see Haber et al., 2008; Morón & Sanborn, 2006), but 
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it was only in Mexico that peace negotiations took place. Hypothesis 4 maintained that 
regardless of the level of regime consolidation, stronger electoral institutions increase the 
probability of peace negotiations only when the rebels are at least as popular as the civil war 
government [and not when the civil war government enjoys more popular support than the 
rebels]. The comparative case analysis allows me to assess the strength of this hypothesis given 
that I have two conditions: a political environment in which the rebels enjoyed stronger domestic 
support than the civil war government (in Mexico) and a political environment in which the 
rebels enjoyed less domestic support than the civil war government (in Peru). In Mexico, the 
analysis revealed that the civil war governments negotiated following improvements in the 
competitiveness of elections (La Botz, 1995). Electoral mechanisms of accountability forced 
presidents in Mexico to be sensitive to the demands and preferences of the electorate, which in 
turn increased the costs of not negotiating with the rebels (see Scott, 1994; La Botz, 1995, 
Davison, 1994a). The PRI party risked losing power in the national government if it did not try 
and end the war (see Davison, 1994a; Scott, 1994; La Botz, 1995). In Peru, the government was 
more popular than the Sendero Luminoso or the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement. The 
Terry, Garcia, and Fujimori governments enjoyed the support of citizens who in general 
condemned non-state groups that resorted to violence and terrorism to achieve political goals (St. 
John, 1984; Leger, 1987a; Long, 1993). Fujimori, who faced weaker electoral mechanisms of 
accountability in the early 1990s, even leveraged public opinion to defend his counterinsurgency 
against the rebels (CNN, 1997). I find no evidence that stronger electoral institutions exerted any 
influence on the decision to negotiate in Peru.  
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7.5. Conclusion and Extensions  
The comparative case analysis reveals that the decision to negotiate is not always a 
function of coercive military power. In Mexico, the evidence shows that the civil war 
government had the military advantage, boasting 15,000 soldiers (La Botz, 1995, p. 9).  
The theoretical expectations of this dissertation may also be generalizable to other 
settings. A handful of Latin American and Central American countries such as Colombia, 
Guatemala and El Salvador, where electoral mechanisms of accountability improved over time, 
have attempted peace negotiations following shifts in the balance of popular support between the 
civil war government and rebels (Hammond, 1998; Peterson, 1997). The Colombian example 
was discussed in the theory chapter of this dissertation. The experience in El Salvador may be 
worth investigating. Throughout the 1970s, national elections in El Salvador were 
noncompetitive (Allison, 2006, p. 144). The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front 
(FMLN), a rebel group that fought a nearly decade-long war against the El Salvadorian 
government beginning in 1980, did not have strong domestic support throughout the 1980s—
according to Joes (2000), the insurgents failed to move the domestic public to take action against 
the civil war government  (p. 273). Elections became more competitive following a series of 
institutional changes in the 1980s (Almeida, 2008, p. 188). No peace negotiations, however, 
occurred between the government and the FMLN in the 1980s (UCDP, n.d.-e). 
 By 1989, the rebels reached a military impasse (Peterson, 1997, p. 38). During the 
stalemate, the rebels focused on forging relationships with the broader population and winning 
popular support through the provision of education and training (Hammond, 1998, p. 64). At the 
same time, the government’s use of indiscriminate violence against civilians helped the rebels 
win more supporters (Peterson, 1997, pp. 36-37). By the end of 1989, the armed conflict between 
the wartime adversaries resumed. At this time, the civil war government could not turn a blind 
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eye to the popularity of the rebels. Counterinsurgency operations against the rebels, which 
included the execution of members of the Jesuit community, hurt the reputation of the 
government domestically (Peterson 1997, p. 38). Peace negotiations eventually took place in 
1990 between the rebels and the government (Peterson, 1997, p. 38; UCDP, n.d.-e). The rebels 
continued to attract and recruit supporters following the events of 1989. The government and 
FLMN entered into another round of peace talks in 1990 under the auspices of the United 
Nations. In 1992, the peace negotiations culminated in a peace agreement, ending the decades-








CHAPTER 8.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
8.1. Introduction  
During armed conflicts, wartime adversaries must decide whether to continue the war in 
hopes of securing a victory or settle at the negotiating table. Rationally, each actor in conflict 
prefers victory over other potential outcomes; if victory is not possible, a peace agreement is the 
next best alternative (Mason et al., 1999). Under peace agreements,  wartime adversaries the 
opportunity to secure some level of political power in the government (Mason et al., 1999; 
Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003). 
 The determinants of peace negotiations, however, are not well understood in the extant 
literature. The small amount of literature that does exist mostly focuses on assessing how 
battlefield dynamics, particularly the military capacity of the rebels (see Hultquist, 2013) and the 
duration of armed conflicts (Zartman, 1995), affects the decision to settle. However, peace 
negotiations still occur in the absence of military stalemates, as illustrated in the Mexican case.  
Civil war scholars have only just begun to examine how other factors apart from the 
length of armed conflict and the fighting capacity affect prospects for peace negotiations (see 
Ogutcu-Fu, 2016; Urlacher, 2011). This research project intends to provide insights into the 
institutional and behavioral factors that are expected to shape incentives for dialogue. Overall, 
my findings tell a rather intricate story, which I will summarize in detail below.  
8.2. Recap of Project  
In this project, I presented a set of behavioral and institutional explanations that I argue 
matter for peace negotiations. My argument is examined via a cost-benefits lens from the 
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perspective of the civil war government. With regard to behavioral explanations, I evaluate under 
what conditions domestic support for insurgents influences when peace negotiations are more 
likely to occur. I also assess how characteristics of a country’s political regime shape the 
decision of the government to negotiate, including an evaluation of the behavioral factors that 
may modify the relationship. Two dimensions of a state’s political regime are undertaken for 
analysis in this research: 1) the institutional consolidation of the regime, and 2) the strength of 
electoral institutions. Overall, my findings here tell a rather intricate story. My project suggests 
that the effect of institutional variables may be shaped by the social-political context, in 
particular, the popularity of the rebels relative to the government.  
In this chapter, I will revisit the main findings of the project emanating from both the 
quantitative and qualitative component of this project. I will then discuss the implications of my 
findings in the extant scholarship on civil wars, including how my findings compare with similar 
work. Finally, I will provide avenues for future research.  
8.3. Summary of Findings and Assessment of Evidence in Support of My Theory  
Hypothesis 1 posited that peace negotiations are more likely to occur when the rebels are 
at least as popular as the state. In the empirical component, popular support plays a much more 
nuanced role than expected. There is no single, unconditional effect [constant effect] of relative 
popular support for the rebels on peace negotiations. The role of popular support for the rebels 
cannot be looked at in isolation from electoral institutions. In the qualitative component, I do 
find evidence that as the balance of popular support tipped in favor of the rebels in Indonesia, 
financial security costs allocated to the war and for the maintenance of law and order became 
exorbitantly high (TAPOL, 2003), leading the civil war government to negotiate (Schulze, 2004). 
However, in the comparative study, it appears that the role of popular support cannot be viewed 
in isolation from the electoral institutions, which I will discuss later below.  
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Hypothesis 2 posited that unconsolidated regimes are more likely to enter into peace 
negotiations than consolidated regimes. In the empirical component, I find strong evidence for 
this hypothesis. Indeed, the least consolidated regimes have nearly a .3 predicted probability of 
engaging in peace negotiations, a figure that is higher than most other predictors of peace 
negotiations. In the qualitative case analysis, including both the within-case analysis and the 
comparative case analysis, I find some support for Hypothesis 2. The strongest support for 
Hypothesis 2 comes from the within-case analysis covering the Indonesian state’s experience 
with the Free Aceh Movement. Peace negotiations never took place under Suharto’s 
consolidation regime (Stanton, 2016; Baikoeni & Oishi, 2016). Boasting strong support from 
security institutions, Suharto opted for a strict military strategy against the rebels (Stanton, 
2016). Following regime change, however, the unconsolidated regime sought a political solution 
to the war (Schulze, 2004). Evidence also suggests that the civil war government under the 
unconsolidated regime placed a greater premium on building and developing the institutional 
apparatus of the unconsolidated regime than prosecuting civil wars (AP Archive, 2015). A 
termination of the conflict via negotiations would allow leaders of the unconsolidated regime to 
protect current international assistance from the foreign oil sector operating in the country and to 
secure further international support (Coll, 2012). In contrast, the consolidated regime was 
unfazed by the possibility of an end to international aid (Stanton, 2016). The regime had already 
developed a strong institutional framework for its political system (Mietzner, 2018). Even when 
other countries cut foreign aid to Suharto, the consolidated regime continued to prosecute the 
war (TAPOL, 1992; Stanton, 2016; Baikoeni & Oishi, 2016). In the Mexican case study, an end 
to the civil war would allow the unconsolidated regime to secure international support and 
realize its goal of becoming a global economic player (Depalma, 1994a; Scott, 1994). However, I 
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do not find support for Hypothesis 2 in the case study on Peru. The unconsolidated regime that 
came into power in 1978 not only continued its unilateral military strategy against the Túpac 
Amaru Movement but also implemented over time a more vicious counterinsurgency strategy in 
an attempt to defeat the rebels. Moreover, Fujimori’s unconsolidated regime in 1992 continued 
to prosecute the war rather than opt for dialogue with the insurgents (Nieto, 2011; CNN, 1997; 
Long, 1993). 
Hypothesis 3 maintained that stronger electoral institutions alone do not have an effect on 
the civil war government’s decision to negotiate. In the empirical component, there is no single, 
unconditional effect of electoral institutions on peace negotiations. The effect of electoral 
institutions depends on whether the rebels are at least as popular as the government or not. When 
the rebels are at least as popular as the government, there is a statistically significant effect of 
stronger electoral mechanisms of accountability on peace negotiations. However, when the 
government is more popular than the rebels, there is no statistically significant effect of electoral 
institutions on peace negotiations. Hypothesis 4 maintained that regardless of the level of regime 
consolidation, stronger electoral institutions increase the probability of peace negotiations only 
when the rebels are at least as popular as the civil war government. I find strong support for this 
conditional hypothesis across all models in my empirical analysis. Countries that have the most 
competitive elections have a .3 predicted probability of engaging in peace negotiations when the 
rebels are at least as popular as the civil war government. The size of this probability is higher 
than those for other predictors of peace negotiations, including relative rebel strength. I find no 
evidence that electoral institutions matter for peace negotiations when the civil war government 
is relatively more popular than the rebels.  
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I find some support for Hypothesis 4 in the qualitative chapters. In Indonesia, I am unable 
to assess to assess the effects of electoral institutions in a political environment in which the civil 
war government enjoyed more popular support. However, I do find evidence that improvements 
in democracy increased the probability of negotiations in a political environment in which the 
rebels enjoyed more popular support than the government. When popular elections were 
implemented in the late 1990s in Indonesia, government leaders negotiated when citizens 
overwhelmingly sympathized with the rebels (Miller, 2009). As the competitiveness of elections 
increased, particularly during the first half of 2000, the government continued to negotiate, even 
intensely at times (Baikoeni & Oishi, 2016). The comparative case analysis vindicates 
Hypothesis 4. In Mexico, the analysis revealed that improvements in electoral competitiveness 
incentivized political incumbents of the PRI-led government to negotiate. The PRI party risked 
losing its power in the national government, and in local elections, if it continued to prosecute 
the war rather than offer concessions to the EZLN (Scott, 1994; Davison, 1994a; La Botz, 1995). 
In the Peruvian case, in which the government enjoyed more popular support for its political 
system—democracy—than those advanced by the rebels (Palmer, 1992), I do not find evidence 
that electoral institutions exerted any effect on the government’s decision to negotiate.  
8.4. Academic Implications  
 This research project provides the following contributions to the civil wars and conflict 
resolution literature. First, and noticeably, this literature adds to the scant scholarship that 
focuses on assessing other factors, apart from the military strength of rebels and the length of 
armed conflict, that shape a government’s decision to engage in peace negotiations with the 
violent opposition (see Ogutcu-Fu, 2016; Urlacher, 2011). Second, this research provides 
synergies with several other research projects examining how political regimes shape conflict 
behavior (see Biswas, 2006; Stanton, 2016). Biswas (2006) finds that, contrary to her 
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expectations, older regimes are less likely to enter into peace negotiations and sign peace 
settlements following peace negotiation attempts. My empirical analysis, while focusing on the 
consolidation of the regime as the theoretical construct of interest, also supports the empirical 
findings in Biswas (2006).  
Although Biswas (2006) finds that democratic countries are more likely to enter into 
peace negotiations than authoritarian countries, it is unclear what component of democracy 
drives the results. My study examines a specific institutional arrangement—electoral 
institutions—and also considers the potential modifying effect of behavioral indicators (relative 
popular support for rebels) on the onset of peace negotiations. My study hence examines 
interactions between political variables and public opinion. In doing so, my research finds a more 
complex and nuanced story regarding under what conditions electoral mechanisms of 
accountability affect negotiation behavior.  
My research also provides synergies with work conducted by Stanton (2016). Her 
research finds that unstable regimes, defined as regimes that have recently undergone regime 
change, are more likely to be careful in the ways they fight wars given the potential for a loss in 
international assistance. Specifically, Stanton (2016) focuses on the unconditional effect of 
democracy on a handful of outcome variables related to violence and human rights abuses 
against civilians, including the government’s use of terrorism against civilians during wars and 
massacres. However, it is unclear what component of democracy leads incumbents to reduce the 
use of violence against civilians during armed conflict. 
Finally, my research on behavioral explanations also provides synergies to research 
conducted by Ogutcu-Fu (2016) and Lieberfeld (1999). Using a bivariate probit model, Ogutcu-
Fu (2016) finds no evidence that domestic support for the violent opposition increases the 
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probability of peace negotiations. My empirical analysis finds that there is no single, 
unconditional effect of popular support on peace negotiations. Rather, popular support cannot be 
viewed in isolation from electoral institutions. However, I do find some evidence from my case 
studies that shifts in the balance of popular support in favor of the rebels affects the decision-
making calculus of the government. Recall that I found evidence in Indonesia that the costs of 
maintaining law and order became too high for the civil war government, which reduced the 
costs of engaging in peace negotiations (TAPOL, 2003). Lieberfeld (1999) also finds support 
that popular support for rebel groups increases the security costs for the state, which increases 
incentives for wartime belligerents to end the armed conflicts in his case studies on South Africa 
and Israel.  
8.5. Recommendations for Future Research  
A number of possibilities for future research exist. First, future studies can assess the 
effects of my behavioral and institutional variables on different stages of the peace process, 
including the reaching of a peace settlement and the implementation of a peace agreement. This 
study only looks at the beginning stages of the peace process (the decision to negotiate). 
Policymakers will benefit from understanding whether the same institutional and behavioral 
factors exert effects on subsequent stages of the peace process and the successful termination of 
war. In the peace agreements literature, the scholarship has not thoroughly scrutinized how 
characteristics of political regimes influence the durability of peace following the signing of 
peace agreements. The vast majority of civil war scholars have restricted their attention to 
examining the content and implementation of peace agreements (see Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003) as 
well as the role of third parties in ensuring peace (see Walter, 1997, 2002). We know very little 
about how different characteristics of a state’s political regime affect the duration of peace 
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following armed conflict. The relationship between political regime type and these outcomes, 
however, can be the subject of additional research. 
Second, additional qualitative research can assess the soundness of my theoretical 
arguments. Research can conduct more case studies across a greater number of civil wars, which 
also helps enhance the external validity of the findings. Given data availability, studies should 
also be conducted to see how changes in rebel support in authoritarian countries affect the civil 
war government’s decision to negotiate.  
Third, future research can assess if other political characteristics of the regime affect 
prospects for peace negotiations and peace settlements. In particular, research can assess the 
effects of institutional constraints on the decision-making power of the incumbent and the degree 
of political fractionalization in the civil war government on these outcomes. Given that peace 
negotiations are a complex undertaking, one can expect that the reaching a peace agreement may 
be more difficult if the consensus of many actors in government is needed to change policies 
(Urlacher, 2011). Changing wartime policies entails transaction costs, but these costs might be 
higher when the approval of a multitude of actors is needed to create new policies (Urlacher, 
2011; Tsebelis, 1999).  
Characteristics of the executive leaders themselves may also influence peace processes. 
The same theoretical logic for unconsolidated regimes may also apply for new leaders. Possibly, 
longer-tenured leaders may be more likely to continue to prosecute armed conflicts—and hence 
less likely to negotiate—given that these rulers have already strengthened their political 
legitimacy and hence face less opportunity costs for continuing the war. In contrast, shorter-
tenured leaders are more likely to have less inclusive domestic support networks, including from 
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politically relevant actors in society, and hence may be more willing to negotiate with the 
opposition to create and nurture legitimacy for their leadership (Thyne, 2012; Urlacher, 2013).  
Future work can focus simultaneously on the institutional characteristics of states and 
rebel groups. Although rebel groups are not authoritarian or democratic per say—especially 
given that they by definition employ violence in an attempt to induce political change—many 
rebel groups do run their own political wings and political committees. The Sinn Fein is the 
political branch of the IRA (Pruitt, 2007, p. 1520). In the EZLN, constituents had a strong role in 
the decision-making of the group. In other rebel organizations, leaders assume power via 
elections by their constituents (Cunningham & Sawyer, 2016; Cunningham & Sawyer, 2019). A 
research agenda has recently emerged that focuses data collection on the institutional features of 
rebel groups overtime (see Heger & Jung, 2017). Future research can benefit from greater data 
on the institutional characteristics of rebel groups over time to assess their effects on the decision 
to negotiate and reach a peace settlement.  
8.6. Final Thoughts on Civil Wars  
Civil conflicts continue to cause overwhelming human suffering and loss of human life. 
Although the number of conflicts fought between countries has decreased, the number of intra-
state conflicts has been on the rise (Petersson & Wallensteen, 2015). Indeed, in recent years, the 
nature of the conflicts themselves have transformed significantly; they are deadlier and involve 
many players, including different countries (Petersson & Wallensteen, 2015). As these conflicts 
continue to wreak havoc, policymakers continue to seek solutions to end them. Peace 
negotiations at least afford wartime belligerents the opportunity to seek peace and prevent further 
casualties. This research project serves as an endeavor to better understand why peace processes 
occur during conflict, an important first step to ending war.  
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APPENDIX. VARIABLES AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS  
Table A.1. Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for Rebel Characteristics  
 Rebel Strength Rebel Mobilization Capacity  
Rebel Strength14 







Table A.2. Mixed-Effects Logistics Regression—Effect of Unpopular Wars and Popular Support for Rebels on 
Regime Change, Log-of-Odds Coefficients Reported 
 
   (1) 
   Regime Change  
Rebel Supporta(t-1) 0.740 
  (0.454) 
Conflict Durationb  -0.176 
  (0.199) 
Casualtiesa(t-1) 0.036 
  (0.057) 
Rebel Strengtha(t-1) -0.395 
  (0.973) 
ELF -0.058 
  (0.138) 
GDP per capitab(t-1) -0.326 
  (0.412) 
Prior Negotiationsa -0.001 
  (0.483) 
NSAs(t-1) 0.053 
  (0.207) 
Cold Wara  -0.183 
  (0.362) 
Territorial Conflicta  -0.448 
  (0.485) 
Constant  -1.203 
  (3.356) 
Country random intercept variance 3.428* 
  (1.883) 
Dyadic random intercept variance  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Obs. 1258 
No. Dyads 
No. Countries  
189 
56 
Standard errors are in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 ; a=dichotomous variable; b=logged variable 
                                               
14 Data for the Rebel Strength variable is from Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009) 
15 This variable is from Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013). In this project, I call this variable Rebel 
Support in my empirical analysis.   
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Table A.3. Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression—Effect of Democracy on Peace Negotiations for 
New Regimes, Log-of-Odds Coefficients Reported 
 
   (1) 
   Negotiations 
Democracy 0.067 
  (0.044) 
Rebel Supporta(t-1) 0.940** 
  (0.429) 
Conflict Durationb 0.527** 
  (0.218) 
Conflict Intensitya(t-1) -0.104 
  (0.409) 
Relative Rebel Strengtha(t-1) 0.844 
  (0.587) 
Territorial Conflicta 0.613 
  (0.564) 
ELF 0.057 
  (0.131) 
GDP per capita b(t-1)  -0.166 
  (0.382) 
Prior Negotiations a 0.714** 
  (0.345) 
NSAs(t-1) 0.149 
  (0.164) 
Cold Wara -2.754*** 
  (0.460) 
Constant -1.166 
  (3.323) 
Country RI* Variance 1.882* 
  (0.989) 
Dyad RI* Variance  0.882 
  (0.580) 
Obs. 573 
No. Dyads 
No. Countries  
125 
43 
Standard errors are in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; a=dichotomous variable; b=logged variable 
RI*: Random Intercept 
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Table A.4. Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression, Using Continuous Measure of Battlefield Deaths 
(logged variable), Log-of-Odds Coefficients Reported 
 
   (1) 
   negotiation 
Regime Age -0.044*** 
  (0.012) 
Elections -0.019 
  (0.110) 
Rebel Supporta(t-1)  -0.318 
  (0.733) 
Elections*Supporta(t-1) 0.269** 
  (0.135) 
Conflict Durationb 0.708*** 
  (0.191) 
Casualtiesb(t-1) 0.002 
  (0.047) 
Rebel Strengtha(t-1) 1.167* 
  (0.660) 
Territorial Conflicta  0.296 
  (0.478) 
ELF 0.009 
  (0.111) 
GDP per capitab(t-1) -0.062 
  (0.331) 
Prior Negotiationsa 0.799*** 
  (0.270) 
NSAs(t-1) 0.194 
  (0.145) 
Cold Wara -2.539*** 
  (0.322) 
Constant  -2.155 
  (2.671) 
Country RI* Variance 1.331* 
  (0.761) 
Dyad RI* Variance  1.770*** 
  (0.649) 
Obs. 1197 
No. Dyads 




Standard errors are in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; a=dichotomous variable; b=logged variable  





Table A.5. Regression results for Restricted Model: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression on Peace 
Negotiations, Log-of-Odds Coefficients Reported (Parsimonious Models without Controls) 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   negotiation  negotiation  negotiation  negotiation 
Rebel Supporta (t-1) 1.060***   0.015 
  (0.359)   (0.676) 
Regime Age  -0.026***   
   (0.009)   
Elections   0.258*** 0.116 
    (0.077) (0.103) 
Elections*Support    0.205* 
     (0.122) 
Constant  -2.270*** -1.335*** -2.968*** -2.824*** 
  (0.341) (0.286) (0.495) (0.590) 
Country RI* Variance 1.612** 1.235* 2.706** 2.311** 
  (0.717) (0.632) (1.089) (0.957) 
Dyad RI* Variance 1.611*** 1.775*** 1.791*** 1.612*** 
  (0.530) (0.549) (0.582) (0.538) 
Obs. 1194 1194 1194 1194 
No. Dyads 










Standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 ; RI*: Random Intercept 
 
 
Table A.6. Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression using Same Sample, Log-of-Odds Coefficients Reported (With Control Variables) 
 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 








































































































































































   -0.045*** 
(0.012) 






             
Elections   0.173** -0.021   0.164* 0.018 0.130 -0.025 -0.017 




    
0.318** 
(0.155) 
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NSAs (t-1)     0.231 0.162 0.232 0.253* 0.230 0.214 0.186 
      (0.147) (0.145) (0.150) (0.149) (0.147) (0.146) (0.143) 
 
Cold Wara  
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